

L'INSTITUT

Nouvelle résidence pour étudiants par Kengo Kuma

DOSSIER

Democracy at Risk



THE
GRADUATE
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INSTITUT DE HAUTES
ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES
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GRADUATE INSTITUTE
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JOURNÉE PORTES OUVERTES À L'INSTITUT à l'occasion de la réunion annuelle des alumni

→ Maison de la paix, chemin Eugène-Rigot 2, 1202 Genève

Vendredi 3 novembre 2017

18:30 – 20:00 Table ronde
WHAT FUTURE FOR THE UN?

Samedi 4 novembre 2017

13:00 Visite du Campus de la paix
Stands des initiatives d'étudiants de l'Institut

14:00 – 15:15 Table ronde
L'UNION EUROPÉENNE ET LA CRISE DES RÉFUGIÉS:
ENTRE RHÉTORIQUE ET RÉALITÉ

15:30 – 16:45 Table ronde
L'AFRIQUE: LES DÉFIS DE 2050

17:00 – 18:15 Table ronde
NORTH KOREA: A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL SECURITY?

Inscriptions:
→ <http://graduateinstitute.ch/portes-ouvertes-2017>

Le programme complet destiné aux alumni se trouve sur le site:
→ <http://graduateinstitute.ch/alumni2017>

ÉDITORIAL

Bienvenue à nos étudiants

Philippe **Burrin**
Directeur de l'Institut



Dans tout établissement d'enseignement, la rentrée d'automne est un moment de grande animation. Les nouveaux étudiants font connaissance avec les lieux, les enseignants, l'administration ; chacun s'emploie à jeter les bases d'une relation qui sera souvent durable. Pour une institution comme la nôtre, c'est aussi un grand moment de satisfaction. Car c'est le monde qui vient à nous. Si une proportion substantielle de nos étudiants sont Européens, un quart d'entre eux proviennent de l'Amérique du Nord et du Sud, un quart de l'Asie, et un peu moins de 10 % de l'Afrique – ce qui est bien insuffisant.

Dans un monde européen et nord-atlantique tenté par le repli et la fermeture, nous formons une communauté cosmopolite, et nous en sommes fiers. Cette communauté est à l'image de la planète, une dans sa diversité, partageant les mêmes défis. Notre défi à nous est d'attirer davantage d'excellents étudiants de partout, en particulier d'Afrique, d'Amérique latine et d'Asie, là où se trouvent les réservoirs démographiques de l'humanité. Pour ce faire, l'aide financière est essentielle.

Au cours de la dernière décennie, nous avons fait de grands efforts et multiplié par dix notre soutien. L'an passé, alors que les bourses rapportaient 3,4 millions de francs, nous avons apporté à nos étudiants, sous forme de bourses complètes (18 000 francs par an) ou partielles et

de dispenses d'écologie, une aide pour un montant de 5,2 millions de francs, la différence provenant des revenus de la Maison des étudiants Edgar et Danièle de Picciotto, et bientôt de la nouvelle résidence dessinée par Kengo Kuma (voir p. 4), ainsi que de dons philanthropiques. De son côté, la communauté de l'Institut se mobilise une fois par an pour recueillir le montant nécessaire à une bourse complète, dans un geste de solidarité remarquable.

Nous faisons beaucoup, nous devons faire plus. Il en va de notre avenir comme institution qui souhaite préparer des jeunes gens à affronter le monde de demain. Il en va du rôle de Genève et de la Suisse dans le champ de la coopération mondiale, dont le besoin se fait toujours davantage sentir. Nous comptons sur nos anciens étudiants, sur nos amis, sur tous ceux qui ont à cœur la formation d'acteurs internationaux indispensables dans un monde plein de défis et de menaces.



L'INSTITUT

Une nouvelle résidence pour étudiants sur un projet de l'architecte Kengo Kuma

L'Institut entreprend la construction d'une résidence pour étudiants qui lui permettra d'ajouter 700 lits aux 250 lits de la Maison des étudiants Edgar et Danièle de Picciotto. Il participe, ce faisant, à la création d'un nouveau quartier au sommet de la route de Ferney qui comprendra le siège de Médecins sans frontières et des logements pour fonctionnaires internationaux. Avec son mixte de logements, de bureaux, de commerces et d'espaces arborisés à côté d'un arrêt du futur tramway allant à Ferney-Voltaire, ce quartier sera tout entier ouvert sur l'international.

Le terrain de la résidence a une superficie de 10 000 mètres carrés et possède un magnifique dégagement sur le lac Léman et le Mont-Blanc. La construction est rendue possible grâce au soutien extrêmement généreux d'une fondation privée genevoise. Son apport comprend le terrain, sur lequel l'Institut aura un droit de superficie gratuit de 99 ans, ainsi que les fonds propres nécessaires à l'obtention d'un financement bancaire. Un concours d'architectes a eu lieu durant l'été auquel une trentaine de bureaux du monde entier ont été invités à participer. Sur les 25 dossiers reçus, tous de qualité, le jury en a retenu 6 qui provenaient des bureaux suivants : Kengo Kuma (Tokyo et Paris), Kéré Architecture (Berlin), Miralles Tagliabue (Barcelone), Pictet Architecte (Genève), Schmidt Hammer Lassen (Copenhague) et Zaha Hadid Architects (Londres).

Après audition des concurrents, le jury a retenu le projet de Kengo Kuma qui a séduit par sa force, sa sobriété et son élégance. Il présente un concept très original de résidence qui invite ses habitants à la circulation, à la rencontre et à l'échange grâce à une promenade qui monte le long de la façade autour de la cour intérieure

formée par deux corps de bâtiment reliés par une passerelle. Vers l'extérieur, la résidence projette une image tout aussi spectaculaire par de grandes ouvertures regroupant sur plusieurs étages les cuisines communes superposées. Le projet de Kengo Kuma propose, en outre, des toitures libres avec une création intéressante d'espaces ouverts et accessibles ainsi qu'une réflexion élaborée en matière de protection solaire et de consommation d'énergie.

La réalisation de la nouvelle résidence a une importance toute particulière pour l'Institut. Venant s'ajouter à la Maison de la paix et à la Maison des étudiants Edgar et Danièle de Picciotto, elle marquera l'aboutissement du Campus de la paix, qui ira du parc Mon-Repos aux hauteurs du Grand-Saconnex et dotera l'Institut d'une infrastructure dont peu d'établissements universitaires bénéficient actuellement. Elle produira des revenus qui lui permettront de poursuivre son essor en dépit des limitations des finances publiques et d'accomplir sa vocation d'établissement postgrade formant des acteurs internationaux de haut niveau. Et surtout, en facilitant à d'excellents étudiants du monde entier leur séjour à Genève, elle favorisera en retour le recrutement d'excellents professeurs, ce qui renforcera la densité et la qualité de l'offre d'éducation disponible dans une région lémanique en plein dynamisme.

Ce projet s'inscrit dans la stratégie de l'Institut de constituer une fortune immobilière dont les revenus viennent compléter la subvention publique et lui donnent les moyens de poursuivre son essor. Avant tout, il lui permet d'offrir un lit à tous ses étudiants et d'attirer ainsi des jeunes gens doués du monde entier.



Kengo Kuma et son associé, Javier Villar Ruiz.

Présent à Tokyo et Paris, professeur à la Graduate School of Architecture de l'Université de Tokyo, Kengo Kuma a acquis une réputation mondiale par des œuvres marquées par la réinterprétation de la tradition japonaise et qui se reconnaissent notamment par l'effort d'intégrer la nature dans la ville. En Europe, il a réalisé le Conservatoire de musique et de danse d'Aix-en-Provence et l'immeuble « Under One Roof » de l'EPFL. Il a été choisi pour construire le principal stade des Jeux olympiques d'été qui se tiendront à Tokyo en 2020.





L'INSTITUT

L'Université de Genève et l'Institut créent un double master en santé

Philippe Burrin
(à gauche) et
Yves Flückiger.
Olivier
VOGELSANG/
Tribune de Genève

Le Global Studies Institute (GSI) de l'Université de Genève et l'Institut proposent désormais un double master dans le domaine de la santé.

Ce programme s'adresse à des étudiants inscrits au master en affaires internationales ou en études du développement de l'Institut et aux étudiants inscrits au master en santé globale du GSI. Il leur propose de combiner leurs études avec un master de l'autre institution et de devenir des spécialistes de la santé globale tout en acquérant une compréhension élargie des affaires internationales ou des questions de développement. Les candidats retenus pourront ainsi obtenir deux diplômes de master en trois ans au lieu de quatre. Deux étudiants de l'Institut et deux étudiants du GSI inaugureront le programme dès cette rentrée académique.

« L'idée est de former les professionnels de la santé aux besoins de demain », indique le professeur Antoine Flahault, responsable du master en santé globale du GSI. « L'étude et la pratique de la santé globale deviennent de plus en plus complexes et interdisciplinaires. La connaissance d'un certain nombre de disciplines en lien avec la santé globale telles que l'épidémiologie, l'économie de la santé, la gouvernance, la diplomatie, le droit et l'anthropologie est essentielle pour naviguer avec autorité et confiance dans ce domaine », complète Gian Luca Burci, professeur associé de droit international à l'Institut et ancien conseiller juridique de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS).

Ce programme s'inscrit dans une perspective plus large, comme l'indique Yves Flückiger, recteur de l'Université de Genève : « Avec la présence de l'OMS, de toute une série d'organisations non gouvernementales et du Campus Biotech, nous avons les moyens de densifier notre apport à la Genève internationale. Sur le thème de la santé, Genève peut s'affirmer stratégiquement dans un domaine porteur. »

Philippe Burrin, directeur de l'Institut, précise que « ce programme doit être vu comme une contribution au développement en Suisse romande d'une "Health Valley", analogue à la Silicon Valley, qui s'appuiera sur les compétences des universités, des organisations internationales et du secteur privé ».

Depuis de nombreuses années, l'Institut propose déjà un LLM en santé globale en partenariat avec l'Université de Georgetown, à Washington.




L'INSTITUT

Les programmes d'été fêtent leurs dix ans

Entretien avec Jasmine Champenois, responsable des projets stratégiques et de l'innovation

Pourquoi les programmes d'été ont-ils été créés ?

L'objectif était de permettre à des étudiants en cours de bachelor ou de master en sciences sociales de se familiariser avec les études internationales et le monde des organisations internationales et non gouvernementales à Genève, à travers un programme d'enseignement intensif durant l'été. En dix ans, plus de mille étudiants du monde entier ont participé aux programmes d'été et d'hiver et obtenu des crédits reconnus.



Jasmine Champenois.

Que font les programmes pour mettre en valeur la Genève internationale ?

Les programmes traitent de sujets importants de la Genève internationale, tels l'humanitaire, les droits de l'homme, le commerce international, les migrations et la santé globale. Ils permettent aux participants de rencontrer des praticiens d'organisations comme les Nations Unies, l'Organisation mondiale du commerce, l'Organisation mondiale de la santé, le Haut Commissariat pour les réfugiés ou encore le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge. Des débats menés en petits groupes offrent aux étudiants l'opportunité de dialoguer avec des professionnels de terrain. Les étudiants bénéficient également d'un programme culturel et de sorties qui leur permet de découvrir Genève et la Suisse et de créer des liens durables entre eux.

Quel est le profil des étudiants et pourquoi viennent-ils ?


Les étudiants représentent plus de cent nationalités différentes. Près de la moitié d'entre eux poursuivent un bachelor en sciences sociales et se montrent aussi intéressés par nos programmes postgrades : presque 20 % postulent à l'un des programmes de master de l'Institut par la suite. Les programmes d'été accueillent également des étudiants de master ou de doctorat et des jeunes professionnels venus découvrir pour les uns (étudiants en médecine ou ingénieurs par exemple) les disciplines des études internationales et du développement et pour les autres (personnels des milieux juridiques ou financiers, fonctionnaires internationaux, diplomates fraîchement nommés) le fonctionnement des organisations internationales à Genève.

Comment l'Institut se situe-t-il dans ce domaine par rapport aux autres universités ?

Nombreuses sont les universités qui proposent des écoles d'été. L'offre de l'Institut se distingue car elle mélange à la fois des enseignements académiques d'excellence, des ateliers interactifs avec des praticiens, ainsi que des visites des organisations basées à Genève. Les participants disent que cette expérience leur ouvre les yeux sur les opportunités qu'ils pourront saisir dans leurs projets de carrière internationale. Ils sont nombreux à rester en contact avec l'Institut pour la suite de leur parcours académique.

Dans les prochaines éditions, nous allons justement développer les ateliers de conseil en orientation et les compétences entrepreneuriales pour contribuer au développement de ces jeunes participants très motivés.

