November 3rd, 2020

THE SOCIAL ORDER OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS AND HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE: A REGIONAL COMPARISON

PROJECT OVERVIEW & OBJECTIVES

Understanding current patterns of violence.



Based on UCDP 20.1 data



UNODC homicide statistic 2017

CASE STUDIES

Brazil & Honduras

Zélie Antier

Alexia Durand de Bousingen

Ayushi Jain

Mali

Valentin Hopfinger

Marie Lobjoy

Myanmar

Phurbu Dolma

Maiwen Dot Pheot Ngalueth

Qualitative Research Framework

Three-dimensional approach to address the complexity of the social orders of NSAGs.

Pillar 1 - Semi-structured interviews
Getting an internal perspective from actors on the ground.

Pillar 2 - Interactive map
Profiling NSAGs and mapping their interactions.

Pillar 3 - Categories for case study comparison
Framing our analysis through common focal points.

Profile Page HONDURAS

MARA SALVATRUCHA 13 (MS-13)

Profile last updated: 05/10/2020

The state of Honduras finds itself in constant threat by the evolution of Mara Salvatrucha 13 into a substantial military, political, economic and criminal force in Honduras. It has a sizeable presence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and has widened and broadened its network with the Mexican drug cartels making its presence stronger and more akin to the State. [1]

It began in the late 1970s in California, where Salvadoran refugees, owing to economic disparities found themselves in the middle of civil conflict. They took on the name "Mara Salvatrucha Stoners" or MSS[2]*. There is confusion regarding the origins of the name. "Mara" is a reference to a large, swarming, overpowering group. Similarly, "Salva" is supposed to be a reference to El Salvador. And "trucha" when translated is a trout, which some interpret as a reference to savagery or cunningness.*[2] *The 13 is seen as a reference to the universality of outlaws and rebels.*

MS-13 entered the human trafficking business to garner funding for their organisation and also gain impunity for the gang leaders' activities and movement along the border themselves. In Honduras, the gang still has a more urban presence[3]*. Expansion beyond urban areas has also happened, over the years, in places in the United States, most notably in Long Island and North Carolina, and increasingly in California. The gang has also now started appearing in certain parts of Europe, specifically in urban areas of Spain and Italy.* [4]

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

LEADERSHIP

- They have loose leadership structures where gang leaders control what are known as "cliques," the cells that operate in specific territories.
- Most cliques have a "primera palabra" and "segunda palabra," and it refers to the first and second-in-command. Some cliques are transnational in nature and some fight with others and have more violent reputations. Furthermore, some cliques control smaller cliques in a given region. They also additionally have roles like treasurers and other small functionary positions.

APPROX. NUMBER OF MEMBERS/ COMBATANTS

- The MS13 has a large size of combatants, varying between 50,000 and 70,000 members, who are concentrated mostly in the urban areas of Central America and locations outside the region where there is a large Central American diaspora.
- The size of the gang in these settings varies greatly and fluctuates, mostly in accordance with law enforcement efforts and migration patterns unrelated to the gang.[5]

[1] Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, The evolution of MS-13 in El Salvador and Honduras' 14 September 2017 https://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-7-1/Article/1298326/the-evolution-of-ms-13-in-el-salvador-and-honduras/
[2] Ibid
[3] Clare Seelke, 'Gangs in Central America', 20 February 2014 https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5640480e4.pdf
[4] InSight Crime; 'MS 13', 11 March 2019 https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile/
[5] InSight Crime; 'MS 13', 11 March 2019 https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile/

FINANCING/ RESOURCES[1]

- Payments from larger companies like those selling LNG tanks, snack, food, beverages—that transit MS 13-controlled territory in Honduras remain a major source of income for the gang and its evolution.
- Along with this, their control over the informal borders that form the drug trade route for various from Puerto Cortes on the Atlantic coast of Honduras to Puerto Barrios and Izabal in Guatemala is a source of both power and income for the group.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

- MS 13 presence in the Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras is sizeable. Within Honduras, the map attached shows the presence in the southern regions.[2]

STRATEGY

IDEOLOGY AND AIMS:

- The MS-13 is seen to enforces social rules to garner social legitimacy, such as prohibiting rape. In one area in Honduras, it was found that child and spousal abuse are strictly prohibited in regions under its control.
- MS-13 gang leaders regularly and constantly interact with the local community and religious leaders to be able to negotiate ways in which they can cross invisible boundaries to go to school, travel to work or visit with friends and relatives, playing a more harmonious role than the others in the region. [3]

ACTIONS AND TARGETS:

- Extortion
- Drug sales
- A host of other ancillary illicit and licit commercial interests

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND/OR INTERACTIONS (COMMUNITY RELATIONS; ALLIANCES WITH OTHER GROUPS, ETC.). [4]

- In recent years, MS13 has evolved its survival strategy with its decision to refrain from extorting the smaller businesses in Honduras which helped garner political support in the neighbourhoods.

