

Targeted Sanctions Consortium **T S C**

Database Codebook

TARGETED
SANCTIONS
CONSORTIUM

Coding Key

Variable number	Variable name	Standard coding			
	Variable description	Yes: 1	No: 0	N/A: -99	Missing: .

General Background

v1	<i>United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responsiveness</i>	Time in months
	The time between the UNSC first taking note of a conflict or situation (presidential note, official conversation/discussion, item on the agenda, etc.) and the imposition of sanctions. Only relevant for the first episode. NOTE: Adjustments in the middle of existing sanction regimes (i.e. Taliban and Iraq) are coded as N/A (-99).	
v2	<i>Is a permanent member of the Security Council (P5) directly affected or involved?</i>	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Direct involvement refers to the degree of engagement between a P5 member and the targeted country or region. A high degree of engagement will generally exist between bordering territories, former colonial powers and subjects, Cold War and contemporary allies, patron states and their clients, as well as between states with a history of close interaction (due to large diaspora constituencies residing in a P5 country, for example).	
v3	<i>Identity of P5 member affected or involved?</i>	US: 1 China: 2 UK: 3 Russia: 4 France: 5
	More than one P5 member may be affected or involved (as indicated in extra columns v3a and v3b). NOTE: N/A refers to cases where no P5 member was affected or involved.	
v4	<i>Is an elected Security Council (SC) member directly affected or involved?</i>	Yes: 1 No: 0
	See v2.	
v5	<i>Is a regional organization involved?</i>	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Involvement of regional organizations includes, among others, mediation, peacekeeping, sanctions, or humanitarian assistance. NOTE: For regional organizations involved, see v168-v176.	
v6	<i>Is the conflict part of another conflict within the region?</i>	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Conflict has well-acknowledged/established links to a preceding conflict in another country/countries in the region. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v7	<i>What is the target's degree of global interdependence?</i>	Open field
	Measured as trade as a percentage of GDP. NOTE: This variable has not yet been coded.	
v8	<i>Distinctively unique aspects of this case</i>	Open field
	This variable covers a broad variety of distinctive	

	elements that can be contained within the design of the sanctions themselves or within the environment they aim to address. Anything novel associated with the relevant sanctions regime.	
v9	<p>Cases involve regime change?</p> <p>Refers to regime change as an outcome at some point throughout the duration of UN targeted sanctions. Causality is not implied. Information for the whole sanctions regime is provided in the first episode.</p> <p>NOTE: In cases where sanctions regimes are split (e.g. AQT), regime change is coded only for the first episode of the original regime.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0

Objectives

Refers to objectives articulated in the UNSC resolutions that trigger new episodes. More than one objective may apply.

v10	Objective: Nuclear non-proliferation	Yes: 1 No: 0
v11	Objective: Counter-terrorism	Yes: 1 No: 0
v12	Objective: Armed conflict - Cease hostilities	Yes: 1 No: 0
v13	Objective: Armed conflict - Negotiate peace agreement	Yes: 1 No: 0
v14	Objective: Armed conflict - Peace enforcement	Yes: 1 No: 0
v15	<p>Objective: Armed conflict - Peace building</p> <p>Support initiatives such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) or United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO) support.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v16	<p>Objective: Democracy support</p> <p>Such as restoring constitutionally elected governments or supporting transitional governments and dissuading spoilers.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v17	<p>Objective: Good governance</p> <p>Such as rule of law, transparency and accountability mechanisms (i.e. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or Kimberley Process).</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v18	Objective: Human rights	Yes: 1 No: 0
v19	Objective: Protect population under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)	Yes: 1 No: 0
v20	Objective: Support humanitarian efforts	Yes: 1 No: 0
v21	Objective: Support judicial process	Yes: 1 No: 0
v22	<p>Primary Objective</p> <p>Acknowledging the complexity of the situation, the primary objective in each episode was based on the text of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode.</p>	<p>Nuclear non-proliferation: 1 Counter-terrorism: 2 Armed conflict (cease hostilities, negotiate peace agreement, peace enforcement, and/or peace building): 3 Democracy support: 4 Good governance: 5 Human rights: 6 Protect population under R2P: 7 Support humanitarian efforts: 8 Support judicial process: 9</p>

Sanctions Regime Details

v23	Number of episodes	Number of episodes
	Episodes are defined principally by change in the nature of the targeted sanction (type of sanctions, target of sanctions, purpose of sanctions, or significant change in enforcement). Dramatic changes on the ground may also trigger a new episode, but variable generally remains dependent on a new UNSCR to start each episode. Information for the whole sanctions regime is provided in the first episode. NOTE: In some cases, targeted sanctions regimes transformed into comprehensive ones. Episodes of comprehensive sanctions are excluded from the database and not considered in this variable.	
v24	Sanctions terminated?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to sanctions terminated explicitly in UNSC resolution. Only relevant for the last episode. NOTE: Sanctions regimes that changed from targeted to comprehensive sanctions (i.e. Former Yugoslavia I and Haiti) are considered terminated.	
v25	UN sanctions preceded by other sanctions?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Autonomous unilateral or regional sanctions put in place with similar objectives prior to UN sanction imposition. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v26	Unilateral sanctions preceded UN sanctions?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Autonomous sanctions imposed by single countries with similar objectives prior to UN sanction imposition. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v27	Regional sanctions preceded UN sanctions?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Autonomous sanctions imposed by regional organizations (such as European Union or African Union) with similar objectives prior to UN sanction imposition. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v28	Did a threat of sanctions precede its imposition?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	A threat must be contained within a formal UN pronouncement or articulated by a public official in a position to bring the proposal of sanctions forward to the UN. Only relevant for the first episode.	
v29	Episode start date	dd/mm/yyyy
	For definition of an episode, see v23.	
v30	Episode end date	dd/mm/yyyy
	For definition of an episode, see v23.	
v31	Duration of episode	Time in months
	Rounded to the nearest half month. For definition of an episode, see v23. NOTE: N/A refers to sanctions regimes that are ongoing.	

