



# Learning From Other Armistice Settlements for Ukraine and Russia

**Final Report Applied Research Project**

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## Executive Summary

This paper examines past historical cases such as the Cyprus, Arab-Israeli and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, as well as their negotiated ceasefires, in order to predict the necessary conditions for achieving a mediated ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Drawing from these previous cases, this paper argues that a ceasefire agreement would require three primary factors. Firstly, the warring parties would likely need to reach a state of military fatigue, wherein they perceive that military engagement will not settle the issue. Secondly, significant pressure from external actors, including international organisations and states, should compel the belligerents to engage in ceasefire negotiations, particularly if the mediators possess influence over the conflicting parties. Lastly, if there are changes in public sentiment or political leadership within Ukraine and Russia, this could serve as a catalyst for initiating ceasefire talks.

## 1. Introduction

This research project aims to identify the conditions necessary to establish a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia and facilitate peace negotiations between the two parties. Our investigation primarily focuses on previous instances of ceasefire agreements in the Cyprus, Arab-Israeli and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. While these settlements encountered challenges, they successfully brought about a cessation of hostilities. By analysing these mediations, this paper aims to extract valuable lessons and propose a potential framework for a future armistice agreement between Russia and Ukraine. For the purposes of this study, a ceasefire is defined as a temporary halt to war, while an armistice refers to a more concrete and lasting ceasefire. Peace talks occur throughout the ceasefire and armistice negotiations, and a successful peace process culminates in a formal agreement signed between the two warring states to prevent any future outbreaks of violence.

The cases of Cyprus, Arab-Israeli and Nagorno-Karabakh have been chosen as they shed light on important factors that contribute to successful ceasefires and identify the essential conditions required for an armistice to be achieved. Military fatigue played a crucial role in facilitating ceasefire negotiations in both the Nagorno-Karabakh and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Military fatigue refers to a parties' unwillingness to continue armed conflict due to loss of life and resources as well as the perceived lack of progress. In the context of the Ukraine war, if the military capabilities of the belligerents remain evenly matched and the shortage of supplies and troops becomes severe, there is a possibility that military fatigue could exert pressure on Ukrainian and Russian leadership, compelling them to re-engage in negotiations.

Historically, external actors have also played a significant role in pressuring parties to end hostilities and initiate peace talks. In the Cyprus and Arab-Israeli conflicts, the United States (US) helped facilitate mediations, while the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) oversaw discussions between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Powerful state actors with leverage over belligerents, such as China, could potentially facilitate future Russia-Ukraine talks. Additionally, domestic pressures can contribute to a cessation of hostilities if political figures feel compelled to negotiate a ceasefire. While President Vladimir Putin's hold on the Russian public may currently seem unassailable, public sentiment could eventually force him to engage in peace talks.

The methodology employed in this paper involves analysing primary and secondary literature to explore the key factors related to ceasefires in the three respective conflicts. By drawing parallels between our understanding of the three case studies and the conditions that led to the resolution of these conflicts, we can hypothesise the conditions that may be necessary to conclude the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The first section of this paper explores the separate historical case studies and analyses the relevant incentives that lead to the respective ceasefire. The second section connects these incentives with the Russia-Ukraine war and explores a possible future ceasefire.



## 2. Analysis of Past Conflicts

### a. Cyprus Case

#### Origins of the Conflict

In 1960, the London-Zurich agreements led to the establishment of the Constitution of Cyprus and independence from British rule. However, this newfound sovereignty was plagued by intercommunal violence between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (Ehrlich, 1966). Tensions escalated in 1963 when President Makarios III proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution that would significantly curtail the power of the Turkish Cypriot minority. In 1964, major violence erupted between the two communities, and it was only due to significant pressure from the US that Turkey refrained from invading Cyprus (Asmussen, 2008). The UN also authorised its peacekeeping force to Cyprus.

In 1973, the Greek government was overthrown, and Dimitrios Ioannides, the chief of the Greek Military Police, assumed power (Camp, 1980). In January 1974, Nikos Sampson, a close friend of Ioannides and leader of the Greek Cypriot paramilitary organisation EOKA-B, took control. Subsequently, in July 1974, EOKA-B launched a coup, with support from the Greek military and ousted the Makarios government. In response to the events, Turkey retaliated by invading Cyprus.

#### Ceasefire Negotiations

On 20<sup>th</sup> July 1974, Turkey launched an invasion of Cyprus, prompting the UN Security Council (UNSC) to adopt Resolution 353 demanding an immediate end to the foreign military intervention (Security Council, 1974). A ceasefire agreement was reached on 21<sup>st</sup> July, brokered by the US. However, the ceasefire was violated, leading to a new ceasefire established by the UN Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on 23<sup>rd</sup> July. The first Geneva Conference on 25<sup>th</sup> July encountered disagreements over the buffer zone size and the role of UNFICYP as the policing authority (Asmussen, 2008). On 30<sup>th</sup> July, a ceasefire agreement was reached but the second conference stalled due to irreconcilable Greek and Turkish positions.