L’Institut étend son réseau international



Désireux de développer ses échanges avec d’autres institutions universitaires, l’Institut a signé trois nouveaux partenariats académiques qui entrent en vigueur, pour la plupart, dès cette rentrée académique.

Un accord avec l’Université Northwestern à Chicago porte sur un échange au niveau du doctorat. Chaque année, deux étudiants de doctorat de certains départements de l’Institut (anthropologie et sociologie, histoire internationale, relations internationales/science politique) pourront faire un séjour de trois mois à une année académique à l’Université Northwestern. Selon Grégoire Mallard, professeur adjoint d’anthropologie et sociologie, celle-ci est « l’une des plus prestigieuses universités pour ses activités de recherche. Les étudiants de l’Institut pourront interagir avec ses professeurs, réputés pour l’originalité de leur approche et leur aptitude à sortir des limites de leur discipline. » En retour, deux étudiants de l’Université Northwestern pourront venir étudier à l’Institut.

Un autre accord a été signé avec l’Université pontificale catholique de Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), qui permettra aux étudiants d’obtenir un diplôme de master des deux institutions en trois années au lieu de quatre. Après avoir fait une première année à PUC-Rio dans le master en

relations internationales, quatre étudiants au maximum pourront être admis à l’Institut pour effectuer les deux années d’un master interdisciplinaire (master en affaires internationales ou en études du développement). Cette initiative s’appuie sur un accord qui permet déjà aux étudiants de master de l’Institut de passer un semestre à PUC-Rio et vice-versa.

Enfin, l’Institut étend son réseau au Japon en signant un accord avec une deuxième université nipponne. Deux étudiants de master ou de doctorat de l’Institut pourront passer un semestre à l’Université Sophia à Tokyo et vice-versa. Fondée en 1913, cette université privée fait partie des institutions académiques japonaises les plus illustres. Avec 206 accords d’échange dans 42 pays, l’Université Sophia accueille chaque année plus de 1500 étudiants internationaux. L’Institut compte déjà un partenaire de longue date au Japon, la Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies de l’Université Waseda à Tokyo, une autre université privée de renom.

Grâce à cette politique, l’Institut renforce sa présence dans le monde et enrichit sa communauté d’étudiants qui compte déjà plus de 100 nationalités.

Islam and the Question of Violence

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou
Professor of International History



FRANCE, Paris. People gather at Bastille Square during a rally organised by the Coalition against Racism and Islamophobia. 14 March 2015. NurPhoto/Michael BUNEL

The surge of radical Islamist attacks has brought to the fore the question of Islam and violence. As terrorist attacks performed by extremists claiming an Islamic heritage multiplied across the globe, and as armed conflicts featuring such association played out in a number of countries in the Middle East and in Africa notably, interrogations increased as to the reasons for the vicinity of violence with the religion of Islam. In spite of the widespread condemnations of the violence by the vast majority of Muslims (approximately 1.9 billion individuals in 50 Muslim-majority countries), many of whom launched initiatives explicitly denouncing the assaults (such as #NotinMyName), the question nonetheless lingered whether Islam did not in fact encourage violence. The explicit or implicit presence of this perceived association led in time to the spectacular rise of Islamophobia in the United States and in Europe and the adoption of unprecedented discriminatory Islam-specific official regulation as in the case of the so-called Muslim Ban introduced by the Donald Trump administration in January 2017 – as well as ethnic cleansing actions against Muslims in Myanmar and in the Central African Republic.

The persistence of such a stance towards Islam amongst widening media, policy and societal sectors, and the absence of genuine political will to counter it beyond rhetorical pronouncements (both in the North and in the South), have

led to the problematic normalisation and the tacit acceptance of what is in effect a misleading and ahistorical shortcut that must be registered. Islam is no more a violent religion than Christianity or Judaism, or other faiths for that matter, are. It features violence today because many Muslim countries (in Nigeria, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan) are going through unresolved postcolonial state-building processes involving political and communal competition between different groups. Colonialism, which was often led by Western missionaries, was, in that respect, a political project, not a Christian one. Seeking religious explanations for political or social violence – even when it instrumentalises religion – is reductionist and, in this case, exceptionalises violence otherwise present in variegated forms throughout the history of most religions. Going beyond facile explanations, we can see that the terrorism wave of the 2010s is fundamentally linked to those unresolved conflicts in the Middle East, just as the terrorism wave of the 1970s was for instance the product of societal tensions in Western Europe. Beyond Islam itself, religion is making a comeback in international affairs and it is this resurgence that must be contextualised, but without double standards.

■ Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou’s new book, *A Theory of ISIS: Political Violence and the Global Order*, is out in November 2017 from Pluto Press (UK) (distributed in the USA by the University of Chicago Press).



LES PROGRAMMES ASSOCIÉS

La recherche au service de la paix

Entretien avec Thania Paffenholz, directrice de l'International Peace and Transition Initiative

L'Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (IPTI), un programme associé de l'Institut, a été créée en 2015. Que faites-vous ?

L'IPTI est spécialisée dans l'étude des processus de paix et de transition politique. Plus particulièrement, nous analysons l'inclusion de différents acteurs dans la résolution des conflits et des crises politiques. Notre recherche se fonde sur la plus vaste base de données qualitatives dans le domaine, développée depuis 2011 à l'Institut : plus de 40 études de cas de processus de paix, de réforme politique et de rédaction de constitution, s'appuyant sur des entretiens avec des centaines d'experts.



Thania Paffenholz.

Dès le départ, notre démarche a reposé sur la conviction que la recherche doit guider l'action politique et que les chercheurs ont la responsabilité d'établir des ponts avec les sphères décisionnelles.

Comment aidez-vous vos partenaires à accomplir cette transition vers la paix ?

Nous travaillons autour de quatre axes, à commencer par le soutien aux processus de paix et de transition politique. Dans ce cadre, nous conseillons des parties au conflit, des groupes de la société ainsi que des acteurs engagés dans des négociations en tant que garants ou médiateurs. La plupart de ce travail est confidentiel. En Colombie, nous avons à la fois conseillé le gouvernement sur l'organisation de consultations publiques lors du processus de paix avec les FARC (Forces armées révolutionnaires), travaillé avec l'Ambassade de Suisse à Bogota et conseillé l'Église catholique colombienne sur la mise en œuvre de son programme pour la paix. En Syrie, au Yémen et en Libye, nous avons fourni des conseils sur l'organisation des négociations en collaboration avec les bureaux des envoyés spéciaux des Nations Unies.

La recherche est notre deuxième axe de travail. Nous développons constamment notre base de données et menons des projets de recherche pluriannuels visant à enrichir l'état actuel des connaissances sur les processus de paix. Nous offrons également un service d'assistance de recherche, un *helpdesk*, aux gouvernements et institutions ayant besoin d'obtenir rapidement des informations scientifiques sur un processus de paix ; nous avons ainsi réalisé une

AFGHANISTAN.
Activistes de la
société civile.
US Institute of
Peace

étude pour un partenaire étatique lors du dernier cycle de négociations avec les FARC. Enfin, nous sommes engagés dans des collaborations de recherche avec certaines organisations internationales. Nous menons ainsi pour la Banque mondiale une analyse du lien entre l'inclusion et la prévention de conflits violents. De même, nous produisons sur la demande du Département des affaires politiques des Nations Unies un rapport sur les « dialogues nationaux », un type de négociation particulièrement inclusif.

Le troisième axe de travail consiste à aider la communauté internationale à atteindre des objectifs tels que ceux du développement durable. Dans le cadre des Nations Unies, nous contribuons à des examens officiels de politiques internationales ainsi qu'à certains débats de l'Assemblée générale. Bien que cela ne représente qu'une dimension de notre recherche, nous avons été très sollicités au sujet du rôle des femmes sur la scène internationale : nous avons participé à l'examen de la mise en œuvre de la résolution 1325 de l'ONU sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité, nous aidons le gouvernement suédois à mettre en place sa politique étrangère féministe, et nous accompagnons de nombreux groupes de femmes dans leurs missions de construction de la paix.

Notre dernier axe est le partage des connaissances avec le public, au travers d'événements, de publications

en ligne et de formations. Nous construisons en outre un portail interactif contenant les témoignages de différents acteurs impliqués dans des négociations de paix.

Comment voyez-vous le développement de l'IPTI dans les prochaines années ?

L'IPTI de demain continuera d'étudier la paix sous de nouveaux angles, de penser des solutions aux conflits hors des sentiers battus et d'établir des ponts entre la recherche et la politique. J'espère voir l'initiative grandir encore davantage en taille et en ambition.

Nos priorités sont les suivantes : élargir notre base de données et trouver des moyens innovants de collecter des informations au niveau local ; continuer de soutenir activement les processus de paix internationaux et se donner les moyens d'être plus proactifs à ce niveau ; consolider la réputation de l'IPTI en tant qu'institution de référence en matière de recherche et de conseil sur les processus de paix ; sécuriser de nouveaux financements qui nous offrent une vraie stabilité institutionnelle ; et renforcer encore davantage notre collaboration avec l'Institut et la Maison de la paix.

→ www.inclusivepeace.org

Dossier produced in collaboration with the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy and based on *Global Challenges* (no. 2, 2017), The Graduate Institute's series of research dossiers.
→ <http://globalchallenges.ch>

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DEMOCRACY AT RISK





DEMOCRACY AT RISK

DEMOCRACY AT THE CROSSROADS

Dominic Eggel
Research Office

MEXICO, Mexico City. A woman walks by as police officers stand guard during a farmers' march in Mexico City. 8 August 2017. Bernardo MONTOYA/AFP/Getty Images

In what has been described as a “decade of decline” (2006–2016) for liberal democracy, freedom has been continuously eroding all over the world. More than 20 years after Francis Fukuyama’s triumphant celebration of the “end of history”, it seems that liberalism, both economic (free trade) and political (pluralism, civil liberties, constitutional safeguards), is in serious crisis. In 2015, Turkey ranked last among electoral democracies in Freedom House’s index. The Arab Spring has given way to widespread disillusion and violence. In Latin America, several democracies have regressed on the slippery slope towards cronyism (Brazil) and authoritarianism (Venezuela, Bolivia). Asian democracies are facing trouble too, as illustrated by a regain in nationalist rhetoric (Japan), endemic corruption (South Korea) and outright illiberalism (the Philippines).

What is equally a cause for concern is that democracy is on the defensive in its Western heartland. The Economist’s Democracy Index in 2016 downgraded the United States, the beacon of democracy for much of the modern era, to a “flawed democracy”.

Deep disenchantment with democracy is sweeping Eastern and Central Europe as Hungary and Poland dismantle constitutional rights and civil liberties. Populist leaders in Western Europe are calling for similar measures.

Despite such alarming signs, however, democracy remains perhaps the most successful political idea in modern history. In 2015, it was the most widespread form of government in the world, with largely “free and fair” electoral processes in place in 125 countries. Even liberal democracy’s detractors such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Narendra Modi, Viktor Orbán, Vladimir Putin, Rodrigo Duterte, Beata Szydło and Donald Trump have all been elected by majorities and praise their own democratic credentials. Outright autocratic regimes such as China, Cuba and North Korea call themselves democracies too.

We thus face a paradox: while electoral democracy continues to be acclaimed everywhere, a series of indicators measuring political and civic freedom show it to be in deep trouble. The key to this paradox may well reside in the notion of “illiberal democracy”, first coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997.

According to Zakaria, what is fundamentally at stake is not democracy but liberalism. Since liberal democracy for many has come to stand for democracy *tout court*, it is now seriously challenged by the new phenomenon of illiberal democracies on the ascendency.

Illiberal democracies are best characterised as regimes elected by a popular majority but striving to undermine constitutional safeguards, the rule of law, and civil liberties. Adopting a winner-takes-it-all approach (*volonté générale*), they discriminate against ethnic, religious and/or sexual minorities in the name of the majority. They tend to concentrate power in the executive in a process of constitutional re-engineering that co-opts or corrodes the judiciary (Hungary, Poland), the legislative (Venezuela), or both (Russia). They weaken civil society by reverting to a set of “authoritarian best practices” including media censorship and state propaganda. They mobilise resentment and anxieties by constructing enemies, both external (migrants, the European Union) and internal (NGOs, human rights activists). Political opponents are intimidated, publicly

vilified (“lock-her-upism”) or subjected to repression by the arbitrary application of purposefully vague laws—often antiterrorism legislation. The final step in consolidating illiberal democracies

legitimisation (referenda, plebiscites), while striving to maintain an illusion of pluralism.

A number of potential causes may be identified behind the recent surge

“While electoral democracy continues to be acclaimed everywhere, a series of indicators measuring political and civic freedom show it to be in deep trouble.”

consists in emasculating the electoral process: not by rigging elections—which usually remain free and fair—but by loading the dice long in advance.