Political Will

v32	What prompted UNSC action	Open field
	Typically based on opening paragraphs of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode.	
v33	Is NGO pressure significant to UN deliberation?	Yes: 1 No: 0

	Evidence of strong lobbying on behalf of an affected party or NGO activists.	
v34	Which country leads drafting UNSC resolution?	US: 1 China: 2 UK: 3 Russia: 4 France: 5 Other: 6
	Information generally found through the Security Council Report and UN press releases. More than one country can lead resolution drafting (as indicated in extra columns v34a and v34b).	
v35	Number of votes in favor	Number of votes
v36	Number of votes opposed	Number of votes
v37	Number of abstentions	Number of votes
v38	Was the vote unanimous?	Yes: 1 No: 0
v39	Number of abstentions from P5 members	Number of abstentions
v40	Stated reasons for opposition or abstention	Open field
	Information available in UN press releases, case studies, and credible media reporting.	
v41	Were there P5 reservations to the sanctions?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Information available in UN press releases, case studies, and credible media reporting.	
v42	Identity of P5 member with reservations to the sanctions	US: 1 China: 2 UK: 3 Russia: 4 France: 5
	Refers to a P5 member statement of reservation at the time of resolution passage. May be more than one country (as indicated in the extra column v42a). NOTE: N/A refers to cases with no P5 member reservations.	
v43	Was Sanctions Committee formed at the beginning of the episode?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Sanctions Committee formed at the passage of the first UNSCR in the episode. Coded as 1 for subsequent episodes if the Committee was already in place at the beginning of the episode. NOTE: Episodes where Sanctions Committee is formed later in the episode (FRY 1 EP1, Somalia EP1, Liberia EP1, and DRC EP1) are coded as 0.	
v44	Is there a Panel of Experts/Monitoring team?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Established or in place at any point during the episode.	
v45	If individual sanctions are authorized, are individual targets designated?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to whether any designations of individuals and/or corporate entities were made during the episode. NOTE: N/A refers to cases where no individual sanctions were authorized.	
v46	Time between UNSCR authorization of individual sanctions and designation of targets	Time in months
	Applies only to episodes where targets of individual sanctions (v106) have been designated (v45). Continuing designations from previous episodes are coded as 0 months (i.e. immediate designation) and "ongoing" if no one was designated and the episode has not yet ended. If the first designations took place in later episodes, the time reported includes also the length of the previous episodes where individual sanctions were authorized but no designations were made.	
v47	Member state reporting	No reporting: 0 Called for / Urged: 1 Conditional: 2 Requested: 3 Required: 4
	Based on UNSC resolution text. Refers to whether	

member states reporting is requested, required, or conditional – that is, if it is requested or required (a) upon completion of a certain action (such as cargo inspection) or (b) only by a specific category of member states (such as those in the region or those participating in a peacekeeping operation).
 NOTE: When more than one reporting requirement is present in the same episode, priority goes to the one considered more strongly worded (i.e. reverse order of the coding rule: required, requested, conditional, called upon/urged). Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.

Purpose and Target

Articulated by UNSC resolutions and inferred from the specific design of the sanctions and the targets to whom sanctions apply. More than one purpose is possible.

v48	Purpose: Coerce a change of behavior	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Specific demands to a target in the form of “desist from...” or “join the talks”, etc. found in the text of the UNSC resolutions. For evaluation of effectiveness in coercing, see v282-286.	
v49	Purpose: Constrain a target’s behavior	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Drawn from the text of the relevant resolution and the design of respective measures. The pattern of individual and sectoral targeting in each case can provide a clear indication of the purpose. For evaluation of effectiveness in constraining, see v287-291.	
v50	Purpose: Signal and/or stigmatize a target	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Drawn from UNSC resolution text, sanction targets, and regime design. This variable looks at how sanctions interact with norms (contestations and reinforcement). It also looks at how targets feel stigmatized. There are, consequently, two dimensions or components to the variable: the clarity of the signal communicated and the degree of stigmatization experienced (social psychological aspect). For evaluation of effectiveness in signaling, see v292-296.	
v51	Principal purpose of sanctions in the episode	Coerce: 1 Constrain: 2 Signal: 3
	Acknowledging the complexity of the situation and the multiple purposes often associated with sanctions, the principal purpose in each episode was based on the text of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode and the design of the sanctions regime.	
v52	Who is meant to be coerced: Entire government	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v53	Who is meant to be coerced: Government leadership	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v54	Who is meant to be coerced: Rebel faction	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	

v55	Who is meant to be coerced: All parties to the conflict	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v56	Who is meant to be coerced: Terrorist group	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v57	Who is meant to be coerced: Leadership family members	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v58	Who is meant to be coerced: Facilitators of proscribed activity	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v59	Who is meant to be coerced: Individual targets	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Includes both individual and corporate/political entities. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v60	Who is meant to be coerced: Key regime supporters	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to domestic regime supporters. Regional supporters (such as neighboring countries) are captured by v62. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v61	Who is meant to be coerced: Domestic constituencies in target country	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v62	Who is meant to be coerced: Regional constituencies	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Such as regional organizations or neighboring states. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v63	Who is meant to be coerced: Global constituencies	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Such as global human rights organizations. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v64	Primary target of coercion	Entire government: 1 Government leadership: 2 Rebel faction: 3 All parties to the conflict: 4 Terrorist group: 5 Leadership family members: 6 Facilitators of proscribed activity: 7 Individual targets: 8 Key regime supporters: 9 Domestic constituencies in target: 10 Regional constituencies: 11 Global constituencies: 12
	Drawn from UNSC resolution text, sanctions regime design, and implementation/enforcement during the episode. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where coercion is a purpose.	
v65	Who is meant to be constrained: Entire government	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	
v66	Who is meant to be constrained: Government leadership	Yes: 1 No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	
v67	Who is meant to be constrained: Rebel faction	Yes: 1 No: 0