On 14<sup>th</sup> August 1974, Turkey launched another invasion of Cyprus, taking over 37% of the island within three days. Pressure from the US led to Turkey declaring a ceasefire on 16<sup>th</sup> August and the "Green Line," a demilitarised zone dividing the island into two parts, was established (Bose, 2007).





Map 1: The territorial division of Cyprus after the Turkish invasion in 1974 (Mappr, 2018).

### Incentives for the Ceasefire

The initial ceasefire agreement did not provide significant incentives for Turkey to end hostilities, which is why it immediately violated the agreement and continued to do so until it could achieve its operational target of controlling 37% of the island (Asmuseen, 2008). International criticism and the opposition of the Soviet Union, which disliked the idea of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) country controlling Cyprus, likely played crucial roles in preventing Turkey from invading the entire island (Aslum, 2016). According to one CIA document, Turkey was believed to be capable of capturing the entire island, but it would come at a high cost, requiring reinforcements and taking several weeks (CIA, 1974b). On the other hand, by sticking to its operational objective of seizing only one-third of the island, Turkey accomplished victory with the available forces within three to six days.

Greece's internal political situation also played a significant role during the ceasefire negotiations. The country experienced several political upheavals, starting with the coup and followed by the formation of an interim government until democratic elections could be held (Asmuseen, 2008). These factors made Greece more cautious in its approach to Turkey, aiming to avoid an all-out war. Additionally, Greece lacked sufficient air and naval support in Cyprus, particularly when compared to Turkey (CIA, 1974b). Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis believed that sending more troops to oppose a Turkish offensive in Cyprus would not be feasible due to the distance involved and the potential weakening of Greece's mainland defence (CIA, 1974a). Moreover, the US had given Greece an



ultimatum to not declare enosis<sup>1</sup> and war with Turkey. Failure to do so would result in all military aid to Greece being withdrawn (Dodd, 2010).

Glen D. Camp (1980) notes that the pressure exerted by the US on Turkey prior to the 1974 invasion was not as strong as it was in 1964. Back then President Johnson sent a letter criticising the use of NATO weapons in Cyprus and warning Turkey of NATO's non-assistance if it engaged in an armed conflict with the Soviet Union over Cyprus. Clearly, the incentives for both sides were less than ideal, which is why the ceasefire that was supposed to take effect on 22<sup>nd</sup> July was almost immediately violated.

### **Role of International Powers**

The US and the United Kingdom (UK) have had significant involvement in Cyprus, with the UK being responsible for negotiating between the two communities in the past (Asmussen, 2008). Some theories suggest that the US had an ulterior interest in the 1974 conflict to curb the spread of communism. However, Asmussen believes that the primary reason for their involvement was the fear of two NATO allies entering an all-out war, as both countries held strategic importance for defence in that region. Solving the Cyprus issue was essential in ensuring NATO's security in the vital eastern flank, as prolonging the issue could weaken them (Times, 1974; Office of the Spokesperson, 2023).

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), internal crises in Turkey and Greece were welcome as these two countries were part of NATO and formed its 'Northern Tier Zone' (Aslım, 2016). During the 1974 crisis, the Soviet Union maintained a 'distant observer role' to ensure the independence of Cyprus and prevent it from falling under the control of any NATO countries.

### **Role of the UN**

The UN has been actively involved in Cyprus. The violence in 1963 led to the establishment of UNFICYP which has been present on the island since 1964 under Resolution 186 (Sozen, 2018). During the 1974 conflict, UNFICYP forces took over Nicosia airport, which had strategic importance due to its location. The airport was a contentious area as the arrival of Greek reinforcements at the airport on 22<sup>nd</sup> July, immediately resulted in ceasefire violations with the Turks carrying out air attacks in Nicosia and Famagusta (Asmussen, 2008). The UN took this area under its control and declared that any attack on it will not be tolerated. Neutralising this area meant that neither party could utilise it and contribute to further escalation of the conflict. The UN also facilitated peace talks between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the aim of resolving the intercommunal conflict between them.

This section on Cyprus revealed the strong involvement of external actors like the US, the UK and the UN in attempting to bring forth a ceasefire. The next section on the Arab-Israeli conflict also

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<sup>1</sup> Enosis is the movement through which Greek communities that live outside of the mainland try to assimilate their regions into the Greek state.

documents how the strong influence of an external actor, along with other pertinent factors led to the cessation of hostilities.