By curtailing or prohibiting extortion and other criminal acts in the area MS-13 acts as an effective and recognised mediator in domestic or neighbourly disputes. It even participates directly in community associations or non-governmental organizations and even help attract or impede votes in elections as well as other services for local political actors working closely wit

[1] Farah, Douglas, and Kathryn Babineau. "The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras." Prism 7.1 (2017): 58-73.
2 Field Research by InSight Crime and the Honduran Police, June 2020
[3] InSight Crime; 'Honduras Gang Evolution spurred by Transnational Crime', 8 August 2014 https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile/
[4] InSight Crime; 'Honduras Gang Evolution spurred by Transnational Crime', 8 August 2014 https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile/

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Profile Page
MALI

JAMAAT NUSRAT AHISLAM WAL MUSLIMEEN (JNIM)

Profile last updated: 12/10/2020

JNIM – also known as the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims – is a Salafi-Jihadist militant coalition established on March 2, 2017 and operating in the African Sahel region. Its creation results from the merger of several high-profile terrorist groups under the banner of al-Qaeda.

It allegedly formalises the collaboration among the constituent groups through the establishment of a formal hierarchy in which AQIM oversees the allied militant groups, and provides strategic guidance, directions and resources.[1]

JNIM's emir, Iyad Ag Ghali, alongside leaders from the other constituent militant groups, www.wakatsera.com

Members of JNIM

Elements of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Ansar Eddine – created in December 2011.
Katiba Macina (also called Macina Liberation Front) – created 2015.
Al-Mourabitoun – created in August 2013.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

LEADERSHIP

- Officially operates under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali – long-time leader of Ansar Dine.
- Pledged allegiance to AQIM's emir Abdelmalek Droukdel, Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, and emir of the Taliban Mullah Haibatullah.[2]

APPROX. NUMBER OF MEMBERS/ COMBATANTS

- Approx. **2000 fighters (2020)**.[3]
- In September 2018, the CSIS Transnational Threats Project report counted between 1000 and 2000 fighters affiliated with JNIM.[4]

FINANCING/ RESOURCES

- Ransom from kidnapping.
- Trafficking and taxes on local trafficking activities.
- Criminal activities such as robbery.
- Religious taxes on local communities.
- AQIM is the wealthiest provider to JNIM.[5]

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

- Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka Regions.
- The network operates in the Sahel region, especially throughout Mali, Algeria and Niger. It is also known to operate in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad.

STRATEGY

IDEOLOGY AND AIMS

- Salafi jihadism.
- Mainly about local rebellions with very strong religious underpinnings.
- Drive foreign forces out of Mali (especially France and the United Nations), expel non-Muslim "occupiers"[1] and impose its version of sharia law.

ACTIONS AND TARGETS

- UN Stabilisation Mission, the French forces present in the framework of military operation Serval (then succeeded by Barkhane), as well as local armies in the Sahel region.
- Suspected collaborators/ allies of their perceived enemies.
- Ghaly publicly stated that JNIM's primary enemy was "France, who has been the historical enemy of the Muslims in this part of the Muslim world,"[2] while France's allies in West Africa (including the United States) are secondary targets.
- The network promotes "combat action against security forces, rather than attacks on the population".[3] This reportedly is an alignment with al-Qaeda's broader global push to present itself as more moderate than its competitors (especially the Islamic State).

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND/OR INTERACTIONS (COMMUNITY RELATIONS; ALLIANCES WITH OTHER GROUPS, ETC.).