	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	
v68	Who is meant to be constrained: All parties to the conflict NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v69	Who is meant to be constrained: Terrorist group NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v70	Who is meant to be constrained: Leadership family members NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v71	Who is meant to be constrained: Facilitators of proscribed activity NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v72	Who is meant to be constrained: Individual targets Includes both individual and corporate/political entities. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v73	Who is meant to be constrained: Key regime supporters Refers to domestic regime supporters. Regional supporters (such as neighboring countries) are captured by v75. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v74	Who is meant to be constrained: Domestic constituencies in target countries NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v75	Who is meant to be constrained: Regional constituencies Such as regional organizations or neighboring states. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v76	Who is meant to be constrained: Global constituencies Such as global human rights organizations. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v77	Primary target of constraint Drawn from UNSC resolution text, sanctions regime design, and implementation/enforcement during the episode. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where constraint is a purpose.	Entire government: 1 Government leadership: 2 Rebel faction: 3 All parties to the conflict: 4 Terrorist group: 5 Leadership family members: 6 Facilitators of proscribed activity: 7 Individual targets: 8 Key regime supporters: 9 Domestic constituencies in target: 10 Regional constituencies: 11 Global constituencies: 12
v78	Who is meant to be signaled: Entire government NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v79	Who is meant to be signaled: Government leadership	Yes: 1 No: 0

	NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.		
v80	Who is meant to be signaled: Rebel faction NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v81	Who is meant to be signaled: All parties to the conflict NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v82	Who is meant to be signaled: Terrorist group NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v83	Who is meant to be signaled: Leadership family members NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v84	Who is meant to be signaled: Facilitators of proscribed activity NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v85	Who is meant to be signaled: Individual targets Includes both individual and corporate/political entities. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v86	Who is meant to be signaled: Key regime supporters Refers to domestic regime supporters. Regional supporters (such as neighboring countries) are captured by v88. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v87	Who is meant to be signaled: Domestic constituencies in sending countries NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v88	Who is meant to be signaled: Regional constituencies Refers to signals being sent to regional organizations or neighboring states; often the AU or ECOWAS are already on the ground and looking for a signal that their pursuits are internationally acknowledged and supported. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v89	Who is meant to be signaled: Global constituencies Refers to signals being sent to all global constituencies, often about a universal international norm. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v90	Primary target of the signal	Entire government: 1 Government leadership: 2 Rebel faction: 3 All parties to the conflict: 4 Terrorist group: 5	

	<p>Drawn from UNSC resolution text and sanctions regime design during the episode. NOTE: Applies only to episodes where signaling is a purpose.</p>	<p>Leadership family members: 6 Facilitators of proscribed activity: 7 Individual targets: 8 Key regime supporters: 9 Domestic constituencies: 10 Regional constituencies: 11 Global constituencies: 12</p>
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Norm Signaling

Norms are generally explicitly articulated in the text of UNSC resolutions or implied by the specific design of each sanctions regime. More than one norm can be signaled.

v91	Norm signaled: Nuclear non-proliferation	Yes: 1	No: 0
v92	Norm signaled: Counter-terrorism	Yes: 1	No: 0
v93	Norm signaled: Prohibition of war/armed conflict	Yes: 1	No: 0
v94	Norm signaled: Support democracy/Oppose non-constitutional change in government	Yes: 1	No: 0
v95	Norm signaled: Improve governance	Yes: 1	No: 0
	In particular with regards to the governance of natural resources and/or the security sector.		
v96	Norm signaled: Human rights	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Human rights violations (such as the use of child soldiers, treatment of minorities, gender-based violence, and ethnic cleansing) articulated in text of UNSC resolution.		
v97	Norm signaled: Protect population under R2P	Yes: 1	No: 0
v98	Norm signaled: Authority of the UN Security Council	Yes: 1	No: 0
v99	Norm signaled: Authority of regional arrangements	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Includes for example regional organizations, peace negotiation initiatives, or peacekeeping forces.		
v100	Norm signaled: Support judicial process	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Including legal referrals to the ICC, creation of specialized courts, and/or support for national legal prosecutions.		
v101	Principal norm signaled	<p>Non-proliferation: 1 Counter-terrorism: 2 Prohibition of war/armed conflict: 3 Non-constitutional change in government: 4 Improved governance: 5 Human rights: 6 Protect population under R2P: 7 Authority of UN Security Council: 8 Authority of regional arrangements: 9 Support judicial process: 10</p>	
	Acknowledging the complexity of the situation, the principal norm signaled in each episode was based on the text of the principal UNSC resolution that triggered the episode.		

Type of Sanctions

NOTE: The specific type of sanction is coded as 'yes' (1) if it was in place at one point during the episode. In the case of sanctions suspensions (Libya 1 EP3 and Haiti EP2), suspended sanctions are coded as 'yes' (1).

V102	Was sanctions implementation deliberately delayed?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to UNSC resolutions passed with delayed implementation date for at least one of the sanctions imposed, at least one time during the episode, with explicit delay (of 30 days, for example) before sanctions come into force.	
V103	Were sanctions imposed for a specific time period?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to sanctions imposed for a limited time period (e.g. 1 year).	
v104	Were sanctions regionally limited within a country?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Includes delimitations by demarcated provinces and areas controlled by targeted group.	
v105	Did this episode involve secondary sanctions?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Imposed on another country for sanctions violations or other actions taken in support of the target(s).	
v106	Were individual sanctions imposed?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	For designations, see v45.	
v107	Individual sanction: Travel ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to individual travel bans. For travel bans on classes of government officials or diplomats, see v118.	
v108	Number of travel ban designees	Number of designees
	Coded according to the highest cumulative number of designees during each episode.	
v109	Individual sanction: Individual/corporate entity asset freeze	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to individual and/or corporate entities (companies, non-governmental organizations or political entities) asset freeze. NOTE: For the subcategory of this variable referring to political entities (government, former regime, or rebel faction) specified directly in the sanctions resolution text, see v110-3.	
v110	Were assets of political entities frozen?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to the subcategory of individual asset freeze, explicitly targeting political entities (government, former regime, or rebel faction) in the resolution text. NOTE: For the broader category of individual/corporate entity asset freeze, see v109.	
v111	Target of political entities asset freeze: Government	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of political entities asset freeze (v110).	
v112	Target of political entities asset freeze: Former regime	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of political entities asset freeze (v110).	
v113	Target of political entities asset freeze: Rebel faction	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of political entities asset freeze (v110).	
v114	Number of asset freeze designees	Number of designees
	Coded according to the highest cumulative number of designees during each episode. NOTE: Applies only to individual/corporate entity asset freeze (v109), including all of its subcategories.	
v115	Individual sanction: Asset freeze and transfer	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to the specific cases in which in addition to an asset freeze (v109) the resolution demands the transfer of assets to a particular source.	

