

International Relations/Political Science

Academic year 2020-2021

Comparative Political Economy

RI-SP111 - Autumn - 6 ECTS

Course Description

This seminar introduces comparative research and debates on varieties of market economies. It focusses on approaches that seek to conceptualize different models of capitalism in advanced and developing capitalist countries, and investigates the relative role of institutions, interest groups, and ideas in constituting, reproducing and transforming these models. Further, emphasis will be put on exploring the economic, social, and political bases for government (non-)intervention in market economies, and on examining them empirically through a variety of topics including industrial relations, corporate governance, immigration, welfare states and inequality.

> PROFESSOR

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Syllabus

The course will meet each Wednesday from 10:15 – 12:00 in Room S4, unless otherwise stated in the syllabus. All required articles and book chapters are provided in electronic format on Moodle. Readings that are recommended will be available over the library reserve. I may occasionally send you additional readings.

Course Objectives

The primary goal of this course is to provide students with the factual and conceptual background of different issues related to how politics and markets interact. Furthermore, the course is designed to give a broad theoretical and empirical architecture for thinking about the following main questions that will pervade all substantive topics:

1. Why do different countries implement different economic policies and have different economic institutions?
2. How has democratic capitalism evolved since the 1980s and what are the consequences of political economic changes?
3. What is/should be the role of the state in governing the economy?

In addition, the course is supposed to help students improve their critical reading and writing of academic work, to bring them up to the present on some of the important intellectual work being done, and equip them to understand and critically evaluate new developments in comparative political economy (CPE) relevant to their future policy or academic careers. Upon completion of this course, students should be able to:

- Have a solid understanding of basic economic patterns, institutional structures, and academic debates in CPE.
- Identify what core concepts, relationships, and issues are involved in different areas of economic and social policymaking.
- Analyze approaches and articles, and identify weaknesses, using their own insights or those of other approaches.
- Understand the normative values and simplifying assumptions that underpin this research.
- Use your knowledge of comparative political economy to become a more sophisticated consumer of news media and academic research.
- Be prepared to conduct your own, original research in the field of comparative political economy.
- Be able to communicate your claims through more effective written and verbal communication skills

How to Maximize Your Learning Experience

1. Be prepared to read, think and discuss... A LOT.
2. Know that I have very high expectations of your work and that you should as well.
3. Schedule appointments to meet with the TA or me to discuss your progress and understanding of course material. **We are always willing to help.**
4. Plan to come to class every day, and remember: "To be 'early' is to be on time, to be 'on time' is to be late, and to be 'late' is unacceptable."

Course Format

Interactive Lecture

A major feature of this class will be class participation in form of discussing the assigned articles (either in class or online), critically reflecting on theoretical approaches, and actively engaging with your peers. Thus, it will be essential that you carefully read the assigned required readings prior to class. I will lecture only to convey general theoretical and topical overviews, as well as key terms and principles that are covered in the readings. You are expected to complete all required readings by the date listed, which will help you contribute to class discussion.

To read efficiently, avoid a careful, one-time, word-by-word reading of the text. Instead, skim the introduction and conclusion, where available, to identify the author's main argument(s). Then scan section headings (or the first sentence in each paragraph) to see how the author develops and supports their argument. Finally, reserve detailed reading for those sections that clarify the argument or provide supporting evidence. If you are spending more than three hours on a set of readings, you are reading too closely.

Furthermore, spend some time thinking about the reading:

- What is the author's main argument?
- What evidence is used to support the argument?
- Is the argument and evidence compelling? Are there alternative explanations?
- How does the reading relate to previous ones covered in the course?
- Why are we reading this?

Participation

Participation is an essential and mandatory component of this course. You are expected to (1) come to class having read the assigned material and contribute meaningfully to class discussions, (2) follow news pertinent to our topics, and (3) critically reflect on concepts and articles we encounter. Turning any class from a 'dry' lecture into an exciting, but insightful seminar requires collective and interactive participation of each student. Thus, the quality of your learning experience is determined by the lively and polite exchange of thoughts and criticisms.

What counts as participation? Asking questions, either for analytical or clarification reasons, that engage the weekly topics, as well as responding meaningfully to questions and statements made in class or on discussion boards, are all great examples of participation. Students can participate either during our class meeting time or via our online discussion forum. All students are strongly encouraged to actively follow and participate in the online discussion board, but online participation is particularly advantageous for students preferring more time to reflect on issues, those finding it difficult to join the conversation during live class, or those that are less comfortable with speaking up in public.