In marked contrast to more full-blown authoritarian regimes, however, illiberal democracies do not yearn for the total control of society. Selectively repressive, they seek regular popular

of illiberal democracies. First, younger generations show signs of historical amnesia as they are no longer cognisant of the totalitarian horrors of the 20th century. Second, a generalised sentiment of insecurity and occupational angst in a fast-changing world has estranged people from the political elites in their own societies. Third, the

social media revolution, coupled with postmodern epistemic uncertainty, has ushered a new era of “post-truth politics” with little space for rational dialogue. Fourth, as the United States retreats from its traditional role of global harbinger of democracy, rivals like China and Russia have been quick to put forth alternative models deemed more competitive, or morally righteous. Fifth, and finally, since its emergence in the Age of Enlightenment, liberalism (freedom) has entertained a complex and tension-riddled relationship with democracy (equality). Liberal democracy, as the 20th century has shown, is an utterly fragile construct.

The question remains how illiberal democracies are likely to evolve in the 21st century. Will they stabilise and become a permanent fixture of geopolitics? Or, on the contrary, will liberal democracy prove resilient and keep the upper hand?

To answer these questions, the present dossier investigates seven case studies from around the world, starting from the premise that illiberal democracy is best represented on a continuum ranging from first worrying signs as in Trump’s America to more advanced authoritarian regimes as in Putin’s Russia—with many shades and nuances in between.

RUSSIA: HAUNTING WESTERN DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATION

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If a Martian were sent to earth with the secret mission to figure out the trends of world politics, he would certainly be puzzled by the outsized role that Putin’s Russia plays in the 21st century imagination of the West. Almost half of the Americans tend to believe that Moscow rigged the 2016 US presidential election; many Europeans suspect that the Kremlin shapes public opinion in their countries; and some of the leading Western media outlets insist that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is the world’s most influential political leader. While in the beginning of this century Russia was viewed as a mixture of failure and banality, today in the minds of many it has mutated into the model of the world to come.

Frankly speaking, neither Russia’s brutal annexation of Crimea, nor its military involvement in Syria or aggressive meddling in American elections could sufficiently explain the obsession of the West with Russia. Russia suffers from low European-level birth rates and almost African-level life expectancy. Its population has one of the highest percentages of university-educated people, but with the lowest labour productivity per hour worked in the industrialised world. The country is profoundly corrupt and though President Putin is a strong leader, the prospects of Russia’s development after him are highly uncertain. So why then is the Western political imagination so obsessed and preoccupied by Russia?

The answer can be found in Dostoevsky’s novel *The Double*, the story of a low-level clerk who ends up in the madhouse after meeting his double, a man who looks like him, talks like him, but who displays all the charm and self-confidence that the tortured protagonist profoundly lacks. When it comes to Russia, the West feels like Dostoevsky’s protagonist in the presence of his double. However, while in Dostoevsky’s novel the double looks like a person that the protagonist

from the past, now it looks like an ambassador coming from the future. Russia is a classic example of a non-democracy functioning inside the institutional framework of democracy. It is a regime in which periodic pseudo-competitive elections are instruments for dis-empowering, not empowering, citizens and the electorate’s voice is not heard. Could it be that competitive elections in the West – shaped by the manipulative power of money, disfigured by growing political

“Russia is a classic example of a non-democracy functioning inside the institutional framework of democracy.”

always wanted to be, for the West Russia has become the double the West fears it could become. While some years ago Russia was perceived by the Western public as a shadow coming

polarisation and emptied of meaning by a lack of genuine political alternatives – resemble Kremlin-engineered elections more than we like to think? Could it be that the global spread of



RUSSIA, Tuva. Russian President Vladimir Putin (left), accompanied by defence minister Sergei Shoigu, guides a boat during his vacation in the remote Tuva region in southern Siberia. Between 1 and 3 August 2017. Alexey NIKOLSKY/ AFP/Getty Images

democracy signals not the liberation of the masses but the liberation of elites from the electorate? Moreover, Russia provides the most radical example of the feudalisation and the incoherence of the state in the age of globalisation. Inside Russia’s deep state, different departments or agencies – the ministries, the police, the prosecutors, and so forth – may seem irresistibly dominant to ordinary citizens but they spend much of their time fighting each other, often over the control of liquid assets, and face no real incentive to cooperate. Such a loose-knit and conflict-ridden state can neither impose itself consistently on society nor respond intelligently to social pressures and demands. What disturbs Western observers is that while reasons for the growing incoherence of Western states do not necessarily resemble the factors shaping the Russian case, the trend is similar. The loss of a shared national purpose radically undermines the interoperability,

or capacity for rationally guided cooperative action, of increasingly fragmented state institutions worldwide. Significantly, the Russian experience also sheds light on the global phenomenon of “superfluous people” produced by a worldwide movement for the liberation of the rich. Russia is an impressive example of the global trend toward growing economic inequality in the 21st century. But at the same time Putin’s Russia is, in a sense, a socialist utopia: only nature is exploited! Russia’s ruling class did not enrich itself by exploiting labour but by privatising the public patrimony, especially the country’s hydrocarbon industry. Ordinary Russians do not even seem to them to be worth exploiting. Rather than trying to dominate or control their fellow citizens, the privileged few have simply turned their backs on them. This strikingly new Russian pattern of *spoliation and neglect* tells us much more about what is going wrong in the West today than does the older

pattern of *repression and exploitation* characteristic of most illiberal and undemocratic societies in the past. Russia is a classic case of how a handful of very rich and politically unaccountable self-enriching rulers have, despite internal rivalries, managed to stay atop the country’s fragmented society without resorting to historically high levels of violence. This political model, neither democratic nor authoritarian, neither exploitative in the Marxist sense nor repressive in the liberal sense, is an image of the future that should keep us awake at night. In short, what causes anxiety in the liberal West is not that Russia will run the world, but that much of the world will be run the way Russia is run today. What is disturbing is that the West has started to resemble Putin’s Russia more than we are ready to acknowledge.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRAJECTORY OF DEMOCRACY

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Almost 200 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville published *De la démocratie en Amérique*, putting the intellectual seal of approval on the idea of US-style democracy as a model for other parts of the world. Tocqueville's analysis went far beyond formal institutions and laws to the normative underpinnings of participation, equality, and voluntary association. Arguably, it is these norms which, in spite of the numerous evils in American history – from slavery and the destruction of the

what Louis Hartz called a “new society”, one without an hereditary aristocracy, with vast fertile lands only thinly settled by peoples who could easily be swept aside, and with oceans and distracted great powers protecting it from invasion, was mostly elided by those who drew inspiration from the democratic norms they saw flourishing in the United States. Indeed, even the most scathing political critics of the United States found themselves having at least to quote, perhaps to finesse, or, horrors,

20th century, other factors were added: economic and military power, language, universities, popular culture, and the sheer omnipresence of the mass media. These in turn led to a sort of path dependence, in which elites in other countries acquired the habit of looking to the United States for ideas about participation and transparency, not to mention the details of certain types of legislation, administrative arrangements within organisations, the setting up of advisory bodies, and, of course, many other facets of US society unrelated to democratic norms. The fact that many of those elites in other countries had themselves been educated in the United States, understood English, and had grown up consuming US popular culture, further reinforced this habit. Thus, even if many US political ideas, such as its 18th-century constitution or its insistence on first-past-the-post voting rules, were no longer imitated, the habit of looking to the United States, perhaps copying certain of its practices, but in any case using those practices as an argument for certain policies, remained alive and well. Not even the presidency of George W. Bush, with its hanging chads, invasion of Iraq, and heartbreaking incompetence on Hurricane Katrina, could stamp out that habit: numerous US expatriates can attest to being congratulated by complete strangers after the election of Barack Obama in 2009.

One would like to imagine that this changed after Trump assumed the

“The United States was a democratic inspiration also because of its protest movements.”

indigenous population to plutocracy, support for foreign dictators, and the tyranny of the majority mentioned by Tocqueville himself – served as a cynosure for people and countries around the world.

The normative power of US democracy was that it was an ideal which, somehow, had been concretised. That this had occurred in the situation of

to adopt outright, features of what they imagined to be American democracy. From attempts at extending the franchise through to legislation modeled on the Freedom of Information Act, US democratic norms continued to serve as a model.

At first, this influence stemmed from the obvious contrast between the US experience and that of Europe. In the



ARIZONA, Phoenix, USA. President Donald Trump speaks at a “Make America Great Again” rally. 22 August 2017. Nicholas KAMM/AFP/Getty Images

presidency in 2017. To some degree it did, as elites lowered their expectations for US policy and focused instead on short-term coordination with their American counterparts. But this is to ignore the enormous boost that Trump's talking points, and the aides he appointed, gave to xenophobic and authoritarian forces around the world. It is no accident that European advocates of immigration restrictions and crackdowns on the press, the judiciary, and dissenting voices lauded Trump, even before election night; by the same token, there is clear mutual admiration between Trump and various autocratic leaders. In effect, the United States is still a model, albeit an antidemocratic one.

This, however, is not the end of the story, or even of the current episode. We would do well to recall that the United States was a democratic inspiration not only, or even primarily,

because of its constitution, its relatively broad electorate, its legislative arrangements, or its free press, but also because of its protest movements. The story of Gandhi being inspired by Thoreau's essay on civil disobedience is well-known, but this is only the tip of the American iceberg. For example, trade union struggles (which resulted, among other things, in the choice of 1 May as International Workers' Day), antiwar protests, and the multiple strands of protests for civil rights (most famously the Civil Rights Movement against racial injustices) each had a marked influence on analogous activities in numerous countries. The point is not that protest movements in the United States served as models elsewhere: some did, but in other cases, influence ran in the other direction. Rather, the fact that protests did occur in the United States, in the face of well-known antidemocratic barriers, was itself significant to activists

in other countries. As one South African campaigner put it, “When the sit-ins started in the USA, I felt I was there. We read the news eagerly and identified unconditionally with those who were demanding their basic rights.”

Thus, the jury is still out on whether or not the United States, under Trump, will become an antidemocratic model. In the end, what matters is not so much what Trump does as what his fellow citizens do in response.



DEMOCRACY AT RISK

TURQUIE : LE VIRAGE AUTORITAIRE D'ERDOĞAN

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Religion et politique dans le monde contemporain

TURQUIE, Ankara. Des manifestants brandissent des drapeaux turcs sur la place Kizilay lors d'un rassemblement contre le coup d'État manqué du 15 juillet. 10 août 2016. Adem ALTAN/AFP/Getty Images

Souvent avec une joie mauvaise, constat est fait du retour de la Turquie à ses vieux démons autoritaires. Et l'Europe d'éprouver un lâche soulagement de se voir enfin débarrassée de la venimeuse question de son élargissement à l'Anatolie.

Car la Turquie de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan a rejoint le camp des « démocraties illibérales » dès lors que l'élection de Nicolas Sarkozy à la présidence de la République française, en 2007, a rendu illusoire toute perspective d'adhésion à l'Union européenne. Face à Ankara, Bruxelles n'avait plus de moyen : ni carotte, ni bâton. Il s'est ensuivi un glissement autoritaire du

pouvoir, de plus en plus personnel, du président turc. Celui-ci, en quelques années, a brisé l'échine politique de l'armée, des médias, de son alliée la néoconfrérie de Fethullah Gülen, de la représentation parlementaire des régionalistes (ou nationalistes) kurdes, de l'opposition civile, libérale et écologique qui s'était manifestée dans l'ensemble du pays en 2013. Ahmet Insel a été le premier à parler alors de la « poutinisation », ou de l'« orbanisation », de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Jusqu'aux élections législatives de juin 2015, le président Erdoğan pouvait se targuer du soutien du corps électoral. Mais il perdit alors la

majorité absolue des sièges, et se lança dans une périlleuse fuite en avant. Il manœuvra, au prix d'une reprise de la guerre civile dans le Sud-Est, pour obtenir la convocation de nouvelles élections, en novembre, et les gagner. Après la tentative de coup d'État de juillet 2016, il perdit toute limite. Il se fit tailler une Constitution présidentielle à sa démesure. Le Parti de la justice et du développement (AKP) est à sa botte. La liberté de la presse a été de facto abolie. Les législatives de novembre 2015 et le référendum constitutionnel d'avril 2017 se sont déroulés dans un climat d'intimidation policière et

judiciaire. Fait peut-être unique depuis 1950, ils ont été entachés de soupçons de fraude. Des purges de masse balayent la police, l'armée, la magistrature, l'université, l'ensemble de la fonction publique et les partis d'opposition.