v116	Number of asset freeze and transfer designees	Number of designees
	Coded according to the highest cumulative number of designees (both individuals and corporate entities or political entities) for asset freeze and transfer during each episode.	
v117	Were diplomatic sanctions imposed?	Yes: 1 No: 0
v118	Diplomatic sanction: Limiting travel of diplomatic or government personnel	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to travel limitations on classes of government officials or diplomats (such as government, armed forces, or military junta). For individual travel bans, see v107.	
v119	Diplomatic sanction: Limiting diplomatic representation	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Including offices of official representation.	
v120	Diplomatic sanction: Revision of visa policy	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to limiting, suspending, or canceling entry visas and/or expulsion of categories of nationals.	
v121	Diplomatic sanction: Limiting number of diplomatic personnel	Yes: 1 No: 0
v122	Were sectoral sanctions imposed?	Yes: 1 No: 0
v123	Sectoral sanction: Aviation ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v124	Sectoral sanction: Arms imports embargo	Yes: 1 No: 0
	For arms exports embargo, see v128.	
v125	Arms imports embargo: Non-governmental entities	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of arms imports embargo (v124).	
v126	Arms imports embargo: Government forces	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of arms imports embargo (v124).	
v127	Arms imports embargo: All parties to the conflict	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to a subcategory of arms imports embargo (v124).	
v128	Sectoral sanction: Arms exports ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
	For arms imports embargo, see v124.	
v129	Sectoral sanction: Proliferation-sensitive material	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Including both imports and exports ban on proliferation-sensitive material.	
v130	Sectoral sanction: Oil services equipment imports ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v131	Sectoral sanction: Shipping and transportation	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Includes bunkering bans and ground or waterborne transportation services and equipment bans.	
v132	Were commodity sanctions imposed?	Yes: 1 No: 0
v133	Commodity sanction: Petroleum imports ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v134	Commodity sanction: Diamond exports ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v135	Relevance of diamonds to total exports	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	
v136	Commodity sanction: Timber exports ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v137	Relevance of timber to total exports	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	
v138	Commodity sanction: Charcoal exports ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v139	Relevance of charcoal to total exports	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	

v140	Commodity sanction: Luxury goods imports ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v141	Relevance of luxury goods to total imports	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	
v142	Commodity sanction: Other	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Including both commodity imports and exports bans. Other commodities include heroin processing chemicals, cultural property, or illegal crude oil exports.	
v143	Relevance of other commodity to total exports	Percentage
	Sources may vary but will be indicated and held constant across commodity type where possible.	
v144	Were financial sector sanctions imposed?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to broader financial sector sanctions. For individual/corporate asset freeze, see v109.	
v145	Financial sector sanction: Central Bank asset freeze	Yes: 1 No: 0
v146	Financial sector sanction: Investment ban	Yes: 1 No: 0
v147	Financial sector sanction: Financial services	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Such as transfers or public support, including provisions of bulk cash, export credits, loans, guarantees, or insurance.	
v148	Financial sector sanction: Sovereign wealth funds	Yes: 1 No: 0
v149	Estimated size of frozen sovereign wealth funds	Size in US dollars
v150	Financial sector sanction: Diaspora tax	Yes: 1 No: 0

Other Actors Involved

Significant players or contributors to policy outcomes on the ground by virtue of a coordination/directing role (regardless of whether they directly interact with the sanctions regime) mentioned in UN reports (panels of experts or monitoring groups, for example) or documented well by media or academic observers. Information of involvement may also be drawn from specific actors' websites. The objective of these variables is to gain insight into the nature of the environment on the ground. This information is used to assess UN sanctions contribution to policy outcomes (v283, v288, v293). Actor is coded as 'yes' (1) if it was involved at one point during the episode.

v151	Conflict-related actor: Peacekeeping forces	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Includes both UN and regional peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Does not consider exclusively civilian or political missions. NOTE: Excludes PKOs that do not address the same issue as the UN sanctions (i.e. Lebanon and Sudan I are coded as 0).	
v152	Conflict-related actor: Peacekeeping mission in neighboring country	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Includes both UN and regional peacekeeping operations.	
v153	Conflict-related actor: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Pre-OCHA institutions (i.e. Department of Humanitarian Affairs) included.	
v154	Conflict-related actor: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Yes: 1 No: 0

v155	Conflict-related actor: World Food Programme (WFP)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v156	Conflict-related actor: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v157	Conflict-related actor: Kimberley Process	Yes: 1	No: 0
v158	Conflict-related actor: Human Rights Council/Commission	Yes: 1	No: 0
v159	Conflict-related actor: Other	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Includes the full spectrum of established actors active in conflict zones (e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, UN Peacebuilding Commission). NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v160	Proliferation-related actor: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v161	Proliferation-related actor: Other	Yes: 1	No: 0
	For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group or US-led proliferation security initiative. NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v162	Terrorism-related actor: Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v163	Terrorism-related actor: Financial Action Task Force (FATF)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v164	Terrorism-related actor: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/International Monetary Fund (IMF)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v165	Terrorism-related actor: Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v166	Terrorism-related actor: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v167	Terrorism-related actor: Other	Yes: 1	No: 0
	For example, United Nations Counterterrorism Committee (UNCTC) or Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v168	Regional actor: Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v169	Regional actor: African Union (AU)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v170	Regional actor: Organization of American States (OAS)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v171	Regional actor: European Union (EU)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v172	Regional actor: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v173	Regional actor: Arab League	Yes: 1	No: 0
v174	Regional actor: Organization of Islamic Conference	Yes: 1	No: 0
v175	Regional actor: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v176	Regional actor: Other	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). NOTE: The name of the actor(s) is indicated in the extra column (open field).		
v177	Is there a Special Representative for the Secretary	Yes: 1	No: 0