The grade you earn will reflect the quantity and quality of your participation, as well as your attendance. It should be common sense that you cannot earn a great participation grade if you are not attending class/do not engage in meaningful online discussions. Below I defined what reflects different qualities of comments.

Comment Quality (In-person and online):

- "High": Comments show reflection about the reading or the discussion at hand, contribution through strong points and/or adding value to the discussion by stating their opinion based on factual knowledge.
- "Satisfying": Comments show engagement in class discussion, willingness to "take a guess", and ability to link previous lecture material to discussions at hand, as well as expressing opinions.
- "Low": Comments show engagement in class discussion, but student never contributes to the added value or demonstrates knowledge from the readings – they are just working for that tick mark.

Assessments

1. Weekly Response Papers (WRP)

Each student is required to submit 6 weekly short, analytic response papers (starting from session 2 on) based on the assigned required readings, **due the day before each class by 6 PM** (i.e. Tuesday by 6 PM) **via Moodle**. Every week 2-3 core questions are posed per unit that can help you in writing the response paper. The goal is to demonstrate that you did the readings, can synthesize and integrate key information and are prepared for class discussion. The response paper should be between 2 and 3 pages (double-spaced) but not shorter. The paper will be evaluated based on its quality and number of readings incorporated, as well as the quality of integration and analytical discussion. Response papers cannot be handed in retrospectively, but additional response papers can replace earlier (weaker) ones. No papers are due for Session 1.

2. Analytical Research Paper

Every student is expected to write a research paper (between 18-20 pages long, double space, 12 font size, including graphs, tables, figures, and references) that investigates a seminar-related topic. The project should strive to produce insight on an important analytical question using appropriate methodological tools and standards of social inquiry. The paper should have a theory section in which you review relevant literature and elaborate your argument, and empirical section in which you present supporting evidence in either quantitative or qualitative forms. Details on this assignment will follow.

Deadlines for this assignment are as follows:

- On October 7, you will submit a brief statement about the issue you plan to investigate.
- On November 11, you will submit a preliminary bibliography and a brief description of the research materials.
- On November 25, you will submit an abstract and outline of your paper.
- On December 18, you submit your final paper via Moodle.

The breakdown of your grade will be as follows:

25% = attendance and class participation

25% = weekly response papers

50% = research paper

Classroom Policies

Name/Pronoun Preferences

I will gladly honor your request to address you by an alternate/preferred name, nickname, or gender pronoun. Please advise me in person or via email of this preference early in the semester so that I may make appropriate changes to my records.

Use of Laptops & Other Electronic Devices

All class material will be provided electronically, so extensive use of laptops to take notes is theoretically not necessary and can be done by hand. However, for the purpose of opening and following class readings/notes on readings, as well as working with other students who join the class remotely, the use of laptops is permitted. However, I reserve the RIGHT TO BAN ALL LAPTOP USE (except for medical needs) if class participation is low and the distraction level through other laptop uses is high (checking emails, surfing the web, chatting, etc.). In addition, students caught consistently not following lecture will receive a 0.25 grade points lower attendance and participation grade for each offense. Lastly, smart/cell phones should be set to silent, not vibrate.

Attendance and Absences

You are allowed two absences for whatever reason during the semester. Beyond that you must provide proper documentation addressing the absence. If you plan to/know you will miss class and have a valid official excuse (e.g., medical, academic) or case of hardship (e.g., eviction from your place of residence or attendance at a funeral), please contact me ahead of time and provide me with proper documentation in each and every case. If you plan on observing religious holidays, please talk to me after our first session. Undocumented absences, as well as repeated tardiness (i.e. being more than 10 minutes late) will result in a 0.25 grade points lowered participation grade. If you chose to take one of your 'free' absences, please keep in mind that you are responsible for all lecture material, handouts, announcements, explanations of assignments, and other relevant details that you missed. Furthermore, if you come more than 20 minutes late to class, I will ask you to leave the room and you will be counted as absent.

Deadlines

The above outlined deadlines are absolute. Failure to turn in any of the assignments by the due date will result in a grade of 1.0 for that particular assignment. In order to avoid a penalty for late submission of a paper or assignment, you must have evidence of extenuating circumstances (e.g., a doctor's note for illness). This must be submitted to the professor prior to the time of the deadline.