- Draws together tribal contexts into the organisation and encourages the presence of a broad range of ethnicities in JNIM, such as Fulanis, Tuaregs, Bambaras, Sahelians and North African Arabs.
- Aim at allying regionalisation and globalisation, to broadens the spectrum of destabilisation from a national to a regional level
- Connections created with other branches arising from mutual frontiers with Algeria and Libya.
- Connections to other groups in the region, such as Boko Haram and the Shabab.[4]
- 2017: Inter-Fulani misgivings resulting in a split in parts of JNIM and the creation of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.
- Several deadly clashes with ISGS in central Mali as a result of the expansion of ISGS into parts of Gao and Timbuktu, towards the north and the tri-State border area.
- March 2020: The expansion of ISGS reportedly led to a split within Katiba Macina, with several Fulani combatants claiming allegiance to ISGS.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Although JNIM is officially composed of four main elements, it should be understood that it is mainly a network of interacting individuals. As such, we are also looking here at dozens of local groups, local cells, locally operating entities, which largely act in semi-autonomous fashion according to capacities and resources and availability of materials and opportunities. Although they presumably receive general guidelines from leadership, their actions very much depend on very local and very self-interested issues.

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[1] Cristiani, Dario. "Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects." Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 05 May 2017
[2] Joscelyn, Thomas. "Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in WestA frica," The Long War Journal, 13 March 2017. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php
[3] Greg Hackleton, "Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin: a merger of al-Qaeda affiliates," Foreign Brief (April 25, 2020). https://www.foreignbrief.com/africa/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin-a-merger-of-al-qaeda-affiliates/
[4] CSIS Transnational Threats Project report , "Backgrounder: Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)," September 25, 2018. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/180927_JNIM_Backgrounder.pdf?CXpU5VJRYdLDg819YAoD_NA0WgloBvbV
[5] Ibid.

[1] SITE Intelligence Group, "AQAP–affiliated Newspaper Interviews Leader of Newly-Formed AQIM Branch in Mali," April 6, 2017, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/aqap-affiliated-newspaper-interviews-leader-of-newly-formed-aqimbranch-in-mali.html.
[2] CSIS, "Background: JNIM," September 2018. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/180927_JNIM_Backgrounder.pdf?CXpU5VJRYdLDg819YAoD_NA0WgloBvbV
[3] UNSC – Counter Terrorism Committee. S/2018/705 Twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/s-2018-705-twenty-second-report-analytical-support-sanctions-monitoring-team-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2368-2017-concerning-isil-daesh-al-qaida-associated/
[4] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, 27 March 2015. Web. 21 Oct. 2015

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

1.OPPORTUNITY & ACCESS

Finding: Lack of opportunities and access to state services legitimizes the implementation of NSAGs.

Recommendation: Creating alternatives to joining/supporting NSAGs should be prioritized.

2. NO SIZE FITS ALL STRATEGIES

Finding: Significant differences across case studies in the categories for comparison.

Recommendation: Adapting interventions and contextual understandings should be prioritized over Western-centric one-size-fits all strategies.

3. BREAKING CYCLES OF VIOLENCE

Finding: Violence is often attributed to structural poverty and unemployment issues.

Recommendation: Building long-term partnerships with carefully selected local NGOs to ensure a sustained and rounded impact.

4. THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING

Finding: Limited access to resources on NSAGs hampers research processes and limits opportunities for knowledge sharing and collaborative solutions.

Recommendation: Promote data-sharing on collaborative platforms that will allow intersectional learning and the creation of innovative solutions.

Thank you for your attention !

Any questions or suggestions can be addressed to us by email:

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This research was conducted in support of the ICRC's work.



DESIGNING AGAINST VIOLENCE

MAEVIA GRIFFITHS
MASSIMILIANO MASINI
ALINE WANI

CAPSTONE PROJECT 2020
VIOLENCE PREVENTION INITIATIVE



DESIGNING AGAINST VIOLENCE

1. VIPRE

2. WHY DANCE ?

3. THE VIDEO

VIOLENCE PREVENTION (VIPRE) INITIATIVE

CENTER ON CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT
AND PEACEBUILDING (CCDP)

PARTNER ORGANISATION

1. VIPRE

"BECOMING A TORTURER IS MORE A PROCESS OF TRANSITION THAN OF DECISION, [...] THIS DISTINCTION IS OFTEN LOST IN THE CULTURAL CYCLE OF TORTURE THAT EMERGES ONCE TORTURE HAS BEGUN."

Austin & Bocco, 2016, p. 860

REASONING & THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2. WHY DANCE ?

IN ORDER TO REPRESENT THE AFFECTIVE, EMOTIONAL AND NON-REFLEXIVE NATURE OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE SUBJECT PERPETRATOR AND THE MATERIALITY OF SPACE.

■■

TO VISUALLY LINK THE DYNAMICITY OF BODY AND SPACE IN A MORE FLEXIBLE, INTUITIVE AND IMMEDIATE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONAL STATES.