	General?	
v178	Is there any functionally specific Special Representative?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	For example, a Special Representative for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.	
v179	Are the Panels of Experts interacting with other actors?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	For presence of Panel of Experts/Monitoring teams, see v44.	
v180	On balance, did UN sanctions complement or conflict with the activities of other UN actors?	Complement: 1 Conflict: 2 Unable to determine: 3
	NOTE: This variable has not yet been coded.	
v181	On balance, did UN sanctions complement or conflict with the activities of other multilateral actors?	Complement: 1 Conflict: 2 Unable to determine: 3
	NOTE: This variable has not yet been coded.	
v182	With which other multilateral actors did UN sanctions conflict or cooperate?	Open field

Other Sanctions

Refers to autonomous sanctions in place that go beyond UN sanctions during the episode.

v183	Are sanctions by regional organizations in place?	Yes: 1 No: 0
	Refers to autonomous sanctions by regional organizations that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations). NOTE: For autonomous sanctions imposed by regional organizations prior to UN sanction imposition, see v27.	
v184	Regional sanctions: Are European Union (EU) sanctions in place?	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2
	Refers to autonomous EU sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	
v185	Regional sanctions: Are African Union (AU) sanctions in place?	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2
	Refers to autonomous AU sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	
v186	Regional sanctions: Are Organization of American States sanctions in place?	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2
	Refers to autonomous OAS sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	
v187	Regional sanctions: Are Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sanctions in place?	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2
	Refers to autonomous ASEAN sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	
v188	Regional sanctions: Are Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctions in place?	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2

	Refers to autonomous ECOWAS sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Autonomous sanctions refer to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	
v189	Are unilateral sanctions in place? Refers to unilateral sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations). NOTE: For autonomous sanctions imposed by single countries prior to UN sanction imposition, see v26.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v190	Unilateral sanctions: Are United States (US) unilateral sanctions in place? Refers to unilateral US sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2
v191	Unilateral sanctions: Are United Kingdom (UK) unilateral sanctions in place? Refers to unilateral UK sanctions that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2
v192	Unilateral sanctions: Are other unilateral sanctions in place? Refers to unilateral sanctions by other countries that were in place at one point during the episode. Unilateral sanctions refer specifically to measures imposed in addition to those authorized by UNSC (including additional designations).	No: 0 Targeted: 1 Comprehensive: 2
v193	Are there sanctions regimes in neighboring countries? Refers to UN sanctions imposed on immediate neighbors (i.e. sharing contiguous borders) in place at one point during the episode.	Yes: 1 No: 0

Other Policy Instruments

Other policy instruments include significant measures taken by the United Nations, individual Member States, or regional organizations.

v194	Other policy instruments: Threat of use of force Refers to a credible threat by or on behalf of a public official in a position to affect the circumstances.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v195	Other policy instruments: Force, limited strikes and operations	Yes: 1 No: 0
v196	Other policy instruments: Force, robust military force	Yes: 1 No: 0
v197	Other policy instruments: Force, no-fly zone	Yes: 1 No: 0
v198	Other policy instruments: Force, naval blockade	Yes: 1 No: 0
v199	Other policy instruments: Peacekeeping operations	Yes: 1 No: 0
V200	Other policy instruments: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)	Yes: 1 No: 0
V201	Other policy instruments: Covert, cyber-sabotage	Yes: 1 No: 0
v202	Other policy instruments: Covert, targeted assassinations	Yes: 1 No: 0

v203	Other policy instruments: International Criminal Court (ICC)/International Court of Justice (ICJ)	Yes: 1	No: 0
v204	Other policy instruments: Other international courts and tribunals	Yes: 1	No: 0
	For example International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or Special Court on Sierra Leone.		
v205	Other policy instruments: Significant diplomatic pressure and/or multilateral negotiation	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Refers to efforts to influence on the part of regional groups or other multilateral coalitions such as the Six Party Talks on DPRK or the E3+3 (France, UK and Germany plus China, Russia, US) on Iran.		

Implementation and Enforcement

v206	Were substantive member state reports received?	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Refers to reports that address more than a simple acknowledgement of compliance or translation into domestic law. Demonstrates that member is actively engaging with the sanctions. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended. For member state reporting requirements, see v47.		
v207	Are Sanctions Committee guidelines in place?	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Refers to the procedural guidelines for the operation of the Sanctions Committee. NOTE: For presence of Sanctions Committee at the beginning of each episode, see v43.		
v208	Are designation criteria specified?	Yes: 1	No: 0
	NOTE: Applies only to individual sanctions (v106).		
v209	Are enforcement authorities specified?	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Refers to enforcement authorities specified in UNSC resolution text. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.		
v210	Are there clear instances of enforcement?	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Refers to examples of enforcement that go beyond implementation articulated by policy or law. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.		
v211	Specific instances of enforcement	Open field	
	Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.		
v212	Does a Peacekeeping Operation have an enforcement role?	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Information derived from UNSCRs and UNDPKO site lists the mandates. NOTE: Applies only for episodes where peacekeeping operations are present (v151). Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.		
v213	Are there indications of national level implementation?	Yes: 1	No: 0
	Primarily refers to implementation by sending countries but could be applied to targets (in the case of certification schemes, for example). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.		
v214	Specific indications of national level implementation	Open field	

	Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	
v215	<i>Is there evidence of travel ban implementation?</i> Refers to both individual (v107) and governmental (v118) travel bans. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v216	<i>Specific evidence of travel ban implementation</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v217	<i>Were assets frozen?</i> Refers to individual/corporate entity asset freeze (v109), including all of its subcategories. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v218	<i>Total volume of assets frozen</i> NOTE: Only applies to episodes in which assets were frozen (v217). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Volume in USD
v219	<i>Were accounts frozen?</i> Refers to individual/corporate entity asset freeze (v109), including all of its subcategories. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v220	<i>Total number of accounts frozen</i> NOTE: Only applies to episodes in which accounts were frozen (v219). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Number of accounts frozen
v221	<i>Were diplomatic sanctions enforced?</i> NOTE: Applies only to diplomatic sanctions (v117). For the different types of diplomatic sanctions, see v118-21. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v222	<i>Instances of diplomatic sanctions enforcement</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v223	<i>Were landing rights denied?</i> Related to aviation ban (v123). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v224	<i>Specific instances of landing rights being denied</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v225	<i>Was servicing denied?</i> Servicing restrictions are primarily related to the implementation of aviation bans (v123), but may extend to other sanctions (such as shipping v131 and specific prohibitions on arms, proliferation, or Internet hosting related servicing) if relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended or relevant sanctions never entered in force. Coded as 1 for cases where servicing was denied based on recommended actions by the UNSC.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v226	<i>Specific instances of denial of service</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as	Open field

	articulated by policy or law.	
v227	<i>Is there any evidence of interdiction?</i> Refers to boarding a vessel, inspection of a vessel or other means of transport, or otherwise arresting the movement of embargoed goods. Where relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v228	<i>Specific evidence of interdiction</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v229	<i>Is there any evidence of detention of vessels?</i> Where relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v230	<i>Evidence of vessels detention</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field
v231	<i>Is there any evidence of the cancellation of credits?</i> Where relevant. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v232	<i>Evidence of credits cancelled</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate enforcement, not simply implementation as articulated by policy or law.	Open field

Impact Assessment

The following variables indicate direct and indirect impacts of targeted sanctions. Impacts of targeted sanctions are direct when they affect principal parties to the conflict or situation that prompted sanctions. Direct impacts include assessments of the economic disadvantages to the target of sanctions and on the target's ability to continue proscribed activities. Variables representing direct political, social, and psychological (stigmatizing or isolating) effects on the targeted parties are also important, including assessments of reputational costs to legitimate actors engaged with targeted parties. Indirect impacts refer to the extent to which the measures had impacts on non-targeted, but inter-related economic, political, and social dynamics, processes, or groups (such as creating incentives for import substitution, as an economic example, or the sociological implications of targeted measures that have indirect implications for gender or ethnicity).

v233	<i>Indications of direct economic impact</i> Assets frozen, change in arms supplies, measure of resource exports, and other measures of diminished trade and/or access to financing.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v234	<i>Specific indications of direct economic impact</i> Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate direct impact.	Open field
v235	<i>Indications of direct political impact</i> Refers to a change in the political dynamics associated with the targeted regime or faction. For example, if a commodities embargo directly contributes to the fracturing of a rebel group or to a regime's decision to call	Yes: 1 No: 0

	a ceasefire.	
v236	Specific indications of direct political impact Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate direct impact.	Open field
v237	Indications of direct social or psychological impact Stigmatizing or isolating effects on the targeted party or legitimate actors engaged with the targeted party.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v238	Specific indications of direct social or psychological impact Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate direct impact.	Open field
v239	Indications of indirect economic impact For example, creating incentives for import substitution, the development of new technologies, or the diversion of foreign investment and credit.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v240	Specific indications of indirect economic impact Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate indirect impact.	Open field
v241	Indications of indirect political impact For example, divisions within political leadership, introduction of rationing schemes, undermining state infrastructure or weakening state institutional capacity.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v242	Specific indications of indirect political impact Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate indirect impact.	Open field
v243	Indications of indirect social or psychological impact Refers to implications of measures that go beyond the targeted parties and affect social or psychological dynamics (associated with gender or ethnicity, for example).	Yes: 1 No: 0
v244	Specific indications of indirect social or psychological impact Instances must refer to documented examples that demonstrate indirect impact.	Open field

Evasion/Coping Strategies

v245	Are there indications of sanctions evasion/coping strategies?	Yes: 1 No: 0
v246	Evasion: Disguise of identity or use of forged documents NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v247	Evasion: Use of front companies NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v248	Evasion: Reliance on family members Utilizing a relative's bank account to move money when assets are frozen, for example. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v249	Evasion: Use of informal value transfer systems Refers to an informal yet defined mechanism for transferring funds or financing evasion, such as the Hawala system. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v250	Evasion: Use of safe havens	Yes: 1 No: 0

	Refers broadly to any place of refuge safeguarded by sympathizers, whether a specific location, region, or foreign country. NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.		
v251	<i>Evasion: Disguise vessels</i> Refer to seaborne vessels and other means of transport (for example, switching the tail numbers of aircraft). NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v252	<i>Evasion: Use of black market contractors</i> NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v253	<i>Evasion: Denial of inspection</i> NOTE: Coded N/A (-99) when sanctions suspended.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v254	<i>Coping: Use of alternative value source</i> Refers to a substitute commodity or industry.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v255	<i>Coping: Shifting terms of debate or change subject (diplomatically)</i> For example, mobilization of AU and Arab League against UN sanctions implementation during Libya 1.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v256	<i>Coping: Stockpiling supplies</i>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v257	<i>Coping: Diversion of trade through third countries</i>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v258	<i>Coping: Coerce or put pressure on major trade partners not to enforce sanctions</i>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v259	<i>Coping: Import substitution, development of new technology.</i>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v260	<i>Coping: Diversify sources of funds and investment</i>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v261	<i>Evasion/Coping: Others</i> Efforts to complicate litigation, for example. NOTE: The specific type of other evasion/coping strategies is indicated in the extra column (open field).	Yes: 1	No: 0