Grade Appeal

If you feel that an assessment was graded incorrectly, submit a written appeal to me within three days after the assessment in question was returned. Appeals or complaints submitted later cannot be accommodated. The instructor will take your comments into consideration and re-read your

assignments. However, be aware that a new grade could not be the same as you originally received; it could be higher, but it could also be lower. Students should keep copies of the assignments they turn in and retain graded papers until they receive their final course grade.

Moodle Use

Assignments, articles, announcements, and grades can be accessed via the Moodle course page. Assignments should be submitted via Moodle, unless otherwise specified.

Academic Honesty

As a student of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies you have agreed to abide by the Institute's academic honesty policy. All academic work must meet the standards described in "Institute's Internal Guidelines Governing Citation of Sources and Plagiarism." Lack of knowledge of the academic honesty policy is not a reasonable explanation for a violation. Final assignments will be analyzed via Turnitin. Please contact me any time you have questions related to course assignments and the academic honesty policy.

Bilingual Policy

Although the class will be held in English, students are welcome to ask questions and submit their written assessments in French.

Tentative Schedule and Reading Assignments

September 16: Session 1 Introduction

September 23: Session 2 Classical Debates and Contemporary CPE

Core Questions: What is CPE (and how does it differ from IPE?) and which major debates have shaped it from its beginnings to contemporary scholarship? What major analytical approaches to CPE exist?

Required:

Menz, Georg. 2017. *Comparative Political Economy: Contours of a Subfield*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1 & 2.

Blyth, Mark. 2009. "An Approach to Comparative Analysis or a Subfield within a Subfield? Political Economy." In: Lichbach, Mark I. and Zuckerman, Alan S. (eds.) *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, 2nd Edition*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 193-218.

Recommended:

Adam Przeworski. 2003. *States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press, chapter 1; Hall, Peter A. 1997. "The Role of Interests, Institutions and Ideas in the Political Economy of Industrialized Nations" In: Lichbach, Mark I. and Zuckerman, Alan S. eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 174-207.

September 30: Session 3 Approaches to CPE: Interest-based Analysis

Core Questions: Does material self-interest shape actors' policy preferences and political behavior? If so, how are these interests aggregated and expressed to the state? If not, what does motivate political and economic actors?

Required:

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121-1137.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1984. "Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s." *International Organization* 38(1): 95-129.

Freeman, G. P. 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States." *International Migration Review* 29(4): 881-902.

Sears, David O. and Carolyn Funk (1990). "The Limited Effect of Economic Self-Interest on the Political Attitudes of the Mass Public." *Journal of Behavioral Economics* 19(3): 247-271.

Recommended:

Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2001. "An Asset Theory of Social Preferences." *American Political Science Review* 95(4): 875-893;
Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. "Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3): 510-530;
Rho, Sungmin and Tom, Michael Toms. 2017. "Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?" *International Organization* 71(S1): S85-S108;
Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 1.

October 7: Session 4 Approaches to CPE: Institutional Analysis I: Development

Core Questions: What are 'institutions' and why is their role in economic and political development so debated? What are the origins of institutions?

Required:

Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2008. "Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 119-135.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth." In: Aghion, Philippe and Steven N. Durlauf (eds.). *Handbook of Economic Growth*. Elsevier: Amsterdam, 387-472.

Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." *Journal of Political Economy* 102(5): 912-950.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 3.

Recommended:

North, Douglass. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(1): 97-112;
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,*

Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Books; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91 (5): 1369-1401; North, Douglass C. and Barry R Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History* 49 (4): 803-832; Acemoglu, Daron et al. 2018. "Democracy Does Cause Growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 127(1): 47-100.

October 14: Session 5 Approaches to CPE: Institutional Analysis II: Varieties of Capitalism

Core Questions: What are the different ways in which countries organize and regulate capitalism? What motivates these differences, and what are their consequences? What are the shortcomings of VOC and why is it still popular?

Required:

Menz, Georg. 2017. *Comparative Political Economy: Contours of a Subfield*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 3.

Hall, Peter and David Soskice. 2001. "An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism." In: Hall, Peter and David Soskice (eds.). *The Varieties of Capitalism*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1-68.

Crouch, Colin. 2005. "Models of Capitalism." *New Political Economy* 10(4): 439-456.

Thelen, Kathleen. 2012. "Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 137-159.