Le retour de flamme autoritaire est d'autant plus impressionnant que le bilan démocratique d'Erdoğan, les cinq premières années de son exercice du pouvoir, n'est pas négligeable. Aucun dirigeant turc n'était allé aussi loin dans la reconnaissance, culturelle et politique, du fait kurde, et n'avait osé ouvrir des négociations avec le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK). Aucun autre n'avait aussi nettement remis en cause la conception ethnoconfessionnelle de la citoyenneté. Enfin, son accession au pouvoir symbolisait une alternance au profit des « Turcs noirs », que les « Turcs blancs » laïcistes avaient marginalisés depuis les années 1920, en même temps qu'elle abrogeait l'ordre constitutionnel contraignant hérité du coup d'État militaire de 1980.

Comment expliquer ce retournement ? Seuls les adeptes de la « transitologie » peuvent s'en étonner. La formation de la démocratie n'a jamais été linéaire. La thèse de l'agenda antidémocratique caché, qu'aurait de tout temps caressé le président, ne résiste pas à l'examen. Quelles qu'aient été ses intentions secrètes, le vrai problème est celui du rapport de force qui s'est noué entre les tenants de l'autoritarisme et ceux de la démocratie. Or, l'Europe s'est gardée d'appuyer les seconds, tout en versant des larmes de crocodile sur la lenteur des « réformes ». Comme à l'époque de la Guerre froide, elle préfère au fond les certitudes de l'autoritarisme aux

aléas de la démocratie pour confier à la Turquie le sale travail : jadis, la lutte contre le communisme, aujourd'hui, l'endiguement des migrants. Le PKK n'a pas plus joué la carte libérale, balançant entre le recours aux armes et la négociation des petits arrangements autoritaires avec Erdoğan. La réaction des autres partis d'opposition a été inepte et en porte-à-faux

annihiler toute forme d'opposition évoque les grandes purges qui avaient suivi la révolte de Cheikh Saïd, en 1925. Son répertoire est celui du nationalisme, ou plutôt du national-libéralisme qui entend assurer le contrôle politique du néolibéralisme, comme en Chine ou en Russie, en Hongrie ou en Pologne. Ce à quoi nous assistons, c'est à la résurgence

“L’erreur serait
d’imputer à l’islam
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avec la nouvelle Turquie, née de dix ans de pouvoir AKP, mais aussi de profondes transformations économiques et sociales. Enfin, le piège de la guerre d'Irak et de Syrie s'est refermé sur Ankara, et a dramatisé la question kurde.

L'erreur serait d'imputer à l'islam la responsabilité de la restauration autoritaire en Turquie. Même si Erdoğan puise dans les ressources du conservatisme musulman pour étayer sa légitimité, il recourt surtout aux vieilles recettes du régime kémaliste. Son conflit avec les *fethullahci* montre qu'il impose lui aussi la primauté de l'État sur le pluralisme religieux. Son instrumentalisation de la tentative de putsch et de la dissidence kurde pour

d'une *situation autoritaire* dont les origines remontent à l'absolutisme d'Abdul Hamid II, au Comité Union et Progrès, au parti unique de l'entre-deux-guerres, aux régimes militaires des années 1960-1980.

Ces précédents historiques dénotent aussi, paradoxalement, l'enracinement de l'idée démocratique en Turquie. L'exercice du suffrage universel l'a régulièrement réhabilitée. De ce point de vue, les résultats du dernier référendum ont été sans appel : malgré le matraquage de la propagande de l'AKP, le non l'a emporté dans les grandes villes qui lui étaient jadis acquises, y compris à Istanbul, le fief de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan depuis les années 1990.

ORBÁN'S LAWFARE AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

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Heineken beer, the Helsinki Committee and the Central European University in Budapest have recently all been the object of the Hungarian government's unfavourable attention. It tried to ban the beer on the pretext that the red star on the can was a totalitarian symbol, to restrict the workings of the well-known NGO, and passed a new law designed to close the renowned private university, whose fate still hangs in balance.

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán embodies the reactionary populist politics gaining ground in many parts of the world. In a well-publicised speech in 2014 he had declared with pride that his country was an "illiberal state", and asserted later that the Trump revolution happened in Hungary, the country that led the global backlash against liberalism. Extolling the virtues of the nation, church and family, Orbán has positioned himself as the defender of Christian Europe against hordes of Muslim migrants. With Orbán taking a leaf out of Putin's authoritarian book, and Poland currently modelling itself on Hungary, one may well ask if illiberal democracies are there to stay in Central Europe.

Between 2010 and 2013 the government led by Orbán enacted some 700 laws that rolled back economic liberalisation: property rights were selectively whittled away and vast

tracts of EU-subsidised agricultural land redistributed to party functionaries. Policies, which initiated a massive recentralisation of economic and political power, were devised to benefit domestic businesses with close ties to the ruling Fidesz Party. The systematic subversion of checks and balances followed a careful design of "lawfare", i.e. legislation passed in ad hoc fashion without public scrutiny or proper legislative deliberation. First, a new constitution was enacted that weakened all checks on majoritarianism. Next, the system for nominating judges to the Constitutional Court was altered to subvert the independence of the judiciary. Then, the electoral framework was changed to make it impossible for any other party to win. The National Election Commission was brought under Fidesz control to curb civil society referenda. Further, by appointing only high party officials to the office of the President, Orbán ensured that presidential powers would not be used to block governmental initiatives. Finally, new laws were enacted to guarantee political control of all media through a regulatory agency exclusively manned by party loyalists. At their own peril can the European Union (EU) and European People's Party (EPP) continue to turn a blind eye to this transformation of the "rule of law" into "rule by law".

A new law assaulting academic freedom, passed in unseemly haste in April 2017, threatens the very existence of the Central European University (CEU), whose professors were called "officers of an occupying army" by former Fidesz Minister Péter Harrach. The discriminatory law targeting the CEU is of a piece with the systematic erosion of the autonomy of all universities in the country. Hungary has seen state expenditure on higher education systematically decline since 2010, with a reduction of 25% between 2010 and 2013. Large funding cuts at all Hungarian state universities have paved the way for the installation of government-nominated "chancellors" tasked with making managerial decisions but de facto determining academic appointments. The result is an alarming decline in student enrolment, which fell by 24% between 2010 and 2014 and a staggering 45% in 2016 alone.

Orbán's government has embarked on a programme of nationalising science, founding, notably, the National University of Public Service, a training ground for the new cadres of the regime. The governor of the Hungarian National Bank has, tellingly, utilised the bank's resources to establish a new economics university in his hometown, whose curriculum includes his own theories. With channels of social



“Between 2010 and 2013 the government led by Orbán enacted some 700 laws that rolled back economic liberalisation.”

mobility within the country blocked, 600,000 of the better educated have exited in the past four years. Their voice is now missing from domestic politics. Emigration can thus become an avenue to eliminate unwelcome critics. But liberal democracy cannot survive in the absence of free public debate and spaces of dissent, which autonomous universities provide. It needs strong, financially independent counter-majoritarian institutions, which advocate diverse, even unpopular, positions. The 70,000 demonstrators marching through Budapest last April, chanting "Free country, free university" in support of the CEU, clearly recognised this, while the state television ignored them, broadcasting instead a programme praising fishing in Hungary.

Democratisation is evidently not the linear, teleological process that

modernisation theory, and its reincarnation, the postcommunist transition paradigm, would have us believe. Nor is democracy inevitably coupled with liberalism. The EU may be in no position to influence the course of illiberal, majoritarian, elected regimes in Russia, India, Venezuela, or the United States. But whether illiberal democracies take root in Europe will depend in large measure on whether the EU and the

EPP continue to tolerate with impunity Viktor Orbán's undermining of separation of powers, erosion of civil and political liberties, transforming Hungary into a "mafia state" — a term coined by the former Hungarian Minister of Education Bálint Magyar. Reactionary ideologies and authoritarian rule often take root as much due to their popular appeal as to the opportunism and hypocrisy of their liberal opponents.

HUNGARY, Buda Hill. Locals take an oath in front of a national flag of the 1956 revolution (the tricolor with a hole) during an induction ceremony of the far-right Jobbik party. 25 August 2007. Attila KISBENEDEK/AFP/Getty Images

REINVENTING AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa thickened the authoritarianism plot. Since democratising change appeared at long last to be making headway across the region, initial forecasts seesawed between hopes for sustained transitions and doubts about their viability. Often either unrealistic, impatient expectations, or fatalistic and deterministic pessimism, such prognoses were nonetheless logical analytical outgrowths of observation of post-authoritarian systems. In earlier cycles, or so-called “waves” of democratisation, the push towards representative systems was understood to be a linear process.

While emphasising the complexity of the transition process and its inherent pitfalls, these assumptions and predictions still functioned on a generic logic of a forward movement. In South-Western Europe in the 1960s, in Latin America in the 1970s and in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, the sequence had been thus – illustrated by push-and-pull contests and resistance but within an overall drive for transformation. Doubts about the paradigm were already being expressed in the early 2000s, revealing a proliferation of “uncertain regimes”, “semi-democratic regimes”, “competitive authoritarianism”, “façade democracy” and “illiberal

democracies”, which should have given cause for caution.

When between 2012 and 2017 the revolts in the Middle East and North Africa turned, for the most part, into violent civil wars in Libya, Yemen and Syria and the expected changes failed to materialise, culturalist explanations proliferated, arguing that the region was “unprepared” for democracy. Side-stepping the encouraging signs in Tunisia and in Morocco, these interpretations missed the key transformation that the post-Arab Spring had yielded, namely an authoritarianism redux, albeit one that was not only novel and hybrid but also internationally connected. The new-old authoritarian regimes of the Middle East reasserted themselves in at least three innovative ways: (1) by appearing to embody change while crushing it; (2) by securing international support for, or tolerance of, their campaigns, and (3) by, more insidiously, sowing doubts amongst their populations about the need for, and value of, democracy.

Firstly, unable to halt the rebellions, the regimes in Egypt, Syria, Yemen and across the Gulf gave the axiom “If you can’t beat them, join them” new meaning. They, however, neither adopted the values of the democratisers nor co-opted them – as they had done in the earlier 1990s cosmetic democratisation phase.

Instead they revised the narrative to represent themselves as the promoters of the “real” change needed in these societies. Nowhere was this better exemplified than in Egypt where Abdelfattah al Sisi forcibly replaced Mohamed Morsi as president, while criminalising him and his supporters and conjuring up the image of a “new Nasser”. Similarly, in Syria, Bashar al Assad – amidst the widespread murderous repression of his opponents and a large-scale civil war – continued to claim to be the candidate for “a new democratic Syria”. In Turkey, reacting both to the continuing Gezi Park– and Taksim Square–centred protests since May 2013 and a failed military coup attempt in July 2016, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan jeopardised the country’s decade-long promising political transition heralded as a model in the region.

This unapologetic rebranding of authoritarianism in the Middle East was, secondly and more importantly, engineered through a message sent to Western governments and societies that support or tolerate the repressive actions of these hybrid regimes as key to regional stability and the “security” of the West. As in the mid-2010s intolerance, racism and societal divisions spread across Europe and the United States, Western governments proposed more militaristic foreign policies



EGYPT, Cairo. Thousands of Egyptians demonstrate in Tahrir Square to denounce violence against protesters, especially women. 23 December 2011. Citizenside/WAHEDMASRY

and asserted support to authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes in a notable departure from their earlier defensiveness. A newfound resoluteness and

development was reached when the current US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated in May 2017 that human rights values would now take

“By sowing doubt as to the value of democracy, the region’s authoritarian regimes benefitted from their ability to bounce back and be repressively creative.”

assertiveness therefore emboldened these authoritarian regimes, whose bedrock remained, however, the contradictions and hypocrisies in Western policies. A high (or low) point of this

a back seat compared to economic interests or national security.

Finally, and even more problematically, many Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes began to adopt in the

late 2010s an “empire-strikes-back” disposition questioning in a deeper and more problematic fashion the very pursuit of democracy. The shared sentiment that “revolutions only bring trouble” and that “democracy is problematic” – now voiced by conservatives, now silently tolerated by former militants – spread slowly but surely across these societies. Thus expanded the repertoire of authoritarianism. What a difference six years made! Whereas in the spring of 2011, the dominant regional and international feeling had been one of “never again” should the Mubarak’s style of rule see the light of day, by the spring of 2017 a form of demand for strict authoritarian rule seemed to have crystallised as societies in the Middle East were now torn between their dissatisfaction with the current regimes and their anxieties of chaos and instability. By successfully sowing doubt as to the value of democracy, the region’s authoritarian regimes certainly benefitted from their ability to bounce back and be repressively creative. But they were also partaking of a wider global moment of neo-authoritarianism.



DEMOCRACY AT RISK

UGANDA: MANAGING DEMOCRACY THROUGH INSTITUTIONALISED UNCERTAINTY

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In 2016, thirty years after he violently seized power, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni was reelected to his fifth term. In 1986, Museveni had become president of a country economically and socially devastated from years of autocratic rule by strongmen rulers Idi Amin and Milton Obote.