## b. Arab-Israeli Case

### Origins of the Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict refers to the 30 years of war between Israel and Arab states over the recognition of the State of Israel and the surrounding territories. Since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Zionists sought the establishment of their homeland in Palestine which already had a significant Arab population (Pressman, 2020). The foundation of Israel in 1948 sparked the first war where several Arab states, including Egypt, attacked Israel. The conflict ended with a ceasefire, but several conflicts of similar nature followed intermittently, namely the Suez War in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition from 1967 to 1970 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel's military was generally superior to that of Arab states throughout the conflicts. However, Egypt showed its strength in the final stage of the wars (Steunberg and Rubinovitz, 2019; Abdel *et al.*, 2013). This section will explore the subsequent peace agreements in 1979 between Israel and Egypt. This agreement has been chosen as it froze the major conflicts in the region and due to Egypt's significance as a leader of the Arab states.

### Ceasefire Negotiations

A critical breakthrough to the armistice was marked by the Camp David Accords in 1978. Here, Egypt and Israel agreed, through the mediation of the US, on Israel's relinquishing of all settlements and air bases in the Sinai and Palestinian autonomy (Steunberg and Rubinovitz, 2019; Jensehaugen, 2018; Abdel *et al.*, 2013). This agreement (Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, 1979) paved the way for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, signed in 1979. It contained mutual recognition of states, cessation of the state of war, normalisation of relations, agreement on Israel's border with Egypt and Israel's withdrawal of its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai Peninsula.



Map 2: The territorial transition in the Arab-Israeli conflict (*What were the outcomes of the four Arab-Israeli wars and how did this further establish the country of Israel?*, 2013)



## Incentives for the Ceasefire

The primary incentive for Israel to enter into the peace agreement was to secure strong relations with the US (Abdel *et al.*, 2013; Telhami, 1990). Because of its size, its limited economic resources and the antagonisms toward its creation in the region, Israel had to rely for its survival on the support from the US. Egypt's diplomatic decisions to distance the Soviet Union and approach the US, as well as the US's economic interest in creating closer ties with Egypt threatened Israel, pushing it to accept the armistice (Telhami, 1999).

Moreover, the protracted war left Israel wanting stability. Choosing armistices with Egypt and detaching it from other Arab nations was favourable, as the Arab world was no military threat to Israel without Egypt. Israel also sought recognition from Egypt, the foremost Arab nation, in order to alleviate the hostility surrounding its establishment and to pave the way for feasible agreements with other Arab states (Quandt, 1986; Atherton, 1992; Journal of Palestine Studies, 1979).

Egypt's motive in agreeing to a ceasefire was also to improve its relationship with the US to gain economic aid in order to combat internal economic crises, especially after its expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt in 1972 (Jensehaugen, 2018; Hinnebusch, 2002). Also, Egypt's military inferiority to Israel required the US's diplomatic assistance to recover its territory loss after the 1967 war. It was also critical that Egypt had confidence to face Israel on a near equal footing in the negotiation. It expected that the US's strategic interests in Egypt would pressure Israel during the negotiations (Telhami, 1999). Its close relationship with Saudi Arabia made it an increasingly important state for the US to secure its oil imports from. Also, because Egypt showed its military competence during the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War and continued to expand its military force, it maintained to be a threat and kept a better position against Israel (Hinnebusch, 2002).

## Role of External Actors

Scholars agree on the crucial role of the US in the peace negotiation. Both sides believed that there was serious room for competition to develop a firm relationship with the US, advancing their cooperation (Telhami, 1999; Steunberg and Ribinovitz, 2019). The US recognised their intention and used this to advance the negotiation by implying to each leader that the rejection of the peace agreement may end the favourable relationship with the US (Quandt, 1986). Also, as a third-state mediator, the US helped the parties overcome deep distrust and historically rooted antagonism between Israel and Egypt.

## Domestic Pressures in Egypt

Another critical factor that contributed to the armistice was Egypt's change of leadership. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's president from 1956 to 1970, took the Pan-Arabism policy to confront Israel as a leader of the Arab world. His successor Anwar Sadat pursued his strong belief in Egyptian nationalism and adopted policies that prioritised Egypt's interest (Karawan, 1994; Abdel *et al.*, 2013). Sadat's anti-Sovietism also resulted in Egypt's reconciliation policy with the US and Israel (Telhami, 1999). Such a drastic change of Egypt's political identity was made possible by its authoritarian regime, where the

president could advance diplomacy without internal consultation (Hinnebusch, 2002). Also, Egypt's ethnic homogeneity and its primacy in the Arab world prevented pressure from other Arab states to keep the 'Arabism' policy (Atherton, 1992).