Unintended Consequences

The following variables identify the principal unintended consequences (both positive and negative) of the sanctions imposed in each episode. Among the possible negative externalities of targeted sanctions are the legacies of corruption and criminality often left by sanctions, the strengthening of instruments of authoritarian rule, a “rally around the flag” effect, an increase in human rights violations, and harmful effects on neighboring states. Positive externalities might include increased capacity to regulate internationally in different issue domains (such as financial controls) or opportunities for capacity building training for financial controls, immigration, or customs.

v262	<i>Are there indications of unintended consequences?</i> As indicated in PoE reports or other authoritative sources.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v263	<i>Unintended consequences: Increase in corruption and/or criminality</i> Refers to the tendency for sanctions to contribute to a proliferation of illicit means and networks that function in place of previously legitimate channels.	Yes: 1	No: 0
v264	<i>Unintended consequences: Strengthening of authoritarian rule</i> Refers to increased repressive capacity by the state and/or the deterioration of civil liberties under targeted	Yes: 1	No: 0

	regimes.		
v265	<p>Unintended consequences: Strengthening instruments of the security apparatus of senders</p> <p>Typically considered a negative externality because it provides justification for a state to build its surveillance and intelligence capacities and puts civil liberties at risk. However, it may also have positive externalities such as strengthening a sending state's capacity for border security.</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v266	<p>Unintended consequences: Rally round the flag effect</p> <p>Sanctions are used to justify diversionary policy, resulting in an increase of short-run popular support for a regime.</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v267	<p>Unintended consequences: Increase in human rights violations</p> <p>Under targeted regime or by targeted parties.</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v268	<p>Unintended consequences: Harmful effects on neighboring states</p> <p>Article 50 concerns and spillover effects of the sanctions regime on other states.</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v269	<p>Unintended consequences: Strengthening of political factions</p> <p>Sanctions contribute to a disproportional strengthening of a political faction, either within the government structure or outside of it.</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v270	<p>Unintended consequences: Enhancing stature of targeted individuals</p> <p>The imposition of sanctions generates sympathy or support for a designated target, possibly encouraging others to emulate the targeted individual. NOTE: Applies only to episodes in which individuals designated (v45).</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v271	<p>Unintended consequences: Increase in international regulatory capacity in different issue domains</p> <p>Creation of new international institutions, laws, or norms in response to proscribed activity, though not designed to establish autonomous regulatory regimes. For example, the Kimberley Process (in diamond cases) or improved anti-money laundering provisions established under the 1267 (AQ/T) regime.</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v272	<p>Unintended consequences: Increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains</p> <p>Refers to an empirically observed increase in enforcement and the capacity to enforce as a result of the imposition of a sanctions regime.</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v273	<p>Unintended consequences: Resource diversion</p> <p>Refers to the diversion of resources from one sector to another as a result of sanctions constraints (for example, healthcare allocations being cut to supplement the military budget).</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v274	<p>Unintended consequences: Increase in the growth of the state role in the economy</p> <p>Refers broadly to a variety of ways a state may intervene in the economy as a response to UN sanctions (e.g. allocation, direct ownership, regulation, or subsuming activity previously conducted by private enterprise).</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0
v275	<p>Unintended consequences: Significant burden on</p>	Yes: 1	No: 0

	implementing states	
	The implementation burden is not confined to the public sector; private sector costs are included as well.	
v276	Unintended consequences: Humanitarian consequences Situations in which sanctions are directly linked to the disruption of basic services and the realization of basic needs (for example, undelivered pharmaceutical materials or medical equipment or food access blocked due to the sanctions regime).	Yes: 1 No: 0
v277	Unintended consequences: Human rights implications for sending states Negative impact on human rights in sending states as a result of imposing and implementing sanctions (for example, increased surveillance due to expansion of the global counter-terrorism regime).	Yes: 1 No: 0
v278	Unintended consequences: Decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council Situations in which a popular loss of faith in the UNSC occurs, whether in sending states or under targeted regimes, due, for example, to a failure to implement sanctions that have been imposed in a UNSC resolution. May also refer to a situation in which UN sanctions are mismanaged (by targeting or designating the wrong individuals) or flawed more generally.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v279	Unintended consequences: Reduction of local institutional capacity Situation in which sanctions unintentionally disrupt or prevent local institutions from functioning properly.	Yes: 1 No: 0
v280	Unintended consequences: Widespread harmful economic consequences Circumstances in which sanctions injure the productive capacity of the country or prevent segments of the population from engaging in the economy (national, regional, or sectoral).	Yes: 1 No: 0
v281	Unintended consequences: Other NOTE: The specific type of other unintended consequences is indicated in the extra column (open field).	Yes: 1 No: 0