Museveni made some early reforms, implementing decentralisation and

structural adjustment policies. International donors swiftly labelled Uganda a "donor darling" on its way to democratic transition. Recent assessments of the regime are less optimistic. It is now seen as a hegemonic party-state that relies increasingly on patronage and violent coercion. Scholars have catalogued how decentralisation policies have actually recentralised

state power and fragmented subnational power bases. The regime has used protracted civil unrest to justify uneven development and a militarised state. Today, Uganda resembles other seemingly fragile African states with long-lasting regimes like Angola, Eritrea and Zimbabwe.

Such cases present a paradox. How can state fragility, a system of electoral

governance, and autocratic rule coexist sustainably? An examination of how citizens experience Uganda's illiberal regime is revealing. Unsurprisingly, the regime restricts civil liberties and maintains distributive systems that offer overwhelming structural advantage for the ruling regime. However, it also governs by instrumentalising uncertainty. Uncertainty is produced via arbitrary government use of authority backed by a threat of violence. As a result, it infuses citizens' perceptions of the state – particularly state security actors but also politicians and government officials.

preventers as ordinary community members, powerless except to report crime like any other citizen. Constant vacillations between promises made and broken, authority claimed and denied, contributed to uncertainty in interactions between citizens and crime preventers, and between crime preventers and state authorities.

The government's ability to continually redefine the role of crime preventers was made possible by a widely held perception that the ruling regime retained access to overwhelming force – a perception reinforced through citizens' memories of state-sponsored

giving wide berth to issues they think are sensitive. Pervasive uncertainty also erodes trust between constituents and authorities. Citizens are cognisant of the fact that politicians also face harsh sanctions for challenging the regime's interests. Politicians who survive this system are thus assumed to be complicit in the regime, making citizens suspicious of those who claim to act in good faith. Unsubstantiated rumours further fuel this scepticism: tales of state-organised assassinations circulate when public figures die unexpectedly; allegations of bribery proliferate when politicians support the ruling party. However, producing suspicion without evidence allows politicians to maintain the possibility – however slight – that they could act in their constituents' interests. In turn, this keeps many citizens marginally engaged with the democratic process.

I have termed this strategy of rule "institutionalised arbitrariness". Institutionalised arbitrariness helps explain how states maintain "hybridity" or "illiberal democracy" as the status quo. The arbitrary use of harsh discipline means that the state can permit occasional expressions of liberal politics such as democratic elections, universal suffrage, civil society, free association and a free press. It is thus difficult for citizens and international observers to decisively categorise the regime as oppressive and autocratic.

The functioning of a democracy is premised on the ability of citizens and their representatives to develop meaningful and reliable expectations of each other. However, in environments marked by high uncertainty, arbitrary assertions and denials of state authority disrupt feedback loops and fragment citizen organisation. Under such circumstances, citizens cannot develop meaningful expectations, nor can they demand regime accountability. Thus, "illiberal democracies" can produce uncertainty and contingency to manipulate formally liberal governance for the pursuit of illiberal ends.

“Institutionalised arbitrariness helps explain how states maintain ‘hybridity’ or ‘illiberal democracy’ as the status quo.”

Take the experience of Uganda's "crime preventers". So-called crime preventers are mainly underemployed young men, recruited en masse before the 2016 elections with promises of access to government loans and employment in the police force. Their mandate was vaguely defined. Politicians on both sides of the aisle stoked fears that crime preventers would use violence to intimidate opposition voters and candidates, and facilitate vote manipulation. However, the reality appeared more mundane. At times, crime preventers assisted the police in arresting and detaining civilians. At other times, the police and government officials sidelined crime

violence. The ruling regime and its military have fought civil insurgencies since taking power, often sacrificing civilian life in the process. Sporadic and unpredictable state violence in everyday life further buttresses this perception. For example, the police often use teargas and live or rubber bullets to disperse rallies. More mundane instances of state coercion include security sweeps rife with intimidation and extortion.

The perception that the state could intervene anytime and deploy overwhelming force produces a particular type of subject, namely, one that is comparatively subdued and risk averse. Ordinary citizens self-police,

UGANDA, Kisoro.
Facade with poster
of President Yoweri
Museveni.
23 July 2012.
By Adam JONES/
CC BY-SA 3.0



DEMOCRACY AT RISK

POST-TRUTH POPULISM IN VENEZUELA

Rafael Sánchez

Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Sociology

VENEZUELA, Caracas. Volunteer rescuers step aside to take cover as riot police motorcyclists charge on opposition activists protesting against the newly inaugurated Constituent Assembly. 4 August 2017. Ronaldo SCHEMIDT/AFP/Getty Images

Illiberal democracy is democracy minus constitutional liberalism. According to Fareed Zakaria, without liberalism’s checks and balances democracy lends itself to the kind of “people-making” based on ethnic, class, racial or religious majorities, a feature that is intrinsic to the authoritarian populisms or “illiberal democracies” proliferating everywhere. Characterised by plebiscitary rule and an expansion of the executive that

renders all state branches into adjuncts of the ruler, Venezuela’s Chavist regime seems to be a good example of an illiberal democracy. I would, nonetheless, raise the following question: Does Chavism have any unique features? Following the standard argument on “illiberal democracy” the answer would be negative as Chavism would simply offer yet another cautionary tale about democracy without liberalism. Recent

developments in Venezuela, however, would suggest otherwise. In my view Chavism’s significance and dynamism have less to do with democracy, understood as majority rule, than with factors that such an understanding occludes. Despite having lost its electoral edge Chavism has recently become even more authoritarian and repressive but *without* drawing (other than fraudulently) on a majority that it no longer possesses.

The following suggestions may further our understanding of this situation.

The collapse of representative democracy and of the nation’s representative institutions instigated by a neoliberal structural adjustment programme in the 1980s explains Venezuelan Chavism better than the mere question of democracy. Though it initially came to power following a democratic implosion, the trajectory of Chavism since is only intelligible as part of the breakdown of political representation that is an *endemic*, even postliberal, condition currently affecting not just Venezuela but the world.

This breakdown has two critical effects: firstly, it reveals a crowd sociality hitherto enclosed within social and political institutions and, with it, the emergence of bodily affect as a crucial political and social crucible. Secondly, in such a situation, there is a growing inability of any representative instance to occupy the place of the universal, and, from there, represent the whole of society to the state. Under these conditions infectious affective contagion spreads. This amounts to a preeminence of the horizontal over the vertical as the axis along which forms of personal and social experience and relations are formed, unformed and transformed.

Confronted with such a slippery terrain brought about by globalisation and traversed by myriad images and desires circulated by the media, the Venezuelan state is unable to totalise society, or represent it as a whole society accountable to itself.

Like sovereignty or democracy, populism too mutates amidst such an unstoppable “retreat of the political” as the instance capable of totalising “society”. If in classical populism

“While the opposition controls ever more ineffective sites of democratic expression, the regime ‘democratically’ holds the firepower.”

appeals to the “people” functioned as the political means to *vertically* restore a fantasised lost unity, sustaining such fantasy is increasingly untenable both ideologically and institutionally now that the political is *horizontally* beset by an increasingly divided, differentiating society.

Under these no longer totalising circumstances, appeals to the “people” function according to an unabashedly “tribal” logic aimed at erecting a war machine centred on affect and the body. It operates on an ever more fragmented social terrain, which it does not seek to totalise but to control and dominate. In what in the current climate of post-truth politics amounts to a Humpty Dumpty effect in the sense that a word “means just what I choose it to mean”, the word “people” can simply refer to “my people”, however the ruler chooses to define them. “My people” are then those always ready to bodily crush the enemy rather than any numerical majority that supports a government or a policy.

The result is “dominance without hegemony” (Ranjit Guha). Having lost its majority, Chavism still insists on maintaining power. To achieve this, the massively corrupt regime has developed a whole new arsenal of control mechanisms ranging from the wholesale distribution of weapons to civilians, the so-called *colectivos*, to

placing the army, which is now subjected to minute forms of intelligence monitored by Cuban agents, in control of the nation’s food distribution and vast mineral wealth.

Meanwhile invocations of “democracy” and “the people” continue but mean what the regime wants them to mean, irrespective of any numerical majorities. The recent top-down decision to set up a “Constituent Assembly” capable of bypassing the opposition-controlled parliament is the latest in the regime’s Humpty Dumpty politics. Yet this is not a case of an “illiberal democracy” if by that one means a well-consolidated, semitotalitarian regime. A more likely scenario, I fear, is: an intensification of the prevailing civic strife, corruption, violence, narco trafficking and chaos. While the opposition controls ever more ineffective sites of democratic expression, the regime “democratically” holds the firepower.

From the very beginning Chavism in all its exorbitance foreshadowed tendencies at work everywhere in times of the “retreat of the political”. Trump’s populist, Humpty Dumpty–like assault on American liberalism bears witness to similar tendencies. In order to defend democracy and liberalism, we will need to rethink them in the face of this withdrawal of the political.

Our Recent Guests

JOSEPH NYE

University Distinguished Service Professor
and Former Dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government

“Are We Seeing the End of the American Liberal Order?”



On 15 June, Joseph Nye returned to the Graduate Institute, where he spent a year as a Visiting Professor during the 1960s, for a lecture on the possible end of the American liberal order.

Prof. Nye said he worries more about the rise of Donald Trump than the rise of China. “If Trump turns out to be a one-term president, much of the damage done will look like an aberration, like an odd four years.” He warned however that if a 9/11-type event were to rally public opinion behind Trump, allowing him to serve a second term, “the likeliest result will be not that China takes over the international order, but rather entropy, the inability to get work done, a gradual deterioration of the capacity to produce global public goods.”

NIKKI HALEY

United States Ambassador to the United Nations

“A Place for Conscience: The Future of the United States in the Human Rights Council”

On 6 June, Nikki Haley spoke at the Graduate Institute about the United States’ troubled relationship with the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC).



Citing the need to “resuscitate” the HRC, Ambassador Haley called for two specific changes: “First, the UN must act to keep the worst human rights abusers from obtaining seats on the Council. Second, the Council’s Agenda Item Seven [Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories] must be removed.”

Addressing concerns that the United States would quit the HRC, she said the Trump administration was “not going to commit today whether we’re going to stay in or out of the Human Rights Council” while admitting to a “growing suspicion that it is not a good investment of our time, money, and national prestige”.

TABLE RONDE “Political Leadership for Global Health”



On 6 March, the Graduate Institute hosted a debate between the three candidates for the post of World Health Organization Director General. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, David Nabarro and Sania Nishtar set out their vision for tackling issues such as power, competing interests of stakeholders, consensus-building and reputation.

Ilona Kickbusch, Director of the Graduate Institute’s Global Health Centre, said the event had been designed to explore “the interaction between an individual’s personal qualities and the institutional and political factors around them”.

The event was organised by the Global Health Centre along with Chatham House, the Rockefeller Foundation and the United Nations Foundation. WHO member states subsequently elected Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as WHO Director General on 23 May.

JENS STOLTENBERG

Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

“Projecting Stability beyond Our Borders”

On 2 March, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg spoke to Graduate Institute students of his “certainty” that the United States remains committed to the transatlantic alliance.



“The only way for NATO to remain strong is if we stay united”, said Mr Stoltenberg. “President Trump has told me in two phone calls that the United States remains committed to NATO. The US knows that a strong NATO is good for the United States. Two world wars and a Cold War have taught us that.”

He said that the continued US commitment to NATO was “good for Europe, good for North America, but most importantly, good for peace and stability in our world”.

Mr Stoltenberg was speaking during a town hall meeting organised by the Graduate Institute and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, which was moderated by Institute Professor Stephanie Hofmann and GCSP Fellow Xavier Colin.

→ <http://graduateinstitute.ch/events>
→ <http://youtube.com/user/graduateinstitute>

Allier l’action à la réflexion

Le professeur Gilles Carbonnier nommé vice-président du CICR



Gilles Carbonnier et une étudiante.

Comment voyez-vous votre nouveau poste ?

Je pourrai vous en dire plus lorsque j’aurai pris mes fonctions au sein de cette organisation qui compte quelque 15 000 employés actifs dans plus de 80 pays, avec un budget annuel d’environ 1,6 milliard de francs. Ceci dit, je vois trois axes principaux. Premièrement, je serai amené à travailler étroitement avec le président, Peter Maurer, ainsi qu’avec mes futurs collègues de l’Assemblée du CICR, notamment pour assurer le bon fonctionnement des mécanismes de gouvernance institutionnelle et de contrôle interne. Deuxièmement, je m’engagerai dans le développement de collaborations stratégiques, que ce soit au sein du Mouvement international de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, avec les milieux scientifiques ou d’autres acteurs-clés. Le troisième axe concerne la mise en œuvre de réformes institutionnelles et de projets prioritaires avec la direction du CICR.