Recommended:

Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2001. "Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State." In: Hall, Peter and David Soskice (eds.). *The Varieties of Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145-183; Hall, Peter and Kathleen Thelen. 2009. "Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism." *Socio-Economic Review* 7(1): 7-34; Korpi, Walter. 2006. "Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists." *World Politics* 58(2): 167-206; Amable, Bruno. 2003. "Introduction" in idem: *The Diversity of Modern Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-26. Hermann, Andrea. 2008. "Introduction" in idem: *One Political Economy, One Competitive Strategy? Comparing Pharmaceutical Firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-25; Menz, Georg. 2011. "Employer Preferences for Labour Migration: Exploring 'Varieties of Capitalism'-Based Contextual Conditionality in Germany and the United Kingdom." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 13 (4): 534-550.

October 21: Session 6 Approaches to CPE: Ideational Analysis

Core Questions: What are the political consequences of economic ideas? Do ideas have a life of their own in explaining actors' behavior and preferences, or are they merely drafted by individuals to justify their self-interested actions?

Required:

Clift, Ben. 2014. *Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 7.

Blyth, Mark. 2003. "Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(4): 695-706.

Berman, Sheri. 2009. "The Primacy of Economics versus the Primacy of Politics: Understanding the Ideological Dynamics of the Twentieth Century." *Perspectives on Politics* 7(3): 561-578.

Blyth, Mark. 2013. "The Austerity Delusion: Why a Bad Idea Won Over the West." *Foreign Affairs* 92(3): 41-56.

Recommended:

Hall, Peter (ed.). 1989. *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Blyth, Mark. 2002. *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1985. *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Weber, Max. 2003 [1902]. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Dover Publications; Sikkink, Kathryn. 1991. *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Jacobsen, John Kurt. 1995. "Much Ado about Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy." *World Politics* 47(2): 283-310.

October 28: Session 7 Industrial Relations, Labor Unions and Preferences for Public Policy

Core Questions: In which ways can labor unions influence politics and do they (still) matter?

Required:

Menz, Georg. 2017. *Comparative Political Economy: Contours of a Subfield*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, chapter 4.

Pontusson, Jonas. 2013. "Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution." *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 51(4): 797-825.

Baccaro, Lucio and Chris Howell. 2011. "A Common Neoliberal Trajectory: The Transformation of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism." *Politics & Society* 39(4): 521-563.

Kim, Sung Eun and Yotam Margalit. 2017. "Informed Preferences? The Impact of Unions on Workers' Policy Views." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3): 728-743.

Recommended:

Wallerstein, Michael, and Bruce Western. 2000. "Unions in Decline? What Has Changed and Why." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 355-377; Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Schmitter, Phillippe C. 1974. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics* 36(1): 85-131; Boix, Carles. 1999. *Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Swenson, Peter. 2002. *Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States and Sweden*. Oxford, Oxford University Press; Becher, Michael, Daniel Stegmueller, and Konstantin Käppner. 2018. "Local Union Organization and Law Making in the US Congress." *The Journal of Politics* 80(2): 539-554; Iversen, Torben. 1999. *Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

November 4: Session 8 **Government, Business and the Politics of Regulation**

Core Questions: How do businesses shape public policy and how in turn do national regulations constrain or enable their power?

Required:

Culpepper, Pepper D. 2011. *Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 7.

Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander and Theda Skocpol. 2015. "Asymmetric Interest Group Mobilization and Party Coalitions in U.S. Tax Politics." *Studies in American Political Development* 29(2): 235-249.

Culpepper, Pepper D. and Raphael Reinke. 2014. "Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States." *Politics & Society* 42: 427-454.

Thelen, Kathleen. 2018. "Regulating Uber: The Politics of the Platform Economy in Europe and the United States." *Perspectives on Politics* 14(4): 938-953.

Recommended:

Gourevitch, Peter and James Shinn. 2005. *Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Martin, Cathie Jo and Duane Swank. 2012. *The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

November 11: Session 9 **Liberal Capitalism, Globalization, and the Role of the State**

Core Questions: How has neoliberalism ascended to become the dominant political ideology in the 21st century? What is the role of the state in the context of increasing liberalization?

Required:

Menz, Georg. 2017. *Comparative Political Economy: Contours of a Subfield*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 8.

Jonah Levy, Robert Kagan and John Zysman. 1998. "The Twin Restorations" in Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon-Hyung Kim (eds), *Ten Paradigms of Market Economics and Land Systems*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 3-57.

Friedman, Thomas. 1999. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Farrar and Strauss, 59-81 & 83-92.

Deeg, Richard. 2012. "The Limits of Liberalization? American Capitalism at the Crossroads." *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(8): 1249-1268.