Video of torture in Syria:
Example of emotional dynamics.

A VIDEO OF DANCE

3. THE VIDEO

INTERACTION WITH OBJECTS SUCH AS A DESK, CHAIRS, TOOLS OF TORTURE.





VIPRE.CH

THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE GENEVA

CENTRE ON CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING

VIPRE VIOLENCE PREVENTION INITIATIVE

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The Impact of Climate Change on Security Sector Governance/Reform

IHEID Research Team

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Introduction

- **SSG-R:** security provision which is democratically accountable, civilian controlled, respectful of HR
- **Climate Change:** multiplier of conflict risk, potential hindrance to SSR
- **Methodological comparison:** Brazil, the Gambia, the UK, the USA

Pathways



Conflict Risks

Regional Securitization

USA
The UK
Brazil

- The US, UK, and Brazil augment conflict risks through the securitization of different regions
- The Gambia increases risk through poor governance leading to corruption and impunity

The Gambia

Crime and Criminal Networks

Consequences

Criminal Networks strengthening

Conflicts between criminals and civil society



Pressure on land and water resources

Contributes to increasing natural disasters

Environmental Crimes

Security Sector Actors

Army

Police

Informal Actors

Governance Processes

Prosecution

Criminology Forensics

Militarization

Migration

The Gambia

The USA

Brazil

The UK

Natural Disasters

The UK

Brazil

The USA

The Gambia

Recommendations



- Increasing Tactical Knowledge and Standards

- National level Policies for Climate Adaptation



- Increased oversight from Legislative actors

Thank you!

For any questions:

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Project done in commission with DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

UNIDIR x IHEID

UN Missions and Mandates: Impact of the changing language of arms control in support of conflict prevention

ELIZABETH NAKIELNY, ZHIYAO (ALLEN) YANG, MAURICIO HUERTAS, HEWAN TAMIRAT

Introduction and primary research question

- The aim of the project
- Research focus areas
- Case study selection and data gathering

ELIZABETH NAKIELNY, ZHIYAO (ALLEN) YANG, MAURICIO HUERTAS, HEWAN TAMIRAT

Case Study Analysis

- 500 pages of documents, 8 PKOS, 6 SPMS and 3 Special Envoys
- 5 in depth case analyses: Mali, Haiti, DRC, CAR & South Sudan
- Tracked changes in arms control language over time since 2000 among three variables
- Descriptive + analytical (coordination, compare, contrast)

Semi-Structured Interviews

- 17 UN personnel (past and present) from three continents
- 20 year time frame
- Qualitative data

NVIVO Analysis





- Tracking arms control key words from 2000 onwards
- All UNSCR and mandates of the 5 countries
- Output = graphs, charts
- Quantitative data = #of keywords and terms

Key Finding:
Arms Control is not sufficiently written into UN mandates

- Little consideration towards:
  - Whether there is or isn’t a peace agreement in place
  - If is an active or post-conflict region
  - Do not sufficiently take into account prerequisites required for specific arms control related practices

CONTEXT

- **Operational** — Not exclusively technical, mainly political
- **Political Relationships** — Implementing arms control practices in non-post-conflict environments

  Lack of cooperation with local agencies

CULTURE

- **Norm Entrepreneurs** — Language needs a balance to be struck between directionality and flexibility
- **Flexibility** — Agents and norms can shape mandates
- **Recycling of language** — "Cookie-Cutter mandates"

COMPETENCIES

- **Technical know-how** — Lack of *how* regarding implementation
- **Event Sequencing** — Need for specific sequencing of events
  DDR first, SSR second

  More attention on one practice -> less attention for another

Conclusion

Arms Control is not sufficiently written into UN mandates. Improvements through 3 key dimensions of culture, context and competencies, which will increase effectiveness of arms control practices in support of conflict prevention



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Thank you!

Questions or comments?





LAWS & Criminal Accountability
Comparative Analysis of Selected National Positions

Why LAWS? Why Now?



Problem Statement

Drones

Increasing ability to operate autonomously in access-denied environments

Weapons Systems

Increasing ability to independently identify and engage targets



Human Machine teaming

AI aiding human decision-making processes

Project Planning



Research Questions:
- Are the current legal frameworks suitable?
- Is there a need to adapt such frameworks?