En quoi vos années d’enseignement et de recherche à l’Institut vous seront-elles utiles ?

Ces années à l’Institut sont précieuses à plus d’un titre. Mes travaux sur l’économie politique des conflits armés m’ont permis de mieux cerner les apports de

Le professeur Gilles Carbonnier a été nommé vice-président du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) et entrera en fonctions au printemps 2018. Directeur des études à l’Institut, il enseigne l’économie du développement. Il est rédacteur en chef de la revue *International Development Policy* et président du Comité directeur du Centre d’enseignement et de recherche en action humanitaire de Genève (CERAH). Avant de rejoindre l’Institut, Gilles Carbonnier a travaillé plusieurs années pour le CICR en tant que délégué sur le terrain et conseiller économique.

l’économie et de la recherche interdisciplinaire en sciences sociales pour saisir les dynamiques complexes qui sous-tendent les conflits armés contemporains.

Nos étudiants – dont une majorité de non-Européens – arrivent à Genève avec une vision de l’humanitaire qui diffère souvent de notre approche « dunantiste ». Certains contestent ce qu’ils perçoivent comme un humanitaire occidental ou néocolonial. Ces questions trouvent aussi un écho dans le contexte de la formation continue, auprès de professionnels originaires de pays en guerre. Les débats avec nos étudiants m’ont amené à mieux appréhender la variété des approches et des savoirs dans le champ humanitaire.

Finalement, j’ai eu la chance d’encadrer depuis 2010 une trentaine de groupes d’étudiants qui mènent des projets de recherche appliquée pour divers acteurs de la Genève internationale. Ces recherches m’ont permis d’approfondir mes réflexions sur des thèmes aussi variés que les conséquences humanitaires des sanctions économiques, la guerre en milieu urbain, les nombreux facteurs qui influencent le comportement des groupes armés, ou encore le rôle des diasporas et des médias sociaux dans les conflits.



Le siège du CICR à Genève.

Vous êtes notamment l’auteur de l’ouvrage *Humanitarian Economics*. Quelle en est l’originalité ?

Alors que la science politique, le droit, l’anthropologie et l’histoire s’intéressent depuis de nombreuses décennies aux guerres civiles, l’économie a longtemps négligé ce phénomène malgré l’impact des conflits dans les pays en développement. Mon livre examine les apports de l’économie politique à la compréhension des désastres, des guerres, du terrorisme et du « marché humanitaire ». J’y souligne le grand potentiel – mais aussi les limites – de la théorie du choix rationnel et de l’analyse coût-avantage dans la compréhension des crises et des réponses humanitaires. Je m’intéresse aussi aux avancées récentes dans le domaine de l’économie comportementale et d’autres disciplines qui peuvent contribuer à expliquer les décisions de divers acteurs en situation de guerre. Lors de la présentation de cet ouvrage, j’ai pu engager un dialogue stimulant tant avec des collègues que des praticiens. Je me réjouis de pouvoir allier l’action à la réflexion en rejoignant le CICR !

Quels sont les principaux défis du CICR ?

J’en mentionnerais trois : maintenir l’accès direct aux populations dans les zones de guerre tout en préservant la

sécurité des employés ; assurer le financement et l’indépendance de l’organisation dans la durée ; développer et gérer les relations avec une variété croissante d’acteurs impliqués dans le secteur humanitaire.

Plus généralement, je constate que malgré la forte croissance du marché humanitaire depuis 1990, les besoins vitaux des populations affectées par la guerre ne sont que très partiellement couverts. Il suffit de penser aux crises qui frappent des millions de personnes au Yémen, en Somalie, au Soudan du Sud et au nord du Nigéria. De plus, les violations du droit international humanitaire demeurent hélas trop fréquentes et impunies, comme dans le cas d’attaques systématiques contre des structures médicales. Mieux assister et protéger les populations demeure un défi majeur.

Un autre enjeu a trait au caractère chronique des conflits armés : les organisations humanitaires opèrent dans certains pays depuis plus de dix ou vingt ans. La question des interactions entre humanitaire et développement se pose avec d’autant plus d’acuité que les acteurs de la coopération au développement tendent à intervenir toujours plus dans les mêmes contextes ou États dits « fragiles ».

Nouveaux professeurs

CYRUS SCHAYEGH (Suisse et Iran)
Professeur adjoint d’histoire internationale
Doctorat de l’Université Columbia, New York (2004)



Avant de rejoindre l’Institut, Cyrus Schayegh a enseigné pendant neuf ans à l’Université de Princeton, d’abord en qualité de professeur assistant puis comme professeur adjoint. Il y a aussi dirigé le programme d’études sur le Proche-Orient de 2014 à 2017. Il a également été professeur assistant au département d’histoire et d’archéologie de l’Université américaine de Beyrouth entre 2005 et 2008.

Ses principaux domaines d’expertise portent sur le Moyen-Orient moderne, l’histoire globale, la décolonisation, la Guerre froide, l’histoire du développement et l’historiographie. Ses projets de recherche en cours se concentrent sur les interactions entre la globalisation et la décolonisation d’après-guerre, les perspectives arabes de la décolonisation en Afrique et en Asie,

la coopération inter-impériale européenne durant l’entre-deux-guerres et l’historiographie.

Le professeur Schayegh a publié *The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World* en 2017 et *Who Is Knowledgeable, Is Strong: Science, Class, and the Formation of Modern Iranian Society, 1900–1950* en 2009, et a coédité *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates* en 2015 et *A Global Middle East: Mobility, Materiality and Culture in the Modern Age, 1880–1940* en 2014. Il contribue à de nombreuses revues, dont l’*American Historical Review*, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* et l’*International Journal of Middle East Studies*.

Polyglotte, Cyrus Schayegh parle couramment l’arabe, l’anglais, le français, l’allemand, l’hébreux, le persan et l’espagnol.

ANNA LEANDER (Danemark, France, Suède)
Professeur de relations internationales/science politique
Doctorat de l’Institut européen de Florence en collaboration avec l’Institut d’études politiques de Paris (1997)



Anna Leander rejoindra l’Institut en janvier 2018. Depuis 2013, elle est professeur de relations internationales à l’Université pontificale catholique de Rio de Janeiro, où elle continuera à enseigner quelques semaines par an. Elle a auparavant occupé divers postes d’enseignement et de recherche à la Central European University à Budapest, au Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, à la University of Southern Denmark, à la Copenhagen Business School, au Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg, au Collegio Carlo Alberto et au Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies de l’Université Cornell.

Elle a mené de nombreux travaux de sociologie politique dans une approche de théorie des pratiques et

s’intéresse depuis longtemps à la commercialisation des affaires militaires et de la sécurité. Ses domaines d’expertise couvrent la sécurité, la sécurité commerciale, la gouvernance et les affaires. Ses recherches actuelles portent sur les politiques des pratiques numériques, esthétiques et juridiques.

Anna Leander a récemment publié le *Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies* (2016, avec Rita Abrahamsen) ainsi que des articles dans le *European Journal of Social Theory*, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, le *Leiden Journal of International Law* et *International Studies Perspectives*.

Elle parle couramment le danois, l’anglais, le français et le suédois.

Adopting a Pedagogy of Active Learning

Elisabeth Prügl
Professor of International Relations/Political Science



Students learn best when teachers adopt a pedagogy of active learning. I value the opportunity to do so at the Graduate Institute, where I teach mostly small classes of students who come with excellent preparation from around the world and have chosen Geneva and the Institute because they are interested in international problems. Many students arrive with unique experiences, having lived, studied and travelled in several countries.

To enable active learning for these students, I try to create a class environment that encourages them to participate and share their knowledge. I keep lectures to a minimum, requiring instead that students come to class well prepared, having carefully read the assigned materials and prepared talking points with opinions and questions about the readings. As a result, almost everybody has something to say, and key insights emerge collectively during class discussions. While there are specific learning goals for each session, there is usually much more that happens. Imagine a discussion between students for whom feminism means the freedom to make their own decisions and others who unproblematically combine their feminism with arranged marriages or take for granted that their master degree will increase the bride price they will be able to garner. Or imagine students from the United States, Western Europe, Japan, Russia, Colombia and Nigeria discussing the aftermath of American hegemony. A highly participatory seminar session can be exhilarating when students explore insights with smart arguments and creatively bounce ideas off each other.

If the Graduate Institute has become my laboratory for facilitating active learning, I got to appreciate the philosophy by teaching undergraduates in the United States. In particular, the “mega” introductory class to International Relations that I taught for many years at Florida International University forced me to think creatively about ways to capture the imagination of students. This requires different tools for 340 undergraduates in a big auditorium than for 20

students in a graduate seminar. But these tools have one thing in common: they need to allow students to become active and take charge of their own learning.

Writing a dissertation is the culmination of active learning at the Graduate Institute, and dissertation supervision requires finding a balance between being directive and allowing a student’s ideas to flourish. I have been privileged to supervise many fascinating dissertation projects on topics (just last year) ranging from the “humanitarian imaginary” in the United Kingdom’s Comic Relief broadcasts, to the politics of male survivors of sexual violence in Uganda and life on Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring uprisings. It is deeply gratifying to read a finalised manuscript that makes a genuine contribution to knowledge and showcases the skills students have acquired through their education.

Researching “Bombs, Banks and Sanctions”

A New ERC Project at the Institute

Grégoire Mallard

Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology



Joining the Institute three years ago was key in the elaboration of my research project “Bombs, Banks and Sanctions”, funded by the European Research Council (ERC). The project analyses the broader sociological logics and discursive shifts that have led some governments and multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council or the International Monetary Fund to sanction “bad banks” involved either in Iranian nuclear-related activities or North Korean activities related to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the multilateral negotiation with Iran affected not only Iran, but also all countries which had to change their laws, policies and rules in order to create more “financial transparency” so as to comply with obligations created by UN Security Council resolutions against nuclear proliferators.

The Graduate Institute is an ideal place to prepare this project. It has gained a lot of visibility in the field of sanctions and counterterrorism financing, thanks to the leadership of Thomas Biersteker, who set up a group of experts in charge of evaluating sanctions policies. In this project, Tom and I will conduct interviews with sanctions specialists. I have hired two postdoctoral researchers who join the project this fall: Farzan Sabet, who has studied US non-proliferation policy and Iranian nuclear history, and Anna Hanson, who has researched anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing policies.

It is not only the Institute’s existing research tradition that has been beneficial to the elaboration of this project, but also the unique relation between research and teaching. Last Spring, I co-taught a class on “The Iran Nuclear Negotiation” with Stephan Klement, a European nuclear expert tasked with preparing the technical work for negotiations with Iran and someone who has prepared and conducted talks with the Iranian teams for more than 14 years.

Teaching a small-size seminar to students in the Master of International Affairs is not only a fantastic opportunity for students, but also for the ERC project, as it gives us the opportunity to learn detailed histories of how the various UN Security Council resolutions against Iran have been interpreted by different parties. It parallels the work I do in the context of interviews with nuclear experts and diplomats, during which I sit with them, with the printed text of the various UN Security Council resolutions, and ask them to interpret for me what their government, or they, have read in these resolutions. With the two postdoctoral researchers we are conducting extensive fieldwork in Washington, New York, Brussels, Vienna, Paris and London. We will thus produce descriptive and causal knowledge about policy processes that are central to understanding how to fight new proliferation challenges.



Professor Vincent Chetail Launches the Migrants’ Rights Law Clinic

A rubber boat in distress with 120 people on board is found approximately 23 miles north-east of Tripoli, Libya. 11 September 2016. NurPhoto/Marco PANZETTI

Migrants’ rights question the universality of human rights. On the one hand, human rights apply to everyone irrespective of nationality or statelessness. On the other hand, as non-citizens, migrants remain structurally vulnerable to abuse, and even more so when they are undocumented. This tension between rights and reality is further exacerbated by puzzling controversies surrounding the application of human rights to migrants.

Against this backdrop, Vincent Chetail, Professor of International Law and Director of the Graduate Institute’s Global Migration Centre, has launched the Migrants’ Rights Law Clinic. The clinic, housed within the Global Migration Centre, acts as an independent pool of expertise at the disposal of governments, as well as international and non-governmental organisations, providing objective and pro bono expertise on the multifaceted issues relating to the human rights of migrants. Services offered by the clinic are tailored to stakeholders’ needs, taking a variety of forms, such as research briefs, preparatory research, fact-finding reports or expert opinions.

As Professor Chetail remarks, “while migration has never been higher on the international agenda, misperceptions surrounding the protection of migrants remain. Yet the duty to protect migrants’ rights was firmly reaffirmed by UN Member States in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of September 2016. With such a need for an evidence-based approach to migration and human rights, the law clinic stands as a unique initiative

in the heart of International Geneva to foster neutral, practical and solution-oriented expertise and dialogue.”