Recommended:

"The Giant Pool of Money" Broadcast and transcript accessible at *This American Life*:
<http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/the-giant-pool-of-money>

Vogel, Steven K. 1996. "Understanding Regulatory Reform." In idem, *Freer Markets, More Rules*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 9-24; Lazonick, William and Mary O'Sullivan. 2000. "Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance." *Economy and Society* 29(1): 13-35; Crouch, Colin. 2008. "What Will Follow the Demise of Privatized Keynesianism?" *The Political Quarterly* 79(4): 476-487; Kinderman, Daniel. 2012. "Free us up so we can be responsible! The co-evolution of corporate social responsibility and neo-liberalism in the UK, 1977-2010." *Socio-Economic Review* 10(1): 29-57.

November 18: Session 10 The State, Economic Development, and Industrial Policy

Core Questions: What is industrial policy? Through what means and why do governments in developed and developing countries seek to direct their economy?

Required:

Kohli, Atul. 2004. *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. New York: Cambridge University Press, introduction & conclusion.

Rodrik, Dani. 2007. "Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century." In idem: *One Economics, Many Recipes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Levy, Johan, Mari Miura and Gene Park. 2006. "Exiting *Etatisme*? New Directions in State Policy in France and Japan." In: Jonah Levy (ed.). *The State After Statism*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 93-136.

Breznitz, Dan, and Darius Ornston. 2013. "The Revolutionary Power of Peripheral Agencies: Explaining Radical Policy Innovation in Finland and Israel." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(10): 1219-1245.

Recommended:

Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. "The Japanese 'Miracle'" in idem, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 3-34; Doner, Richard, Bryan Ritchie, and Dan Slater. 2005. "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective." *International Organization* 59(2): 327–361; Pack, Howard, and Kamal Saggi. 2006. "Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical Survey." *World Bank Research Observer* 2(2): 267-97; Taylor, Zachary. 2016. *The Politics of Innovation: Why some Countries are Better than Others at Science and Technology*. New York: Oxford University Press; Block, Fred. 2011. "Innovation and the Invisible Hand of Government." In Block, Fred and Matthew Keller, eds., *State of Innovation*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm; Wade, Robert. (2016). "Industrial Policy in Response to the Middle-income Trap and the Third Wave of the Digital Revolution." *Global Policy* 7(4): 469–480; Hall, Peter. 2019. "How Growth Strategies Evolve in the Developed Democracies." Working Paper. <https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hall/files/palier2018pt.pdf>; Ornston, Darius. 2013. "Creative Corporatism: The Politics of High-Technology Competition in Nordic Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(6): 702-729.

November 25: Session 11 The Political Economy of Immigration

Core Questions: What economic factors shape whether immigration policies are liberal or closed? How does immigration in turn affect the economies of receiving countries?

Required:

Afonso, Alexandre and Catherine Devitt. 2016. "Comparative Political Economy and International Migration." *Socio-Economic Review* 14(3): 591–613.

Peters, Margaret. 2015. "Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization." *World Politics* 67(1): 114–154.

Kolbe, Melanie and Elif N. Kayran. 2019. "The Limits of Skill Selective Immigration Policies: Welfare States and the Commodification of Labour Immigrants." *Journal of European Social Policy* 29(4): 478–97.

Shin, Adrien J. 2017. "Tyrants and Migrants: Authoritarian Immigration Policy." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(1):14-40.

Recommended:

Afonso, Alexandre. 2012. "Employer Strategies, Cross-Class Coalitions and the Free Movement of Labour in the Enlarged European Union." *Socio-Economic Review* 10(4): 705–30; Caviedes, Alexander A. 2010. *Prying Open Fortress Europe: The Turn to Sectoral Labour Migration*. New York: Lexington Books; Devitt, Catherine. 2011. "Varieties of Capitalism, Variation in Labour Immigration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37(4): 579–96; Ruhs, Martin and Philip Martin. 2008. "Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs." *International Migration Review* 42(1): 249-265; Cerna, Lucie. 2009. "The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Coalitions and Policy Outputs in Advanced Industrial Countries." *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(1): 144–61; Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda, and P. Mishra. 2011. "Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?" *Journal of International Economics* 85(1): 114–128; Menz, Georg. 2011. "Employer Preferences for Labour Migration: Exploring 'Varieties of Capitalism'- Based Contextual Conditionality in Germany and the United Kingdom." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 13(4): 534–50; Watts, Julie R. 2002. *Immigration Policy and the Challenge of Globalization—Unions and Employers in Unlikely Alliance*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Wright, Chris F. 2012. "Immigration Policy and Market Institutions in Liberal Market Economies." *Industrial Relations Journal* 43(2): 110–36; Boräng, Frida, and Lucie Cerna. 2019. "Constrained Politics: Labour Market Actors, Political Parties and Swedish Labour Immigration Policy." *Government and Opposition* 54(1): 121–144; Wright, Chris F. 2015. "Why Do States Adopt Liberal Immigration Policies? The Policymaking Dynamics of Skilled Visa Reform in Australia." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(2): 306–28; Castles, Stephen. 2006. "Guest Workers in Europe: A Resurrection?" *International Migration Review* 4(4): 741-766; Marino, Stefania, Rinus Penninx and Judith Roosblad. 2015. "Trade Unions, Immigration and Immigrants in Europe Revisited: Unions' Attitudes and Actions under New Conditions." *Comparative Migration Studies* 3(1): open access.