Effectiveness

v282	<p>Policy outcome: Coercion</p>	<p>1: Lack of significant change in behavior, ignoring the UNSCR, or complete intransigence. 2: Agreeing to a process and/or engaging in negotiations that could result in settling or resolving the dispute or in obfuscation, delaying, or changing terms of debate. 3: Accommodation or significant concessions to resolve the dispute. 4: Meeting most of the objectives of the UNSCR and/or approximating the core purposes as originally articulated in the UNSCR (but not necessarily according to the explicit terms spelled out in the original UNSCR). 5: Meeting all the principal objectives of the UNSCR.</p>
	<p>Evaluates the extent to which the target changed its behavior and the demands of the Security Council have been met. NOTE: For indicators of coercion as a purpose of sanctions, see v48. For overall sanction effectiveness in coercing, see v284-286.</p>	
v283	<p>UN Sanctions contribution: Coercion</p>	<p>0: Negative (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity) 1: None (no discernible sanctions contribution) 2: Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome) 3: Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures) 4: Major (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target) 5: Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions)</p>
	<p>Measurement of sanctions contribution considers all other instruments utilized by the international community at the time (such as diplomatic pressure, use of force, other sanctions, etc.) and indications by the target of the impact and role of UN sanctions. NOTE: For indicators of coercion as a purpose of sanctions, see v48. For overall sanction effectiveness in coercing, see v284-286.</p>	
v284	<p>UN sanctions effectiveness: Coercion – Effective</p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>effective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy outcome is 4 or 5, and UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in coercing, see v282; for UN sanctions contribution to coercion, see v283.</p>	<p>Yes: 1 No: 0</p>
v285	<p>UN sanctions effectiveness: Coercion – Mixed</p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>mixed</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy outcome is 3, and UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in coercing, see v282; for UN sanctions contribution to</p>	<p>Yes: 1 No: 0</p>

	coercion, see v283.	
v286	<p>UN sanctions effectiveness: Coercion – Ineffective</p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>ineffective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy outcome is 1 or 2, or • Policy outcome is 3, 4, or 5 but UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is negative (0), absent (1) or minor (2). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in coercing, see v282; for UN sanctions contribution to coercion, see v283.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v287	<p>Policy outcome: Constraint</p> <p>Evaluates the extent to which the target has been constrained in proscribed activities (raising costs/changes in strategy). NOTE: For indicators of constraint as a purpose of sanctions, see v49. For overall sanction effectiveness in constraining, see v289-291.</p>	<p>1: No discernible constraints experienced by the target. 2: Increases in costs can be managed by the target (sanctions are largely a nuisance factor) perhaps due to ease of evasion. 3: Slight increases in costs to target (as evidenced by diversion of trade through third countries, and/or delay in engaging in proscribed activity and/or diminution in the frequency of engagement in proscribed activity). 4: Increases in costs, minor changes of strategy of the target, statement that target may be experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity. 5: Significant increases in costs, changes of strategy of the target, statement that target is experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity.</p>
v288	<p>UN Sanctions contribution: Constraint</p> <p>Measurement of sanctions contribution considers all other instruments utilized by the international community at the time (such as diplomatic pressure, use of force, other sanctions, etc.) and indications by the target of the impact and role of UN sanctions. NOTE: For indicators of constraint as a purpose of sanctions, see v49. For overall sanction effectiveness in constraining, see v289-291.</p>	<p>0: Negative (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity) 1: None (no discernible sanctions contribution) 2: Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome) 3: Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures) 4: Major (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target) 5: Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions)</p>
v289	<p>UN sanctions effectiveness: Constraint – Effective</p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>effective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy outcome is 4 or 5, and • UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest 	Yes: 1 No: 0

	(3), major (4) or significant (5). NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in constraining, see v287; for UN sanctions contribution to constraint, see v288.	
v290	<p>UN sanctions effectiveness: Constraint – Mixed</p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>mixed</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy outcome is 3, and • UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in constraining, see v287; for UN sanctions contribution to constraint, see v288.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v291	<p>UN sanctions effectiveness: Constraint – Ineffective</p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>ineffective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy outcome is 1 or 2, or • Policy outcome is 3, 4, or 5 but UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is negative (0), absent (1) or minor (2). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in constraining, see v287; for UN sanctions contribution to constraint, see v288.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v292	<p>Policy outcome: Signaling</p> <p>Evaluates the extent to which the norm has been articulated and the target stigmatized. NOTE: For indicators of constraint as a purpose of sanctions, see v50. For overall sanction effectiveness in signaling, see v294-296.</p>	<p>1: Norm (or norms) not articulated, no stigmatization and/or clear evidence of legitimation.</p> <p>2: Norm (or norms) poorly articulated (e.g. too many, diffusely articulated), limited evidence of stigmatization and/or possible legitimation.</p> <p>3: Norm (or norms) articulated, and some stigmatization of target.</p> <p>4: Norm (or norms) articulated and targets strongly stigmatized.</p> <p>5: Norm (or norms) clearly articulated and target fully stigmatized and/or isolated (e.g. effective signaling to the international community and stigmatizing and/or isolation of the target).</p>
v293	<p>UN Sanctions contribution: Signaling</p> <p>Measurement of sanctions contribution considers all other instruments utilized by the international community at the time (such as diplomatic pressure, use of force, other sanctions, etc.) and indications by the target of the impact and role of UN sanctions. NOTE: For indicators of signaling as a purpose of</p>	<p>0: Negative (regime is strengthened and/or increases its proscribed activity)</p> <p>1: None (no discernible sanctions contribution)</p> <p>2: Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome)</p> <p>3: Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures)</p> <p>4: Major (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target)</p> <p>5: Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions)</p>

	sanctions, see v50. For overall sanction effectiveness in signaling, see v294-296.	
v294	<p><i>UN sanctions effectiveness: Signaling – Effective</i></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>effective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy outcome is 4 or 5, and • UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in signaling, see v292; for UN sanctions contribution to signaling, see v293.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v295	<p><i>UN sanctions effectiveness: Signaling – Mixed</i></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>mixed</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy outcome is 3, and • UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is modest (3), major (4) or significant (5). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in signaling, see v292; for UN sanctions contribution to signaling, see v293.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0
v296	<p><i>UN sanctions effectiveness: Signaling – Ineffective</i></p> <p>Sanctions effectiveness is determined based on a combined evaluation of (1) Policy outcome and (2) UN sanctions contribution to this outcome. UN sanctions are considered <i>ineffective</i> if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy outcome is 1 or 2, or • Policy outcome is 3, 4, or 5 but UN sanctions contribution to the outcome is negative (0), absent (1) or minor (2). <p>NOTE: For criteria used for evaluating Policy outcome in signaling, see v292; for UN sanctions contribution to signaling, see v293.</p>	Yes: 1 No: 0