The Migrants’ Rights Law Clinic capitalises on the leading expertise of the Global Migration Centre in the field of migration and human rights. It actively involves postgraduate students from the Graduate Institute, offering them a unique practical experience during their studies. Striving for the highest quality and degree of professionalism, students are selected on the basis of their strong motivation, commitment and skills, while working under the close supervision of Professor Chetail and in collaboration with Global Migration Centre researchers.

➔ <http://graduateinstitute.ch/migrantsrights-lawclinic>

Building Bridges between Asylum Seekers and Other Residents



Students involved in Essaim d’Accueil.


Graduate Institute students are involved with Essaim d’Accueil, an association which creates a personal reception network for asylum seekers arriving in Geneva. It was launched in 2016 out of discussions with social workers in Geneva about the need for civil engagement with questions relating to migration and asylum. The association is formed of a network of volunteers who welcome each newcomer to the city; by facilitating interpersonal exchanges among residents, the association seeks to develop more familiarity among them. Whether having a coffee, exploring Geneva or taking part in any other creative activity, the idea is for asylum seekers and residents to spend time together, getting to know each other.

Executive committee members come from Switzerland, France, Brazil, Syria, Bosnia and America. “At the heart of the project is the idea that personal ties and meetings form the basis for social understanding, solidarity and cooperation”, says Catherine Polishchuk (Master in Anthropology and Sociology). “The idea of civil engagement and personal contact with people who are applying for asylum really spoke to us. The goal is to build bridges between different parts of the city and between residents who otherwise wouldn’t meet. We connect people independent of their legal status or cultural background.”

“Essaim d’Accueil plans to organise a range of activities, from informal ones like drinking coffee or going swimming to more substantive ones like music classes or sports activities”, says Alexandre Lopes (Master in International Affairs). “The point is that participants will be able to choose what they want to do.”

The association has just launched a crowdfunding campaign to raise funds to develop a training programme for its members on the administrative and legal process of asylum, and some of its social implications, in Switzerland in general and Geneva in particular. They also hope to raise awareness about the role of volunteers in the field and how to convey values and discourse of equality and humanity. The project will allow Essaim d’Accueil to broaden the diversity of its participants and increase its overall impact. The association’s ultimate objective is to extend their activities beyond Geneva and to change the dynamics of migration-related activities and discourse.

- ➔ <http://essaimdaccueil.weebly.com>
- ➔ <https://www.facebook.com/essaimdaccueil>



A Letter of Motivation

Why I Want to Study at the Graduate Institute

For long, my sense of self was informed by my membership in the Bemba tribe of Zambia. Like many other tribes, Bemba customs dictate patriarchal and phallocentric gender norms, from my alcoholic neighbour whose constant wife-battering was justified, to earning women forced to hand over all their income to their husbands. I saw my mother struggle to raise eight children as patriarchal norms attempted to constrain her efforts. When I questioned these injustices, I was often rebuked. Thus, I became certain that this was not an identity I wanted to possess. My sense of self had to be far removed from such stigmatising norms.

At seventeen, my youth empowerment efforts and work as an HIV activist earned me a full scholarship to pursue the International Baccalaureate Diploma in Kolkata. Zambia and India are worlds apart in terms of culture, yet it was striking to see the close similarities in terms of social and political problems. In India, I heard stories of female infanticide and publicly witnessed sexual assault in broad daylight.

As an undergraduate student at Ashoka University, I was exposed to Political Science, forcing me to critically question my beliefs and re-evaluate the structures that develop and constrain our societies. I began to appreciate that we are living in increasingly uncertain times when states and individuals face a series of interconnected challenges, and when collaborative action is obligatory to address them – action that crosses boundaries between organisations, states, cultures, academic fields, ethnicities and religions.

I have realised that my sense of self and belonging should be grounded in social and political integration. My

professional goal is to work on a kind of political development that will target problems like gender inequality.

This is why I want to take up a Master in International Relations/Political Science. The course will provide a general substantive background while enabling me to pursue my interests: gender, identity politics and conflict. Through my research, I want to understand how gender politics can be positioned in Africa’s context. Since the programme engages with multiple approaches and methods, it will provide me with both analytical and practical skills that I can use to formulate and implement political development policies to tackle gender inequalities while working with the African Union.

I want to be at a university that lives by the ethos of crosscultural and broader integration, like the Graduate Institute with its unusual openness to Africa and all regions. I strongly believe that education at the Institute will equip me with the skills to pursue my goals, and prepare me to respond to the fundamental dilemmas of our time.

McPherlain Chungu

■ Mr McPherlain Chungu was admitted to the Master in International Relations/Political Science (2017–2018) and benefits from a full scholarship from the Institute. The Institute has granted 20 scholarships to students from the Middle East and North Africa and from crisis-affected countries.

Souvenirs de mes études à Genève

YAN LAN (Chine)
Doctorat en droit (1991)
Directrice générale et cheffe de Greater China Investment Banking, Lazard Lt

Je fais partie d’une génération quelque peu bouleversée. Pendant la Révolution culturelle ma famille a beaucoup souffert. Mon père et mon grand-père ont été emprisonnés dans la prison d’État de Qincheng alors que ma mère et moi-même avons été envoyées dans la campagne du Henan. J’ai participé à la première session du baccalauréat après la Révolution culturelle. Par la suite, j’ai étudié le droit international à l’Université de Pékin avec des professeurs comme Wang Tieya et Zhao Lihai. Nous étions au début des années 1980 et la Chine s’ouvrait au monde extérieur. C’est ainsi qu’en 1984, j’ai passé deux concours, un pour entrer à l’Université Yale, l’autre pour étudier à l’Institut de hautes études internationales (HEI). J’ai choisi Genève car je voulais faire un doctorat et HEI m’offrait une bourse pour réaliser ce rêve.



Comme pour bien des gens de ma génération, le départ a été un déchirement. Nous venions de sortir de la Révolution culturelle et d’un pays fermé pendant dix ans pour nous envoler vers un ailleurs dont on ne savait rien – contrairement à la génération suivante, qui était heureuse de partir étudier à l’étranger et a pris l’avion comme on prend le bus.

L’Institut n’était pas grand, mais très international. Nous n’étions qu’une dizaine par classe, mais nous venions des cinq continents. Les meilleurs élèves venaient d’Allemagne et d’Israël. Je devais être dans les premiers de classe pour garder ma bourse, mais même avec une licence en français j’avais la tête sous l’eau quand il fallait comprendre des cas juridiques et des notions de droit international. Avec Zhang, un autre étudiant chinois, nous avons mis les bouchées doubles et à la fin du premier semestre nous étions parmi les premiers. Le professeur Caflisch s’était exclamé : « C’est incroyable que même après la Révolution culturelle, le niveau des élèves chinois soit toujours aussi haut. Il faut que nous en recrutions plus ! »

Nombreux sont les amis et les professeurs qui m’ont aidée et à qui je suis redevable, au premier rang desquels Lucius Caflisch, mon directeur de thèse et ami de Wang Tieya. M. Wang avait demandé à M. Caflisch de prendre soin de moi, ce qu’ils firent, lui et sa femme. Ils m’ont même emmenée le week-end dans leur chalet de montagne ! Pour ma thèse, le professeur Caflisch m’a encouragée à aller faire des études comparatives aux États-Unis, où j’ai pu rencontrer l’élite des étudiants chinois à l’étranger de l’époque, comme Gao Xiqing et Wang Boming, qui avaient décidé de rentrer en Chine pour aider à instaurer le système boursier chinois. Après l’obtention de mon doctorat, M. Caflisch m’a encouragée à aller à la Chambre de commerce internationale à Paris pour un stage. Ce travail sur le terrain s’est avéré un tremplin décisif pour ma carrière.

→ <http://graduateinstitute.ch/alumni>



LES ALUMNI Sharing the Institute’s Values Interview with Ting Fang, President of the Beijing Alumni Chapter

Ting Fang (far left) and members of the Beijing Alumni Chapter.

You launched the Beijing Chapter and act as its President. Why did you decide to get involved?

I feel very attached to the Institute – I gained a great deal of knowledge and friendship here, and was able to shift from a career in engineering to international development. Anyone who studies at the Institute is exposed to its cosmopolitanism, global responsibility and a multidisciplinary approach to meet real-world challenges. Unfortunately, globalist and cosmopolitan views are often not commonly shared in this day and age. Therefore, local alumni chapters play an important role for sharing the values of the Institute and discussing complex global issues.

While there was already a chapter in Shanghai, many believed Beijing deserved to host a separate chapter, reflecting the city’s growing importance in world affairs. Besides, Beijing holds historic significance for the Institute’s alumni community. As early as the 1980s, HEI (Graduate Institute of International Studies), the predecessor of the Institute, offered training courses for Chinese diplomats. Many participants, including former Deputy Foreign Minister He Yafei, held prominent official positions after returning to Beijing. The Institute established a concurrent BA/MA programme with Peking University in 2016, meaning Beijing was poised to receive more and more graduates from the Institute.

I had been thinking of organising a Beijing alumni chapter since my return to China in 2015. This intention was

reinforced by Prof. Cédric Dupont’s visit, during which he held an alumni reception and encouraged Beijing alumni to create a local chapter. With the help of committee members including Natalie Bertsch, Qian Wu, Adrian Schmied, and Amb. Jean-Jacques de Dardel, the preparation and launch processes were incredibly smooth.

What are your best memories from the Institute?

A course titled “Interdisciplinarity and Epistemology” (no kidding!). But what was also nice were the many inspiring discussions with classmates *au bord du lac*. The Institute is a place where you learn as much from your classmates as from your professors! From them, we nurture a respect for diversity, understand the complexity of global issues, and discover our innate aspiration to bolster communication and cooperation between different nations.

How did your studies help you in the workplace?

I spent a year in Yemen after graduation in the hope of breaking into the humanitarian “business”, and was eventually offered a position at the ICRC’s Regional Delegation of East Asia as Corporate Sector Advisor. My studies proved their worth, not only in terms of skills and knowledge required for this role, but also as regards the alumni network which helped me find the right people at the right time.

My Swiss Life as a “Rigotnomist”

Yi Huang
Assistant Professor of International Economics
Pictet Chair in Finance and Development



the academic work, my colleagues have really looked after me, helping me integrate into my new life: housing, coping with the French language, Escalade, Geneva Marathon, ski trips, wine tasting, family gatherings, travelling, vacation... So far, I have been invited to work with leading scholars across Swiss universities and received the prestigious CICF Best Paper Award and a research grant from the Swiss government. Colleagues from other departments have also been essential in helping me pursue my academic career and growing into the profession.

Cheese and Wine as Hobby

There was a magic moment when I started enjoying cheese. Growing up without high-quality dairy products, I was not used to eating cheese either as a starter or as a dessert. I still remember my first cheese fondue dinner – I was up the whole night trying to digest it! Yet the more cheese I ate, the more addicted to it I became, and suddenly I was a serious fan. I have now explored many of the myriad varieties of Swiss (and French) cheese. Two years ago, as a hobby, I started writing a book to teach my Chinese fellows how to taste various cheeses and wines, as well as matching them with different Chinese cuisines. As a foodie and chef, my cooking, especially the *brasato al barolo*, has led to memorable nights with friends, and it is the best way to relax after a long day of intensive work.

Art as Dream

Art Basel inspired me when I was a student. Later, after spending days at the Phillips Collection in Washington, enjoying masterpieces from Switzerland, I was able to visit Swiss museums and galleries as well as private collections. Recently, I went to Verbier and Martigny and had a great time at the Fondation Pierre Gianadda. My next plan is to visit the contemporary Chinese Art Museum owned by Ambassador Uli Sigg, who has collected more than 2,000 works by over 350 Chinese artists. Art encourages me to taste the beauty of life. I enjoy it and have a long way to explore!

To sum up, my high-quality life as a Rigotnomist in Switzerland is full of happiness, surprise and joyful memories with my friendly colleagues, smart students and the lovely Swiss people. As Henri-Frédéric Amiel taught us: *“Chaque vie se fait son destin”*!

Mes trente-deux années à l’Institut

Marielle Schneider
Responsable qualité
au Service informatique et logistique



J’aime le changement et je me pose régulièrement la question : 32 ans à l’Institut, comment est-ce possible ? Voici quelques exemples qui m’aident à répondre à cette question.

Tout d’abord, je bénéficie de l’évolution constante et rapide de mon champ d’activité, l’informatique. C’est d’ailleurs ma fierté d’avoir activement contribué, au début de ma carrière, au passage de l’Institut au numérique : un beau défi pour un grand changement culturel. Durant cette période, en emploi à 80 % grâce à la possibilité offerte par l’Institut de travailler à temps partiel, j’ai élevé mes trois filles en accord avec mon principe d’éducation : être présente, mais pas trop.