December 2: Session 12 The Political Economy of Welfare States

Core Questions: *What logics inform institutional variation across welfare states? How have welfare states changed and what are the purported drivers?*

Required:

Clift, Ben. 2014. *Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 11

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: chapters 1 and 2.

Mares, Isabela, and Matthew E. Carnes. 2009. "Social Policy in Developing Countries." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 93-113.

David Rueda. 2015. "The State of the Welfare State: Unemployment, Labor Market Policy, and Inequality in the Age of Workfare." *Comparative Politics* 47(3): 296-313

Recommended:

Karl Polanyi. 1944. "The Self-Regulating Market and the Fictitious Commodities" in idem., *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press, 68-76; Rodrik, Dani. 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" *The Journal of Political Economy* 106(5): 997-1032; Arts, Wil and John Gelissen. 2002. "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report." *Journal of European Social Policy* 12(2): 137-158; Rudra, Nita. 2007. "Welfare States in Developing Countries: Unique or Universal?" *The Journal of Politics* 69(2): 378-396; Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2002. "Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness." *International Organization* 56(02): 229-262;

Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme. 1998. "The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries." *American Sociological Review* 63 (5): 661-687; Iversen, Torben and Thomas Cusack. 2000. "The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization" *World Politics* 52(3): 313-49; Cameron, David. 1978. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis" *American Political Science Review* 72(4): 1243-126; Ruggie, John G. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order" *International Organization* 36(2): 379-415; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1985. *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY; Fenwick, Clare. 2019. "The Political Economy of Immigration and Welfare State Effort: Evidence from Europe." *European Political Science Review* 11(3): 357-375; Rudra, Nita. 2002. "Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries." *International Organization* 56(2): 411-45; Brady, David, Jason Beckfield and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, M. 2005. "Economic Globalization and the Welfare State in Affluent Democracies, 1975-2001." *American Sociological Review* 70(6): 921-948; Pierson, Paul. 1996. "The New Politics of the Welfare State." *World Politics* 48(2): 143-179; Kaufman, Robert and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. 2001. "Globalization, Domestic Politics and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973-1997." *World Politics* 53(4): 553-87; Avelino, George, David S. Brown, Wendy Hunter (2005). "The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America 1980-1999." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 625-641; Fenwick, Clare. 2019. "The Political Economy of Immigration and Welfare State Effort: Evidence from Europe." *European Political Science Review* 11(3): 357-375.

December 9: Session 13 The Politics of Inequality in the 21st Century

Core Questions: What are the causes and consequences of contemporary rising inequality?

Required:

Rajan, Raghuram. 2010. "Let Them Eat Credit" in idem, *Fault Lines*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 22-43

Hacker, Jacob and Paul Pierson. 2010. "Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States." *Politics and Society* 38(2): 152-204.

Schakel, Wouter. 2019. "Unequal policy responsiveness in the Netherlands." *Socioeconomic Review*. Forthcoming.

Huber, Evelyne, Jingjing Huo and John D. Stephens. 2019. "Politics, Markets, and Top Income Shares." *Socio-Economic Review* 17(2): 231-253.

Recommended:

Hopkin, Jonathan and Kate Alexander Shaw. 2016. "Organized Combat or Structural Advantage? The Politics of Inequality and the Winner-Take-All Economy in the United Kingdom." *Politics and Society* 44(3): 345-371; Pontusson, Jonas and Lane Kenworthy. 2005. "Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries." *Perspectives on Politics* 3(3): 449-471; McCarty, Nolan and Jonas Pontusson. 2009. "The Political Economy of Inequality and Redistribution." In: Wiemer Salverda (ed.). *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality*. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 665-692; Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2009. "Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run," *World Politics* 61(2): 215-253.

December 16: Session 14 Conclusion