Issues Encountered

Terminological unclarity

- Autonomy
- Meaningful Control

Practical difficulties

- Dual-Use Nature
- Axes of attribution

Country Positions

	NL	FR	UK	JP	ISR	SK	CH	US
Ban	No							
Autonomy	Independent attack	Semi*	Higher Intent	Graduated levels	Solely human	Flexible*	Human element	Flexible*
Human Control	Wider Loop	In The Loop	On The Loop	In The Loop	On The Loop	In The Loop	In The Loop	In The loop
Compliant with IL	Yes							

Tentative Findings

Conclusions

States maintain the position that current & near-future uses of autonomous systems comply with rules found in international law.

Inconclusions

Due to the inconclusiveness of terminology and slow pace of current debate, there exists a danger that developments in AI will outpace IL.

The Team

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SUSTAINING THE PEACE:
Economic Empowerment of Youth and Global Security in West Africa

Security Track - Capstone Project 2020

WHO ARE WE?

ANGIE BROOKS INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
WOMEN UNITE TO LIFT THE WORLD!
For Women's Empowerment, Leadership Development, International Peace and Security

Henry

Juvenal

Milena

Renee

WHAT DID WE RESEARCH ?

Youth

Economic Empowerment

Peace and Security

WHERE DID WE DO OUR RESEARCH?

GHANA

- 57% under 25 years old
- Election Period
- Lack of Opportunities after Graduation

LIBERIA

- Post-Conflict situation
- 72% of the population are young people
- Young people represent 85% of the unemployed

SIERRA LEONE

- Post-Conflict situation
- 60% of the population are youth
- Youth Unemployment reached post-war high in 2015

HOW DID WE WORK ?

DESK RESEARCH

- Literature Review
- Research of actors active in this field

SURVEY

- Online Survey with 81 respondents
- Age 15-35

INTERVIEWS

- 28 Young people
- 7 Youth Organizations
- Mix of youth from various backgrounds, age, gender


ANGIE BROOKS
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
For Women's Empowerment, Leadership Development, International Peace and Security
WOMEN LIFE TOUT LE MONDE
THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE GENEVA
INSTITUT DE HAUTES ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

MAJOR FINDINGS

YOUTH ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT = SECURITY

Inextricable link between them



PARTICIPATION

Inclusion of youth voices in policies is key.

ELECTIONS AS TIPPING POINTS

Disempowerment essentialised for electoral violence

PRODUCTIVITY

Youth idleness not ideal. Youth as creators of opportunities.

NO OPPORTUNITIES = BRAIN DRAIN

Disempowerment results in emigration of youth

RECOMMENDATIONS

LEAVE NONE BEHIND
Bridge inequalities between rural and urban youth.

SHIFT NARRATIVE
Avoid broad brush narrative on youth.



INCLUSION
Incorporating youth voices in policies must be a priority.

TAILORED SOLUTIONS
‘One-size-fit all’ do not respond to youth needs.

THANK YOU – FEEL FREE TO CONTACT US

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The Role of Identity and Purpose for Youth Joining Violent Extremism

by Carla Sabato, Aléna Helbling, Yaroslava Mikhaylova and Fares Mahouachi

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MASTER IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Kofi Annan FOUNDATION

Introduction

- The research we conducted aimed at providing an overview on the impact Identity and Purpose has on the recruitment of young people to violent extremist organisation.

- Our work has been conducted in partnership with the Kofi Annan Foundation and their Extremely Together Program.

Our Aim

- Through this report we aimed at testing the theory of change hypothesis: As more young people are active within Extremely Together, the more it will disrupt recruitment of young people by VE groups and the more it will prevent VE.

- We tried to show how Identity and Purpose are linked to violent extremism and how it could be disrupted to help the KAF adapt its Extremely Together programs to the needs of young people.

Research Design

A comparative analysis was conducted based on interviews with 16 experts from academia and NGOs, focusing on youth and violent extremism in the context of four countries

Pakistan

- Ahle Sunnah Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), active in urban areas throughout Pakistan

Uganda

- Al Shabaab, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

Somalia

- Al Shabaab movement and Al-Qaeda

Philippines

- New People's Army (NPA) and Islamist VE groups in the southern region of Bangsamoro

Preliminary Findings

- VE offers means to express existing identities/purposes
- closely connected to lack of alternatives for expression


Lack of opportunities
Different types of vulnerabilities
Importance of family/social ties
Ingroup/outgroup narrative
Collective purpose

Limitations and recommendations

- More active involvement of young interviewees
- More political and historical context to be used
- Long-term qualitative research to be done

COVID-19: what impact does it have on youth and violent extremism?

THANK YOU
FOR
YOUR ATTENTION

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