Plus tard, j’ai bénéficié d’une formation diplômante de cheffe de projet informatique, entièrement financée par l’Institut. Elle m’a permis, en quelque sorte, de faire peau neuve.

Puis encore une nouvelle renaissance : à mon arrivée à l’Institut on parlait – et ce n’était pas un nouveau sujet – du campus de l’Institut. J’y ai toujours cru, mais jamais je n’aurais imaginé un tel dénouement : un si bel immeuble, nommé Maison de la paix, porteur de tant de possibles, qui comble mon désir profond de réaliser la paix par la culture et l’éducation.

Dans la foulée, les méthodes de travail évoluent à grande vitesse ; l’Institut devient agile, grâce à la méthode Scrum mise en place il y a deux ans. On se parle différemment en se concertant dans la bienveillance. C’est notre nouvel outil, le langage commun, un beau défi pour la multiculturalité. Au sein de l’administration, on secoue les silos des services qui s’ouvrent en confiance à la collaboration active avec les autres et on se met d’accord pour aérer nos processus interservices.


En parallèle, depuis 30 ans la circulation automobile asphyxie Genève ; les trajets deviennent cauchemardesques. L’avènement de la Maison de paix est l’occasion de mettre en place une incitation à la mobilité douce par le biais d’une prime annuelle. J’adhère, et depuis septembre 2016 je réalise un rêve d’une vingtaine d’années : appliquer le Protocole de Kyoto à ma façon, en réduisant de 75 % mon empreinte carbone liée aux trajets professionnels.

Cerise sur le gâteau, l’Institut étant totalement ouvert au télétravail, je réduis mes heures de transport en travaillant un jour par semaine chez moi, où je peux m’atteler aux sujets qui nécessitent du calme.

Comment est-il possible que 32 années soient déjà passées ?

Les revues de l’Institut

International Development Policy (DevPol)
Editor-in-chief: **Gilles Carbonnier**



International Development Policy
Special Issue 8.0,
2017.


DEVELOPMENT AS A BATTLEFIELD

Editors: Irene **Bono** and Béatrice **Hibou**

This 8th thematic issue offers an innovative exploration of the multidimensional meanings of – and interactions between – conflict and development. The volume invites the reader to reconsider and renew the way social scientists seek to make sense of sociopolitical and economic developments in the Middle East and North Africa and beyond.

The authors, all women and many from the region, share a deep understanding of past-present, local-global interactions that infuse power relations. The special issue is available in open access and published in paper format (Brill | Nijhoff).

→ <https://poldev.revues.org/2300>



International Development Policy
Special Issue 9.0,
2017.

ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT *LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA*


Editors: Gilles **Carbonnier**, Humberto **Campodónico**
and Sergio **Tezanos Vázquez**

This 9th thematic issue looks at recent paradigmatic innovations and related development trajectories in Latin America, focusing on the Andean region. It examines the diverse development narratives and experiences in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru during a period of high commodity prices associated with robust growth and poverty reduction. Highlighting propositions such as *buen vivir*, it questions whether competing ideologies and discourses have translated into different outcomes with regard to environmental sustainability, social progress, primary commodity dependence, or the rights of indigenous peoples. It is available in open access and published in paper format (Brill | Nijhoff).

→ <https://poldev.revues.org/2333>

All articles are available online in open access at → <http://devpol.org>

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International Development Policy was launched in 2010 as a peer-reviewed open-access e-journal on global development and international cooperation. A thematic print edition is published each year with Brill | Nijhoff, along with e-issues that feature peer-reviewed articles by policymakers, academics and practitioners.
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RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Revue coprésidée par **Mohammad-Reza Djalili**, professeur retraité de l’Institut, et **Antoine Marès**, professeur à Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Créée en 1974 par Jean-Baptiste Duroselle et Jacques Freymond, alors directeur de l’Institut, *Relations internationales* s’adresse à des spécialistes et à un public cultivé qu’intéresse l’histoire moderne et contemporaine.

Entièrement francophone, la revue propose des études historiques enrichies par des apports économiques, géographiques, psychologiques, sociologiques et de théories politiques. Deux numéros annuels sont issus d’un colloque, tenu en France ou en Suisse ; les deux autres cahiers sont soit thématiques, soit consacrés à de nouvelles recherches.

La revue attache beaucoup d’importance à la contribution de jeunes auteurs qui peuvent soumettre des propositions d’articles au comité de rédaction de la revue.

Dans son numéro 169 (printemps 2017), la revue propose un dossier sur la comparaison internationale et la circulation d’éventuels modèles de diplomatie culturelle et, dans son numéro 170 (été 2017), les œuvres des lauréats et candidats remarquables des prix Jean-Baptiste Duroselle 2016 et de quelques chercheurs plus avancés.

Distribuée par les Presses Universitaires de France, *Relations internationales* est aussi disponible en version numérique sur Cairn.

→ <http://graduateinstitute.ch/revue-RI>



MEDICINE ANTHROPOLOGY THEORY

Graduate Institute faculty and students are working to push academic publishing boundaries with *Medicine Anthropology Theory (MAT)*, the world’s only open access journal in the anthropology of health, illness and medicine.


MAT’s founding coeditors are Vinh-Kim Nguyen, Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at the Graduate Institute, and Eileen Moyer, Associate Professor of Urban and Medical Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam.

MAT is a crucial resource for anthropologists and health practitioners who cannot access expensive social science and health journals. It publishes a wide range of original articles, essays and reflections that offer unique insights into how medical anthropologists use theoretical approaches in the field, how novel empirical problems inform conceptual work, and the challenges and rewards of interdisciplinary collaboration. Conference reviews, reports on research in progress and recent dissertations give readers a broad sense of where the field is going.

As *MAT*’s reach and impact grow, Graduate Institute students Rosie Sims, Lauren Riggs, Kwaku Adomako, Gabriela Hertig and Andri Tschudi are working hard to develop its website and publish a broader range of content.

→ www.medanthrotheory.org

Nouvelles publications



Paris : La Découverte.
2017. 240 p.


L'IMPASSE NATIONAL-LIBÉRALE GLOBALISATION ET REPLI IDENTITAIRE

Jean-François **Bayart**

Face aux évolutions tragiques du monde, les élites politiques semblent à court de vision, et l’invraisemblable d’hier devient la réalité d’aujourd’hui, de l’arrivée au pouvoir de l’extrême droite au délitement de l’Europe, des attentats de masse à l’exode des peuples, en attendant peut-être le retour de la guerre sur le Vieux Continent ou en Asie...

Si la confusion règne ainsi, c’est parce que notre grille de lecture est tout simplement fautive. Nous croyons que le monde est pris dans deux processus contradictoires : la mondialisation, d’un côté, et le repli national-identitaire, de l’autre. Or, ces deux processus participent d’une même dynamique « national-libérale », qui a conduit les politiques étrangères des pays occidentaux dans une impasse tragique. Ce n’est donc pas un hasard si certains hommes politiques, à l’instar de Nicolas Sarkozy, François Fillon, Manuel Valls, Vladimir Poutine ou Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, se réclament haut et fort de l’économie globale et de la souveraineté nationale.

Né du passage d’un monde d’empires à un système international d’États-nations, le national-libéralisme – libéral pour les riches, national pour les pauvres – a conduit le monde au bord du gouffre. Il est grand temps de ne plus laisser le monopole du politique aux marchands d’illusions identitaires, ces faiseurs de malheurs.



2 vols. International Law
Series 16. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
2017. 1,568 p.

THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW


Edited by Andrea **Bianchi**

This research collection offers a comprehensive view of the most notable contributions to the theory and philosophy of international law.

In the first volume, a number of philosophical inquiries have been selected, alongside contributions offering general theoretical insight into international law. The purpose is to identify general themes of discussion, such as the nature and functioning of international law, and to illustrate how philosophers and international law scholars tackle them in their respective fields of inquiry. In the second volume, the kaleidoscope of different contemporary theories and approaches to international law is presented, with a view to illustrating the different ways of thinking about international law nowadays.

In his introduction, entitled “On Asking Questions”, Professor Bianchi calls into question the traditional compartmentalisation between philosophy and theory and offers a few insights on the meaning and value of theoretical work.

“With his well-known sharpness and erudition, Andrea Bianchi realises a tour de force by compiling some of the most representative, provocative and pivotal works on the philosophy and theory of international law in recent decades.”
Jean d’Aspremont, University of Manchester, UK




London: Pluto Press.
November 2017. 192 p.

A THEORY OF ISIS POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE GLOBAL ORDER

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould **Mohamedou**

In the course of a few years, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – more commonly known as ISIS – has become classified as the most dangerous terrorist organisation in the world. It is the subject of intense Western scrutiny, demonised by all, and shrouded in numerous myths and narratives.

Against these established narratives, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou presents his new theory of ISIS. Tracing the genealogy of ISIS and documenting its evolution in Iraq and Syria, he argues that ISIS has actually transcended Osama Bin Laden’s original scheme of Al Qaeda, mutating into an unprecedented hybrid between postcolonial violence, postmodernity, and postglobalisation. *A Theory of ISIS* offers an original take on the militant group. Professor Mohamedou explains the proliferation of terrorist attacks on the West and deepens our understanding of the group’s impact on the very nature of contemporary political violence.



Sociograph 26.
Geneva: University of
Geneva. 2017. 112 p.


COMPLICITY AND ANTAGONISM ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEWS OF GENEVA

Edited by Alessandro **Monsutti**, Françoise **Grange Omokaro**, Philippe **Gazagne** and Sandro **Cattacin**

Focusing on Geneva, a unique laboratory for studying cities and migration, this volume brings together texts and drawings produced by students of the Master of Anthropology and Sociology at the Graduate Institute. It observes social dynamics in the weekly market in Les Grottes, a gaming hall in Plainpalais, the Sentier des Saules in Jonction, a Lebanese restaurant or during a guided walking tour in the street of Les Pâquis. Through everyday life stories and fine-grained description, the authors evoke places, people and atmospheres without skipping over their intellectual and ethical doubts.

One aspect of the ethnographic approach’s relevance becomes clear in the reading: emotion and loyalty within a relationship, far from being obstacles, are valuable heuristic tools, a research method that allows little facts, gleaned almost at random, to become significant. The contributors show how diversity is experienced in the form of movement.

They also reveal the place of subtle, micropolitical logic in a public staging of belonging, in the appropriation of areas, exploring people’s origin, gender, class and intersectional organisation within the public sphere.



Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press. 2017. 430 p.

ASSESSING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FIT FOR PURPOSE?

Edited by Joost **Pauwelyn**, Manfred **Elsig** and Bernard **Hoekman**

The World Trade Organization (WTO) recently celebrated twenty years of existence. The general wisdom is that its dispute settlement institutions work well and its negotiation machinery goes through a phase of prolonged crises. This book overcomes this myopic view and takes stock of the WTO’s achievements whilst going beyond existing disciplinary narratives. With chapters written by scholars who have closely observed the development of the WTO in recent years, it presents the state of the art in thinking about WTO performance. It also considers important issues such as the origins of the multilateral system, the accession process and the WTO’s interaction with other international organisations. The contributions shed new light on untold stories, critically review and present existing scholarship, and sketch new research avenues for a future generation of trade scholars.

This book bridges disciplinary views on the World Trade Organization and encourages supplementary views over standard, narrow assessments. It will appeal to a wide audience that aims to better understand the drivers and obstacles of WTO performance.



Nouvelle édition.
Paris : La Découverte.
2017. 128 p.

HISTOIRE DE L’IRAN CONTEMPORAIN

Mohammad-Reza **Djalili** et Thierry **Kellner**

Étrange pays que ce grand État chiite, qui n’a jamais rompu avec son passé préislamique et qui, malgré son particularisme – son insularité, disent certains –, a toujours exercé un rayonnement culturel bien au-delà de ses frontières. Curieux destin que celui de ce vieil empire aujourd’hui entouré de jeunes États, objet pendant tout le XIX^e et le début du XX^e siècle de rivalités entre puissances russe et britannique, et qui est aussi la première nation du Moyen-Orient à s’être dotée d’une Constitution moderne obtenue à la suite d’une révolution dès 1906.

Précurseur dans la nationalisation de ses ressources pétrolières, l’Iran est également le premier pays à connaître une révolution islamique qui provoque un séisme politique sans précédent à travers le monde musulman et au-delà. Aujourd’hui, alors que ses voisins tentent d’endiguer la montée de l’islamisme radical, il cherche la voie pour sortir d’une révolution religieuse.

L’histoire contemporaine de l’Iran, à la fois laboratoire politique pour le monde et nation à part, du point de vue identitaire et historique, vaut d’être connue. Le présent ouvrage a pour ambition d’initier le lecteur à cette histoire foisonnante et méconnue de l’Iran des deux derniers siècles (1796-2017).





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