In addition, Egypt's socio-economic hardships and its connection with Egypt's external commitment in armed conflicts against Israel, which was emphasised by Sadat, led the population to favour ceasefire (Hinnebusch, 2002; Karawan, 2002). Although Egyptians' hostility toward Israelis was pervasive, the armistice was supported through their recognition of dividing the roles of state and society (Stein, 2011). Egyptians viewed that Egypt, as a state, should accept the ceasefire, while social movements should continue to oppose normalisation and confront Zionism.

As was the case in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the next section on Nagorno-Karabakh explores how military fatigue can influence political leaders to come to the negotiating table as well as how international organisations can pressurise belligerent parties.

### **c. Nagorno-Karabakh Case**

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ongoing post-Soviet conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over this contested territory. Officially, the area belongs to Azerbaijan, yet the almost exclusively Karabakh Armenian population refute this and wish to secede Azerbaijan, either to form an independent state or to join Armenia. To date, this conflict has yet to be resolved. This section will focus on the 1994 ceasefire, prompted by the Bishkek protocol and the border clashes leading up to the outbreak of the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

### **Origins of the Conflict**

The origins of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are complex and not easily defined. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that the conflict traces back to the 1919 referendum that took place following the establishment of the USSR. At that time, the predominantly Armenian population of Karabakh agreed to be incorporated into the Azerbaijan Soviet State, while retaining the right to internal self-rule. This decision was influenced by British pressure (Potiers, 2001). However, the population of Nagorno-Karabakh promptly contested this judgement, and the predominantly Armenian inhabitants have been advocating for secession from Azerbaijan ever since. Tensions eventually reached a boiling point in February 1988, following an unauthorised political rally held by Karabakh Armenians in Lenin Square. During the rally, they expressed their desire to break away from Soviet Azerbaijan and join Soviet Armenia. This event served as a catalyst for the outbreak of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (De Waal, 2003). With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the violence intensified in 1992. Eventually a ceasefire was negotiated and signed in May 1994, known as the Bishkek protocol, with Armenia seen as the conflict's victor.

The war was considered a 'frozen' conflict between 1994 and 2020. While ongoing outbursts of violence occurred regularly on the border during this time, there was no full-scale military escalation. These skirmishes resulted in military deaths on both sides consistently every year. The most notable was





in April 2016, the Four Day War, when heavy fighting erupted. Moscow was able to mediate a ceasefire before the conflict could deteriorate further (Rácz, 2021; Cavanaugh, 2021).

In September 2020, the Second Karabakh War erupted, following a series of border clashes that occurred in July. The war lasted for six weeks, resulting in significant casualties and the displacement of thousands of people. Both sides accused each other of initiating the hostilities. However, escalation of violence was inevitable following the unsuccessful attempts to mediate a peace agreement after the 1994 ceasefire. This failure was caused by various factors including the incompatible position of the actors involved, the polarisation of public opinion by the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Nagorno Karabakh leaders as well as economic disparities and geopolitical interests in the region.



Map 3: Territorial borders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region after the 1994 ceasefire ('Nagorno-Karabakh conflict', 2023)

### Ceasefire Negotiations

The ceasefire that took place on 12<sup>th</sup> May 1994, known as the Bishkek protocol, marked the conclusion of the First Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. It was mediated by delegates from the OSCE Minsk Group, established in 1992 and co-chaired by Russia, the US and France, with the specific aim of resolving the conflict (De Waal, 2003). Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the Minsk Group continued to propose peace initiatives, including the 'step-by-step' peace process as well as the 'package' process (Ismailzade, 2016). In 2007, they formulated the 'Madrid Principles', which were regarded as an impressive example of peace mediation, despite not being accepted by either Armenia or Azerbaijan (Broers *et al.*, 2015). As a consequence, the conflict remained in a state of limbo, frozen for over twenty years.

## Incentives for the Ceasefire

De Waal (2003) posits that the primary impetus behind the ceasefire was the fact that both Armenia and Azerbaijan were exhausted by the conflict. The war, ongoing for 6 years, claimed the lives of between 15,000-25,000 people, with upwards of 50,000 wounded and whole towns and villages destroyed in the region. Around 670,000 displaced persons flooded into Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan had suffered significant casualties while making only negligible progress on the frontline. This incentivised its willingness to negotiate a ceasefire agreement.

Similarly, Armenia incurred substantial casualties, although they were able to seize control of 14% of Azerbaijani territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh. However, interruption of railway services to Russia via Abkhazia hindered Armenia's connections with the outside world, particularly its ties to Russia, impacting its economy (Walker, 1998). The Armenian leadership deemed a ceasefire necessary to facilitate the reorganisation of its military forces in order to safeguard its territorial gains.

## Role of External Actors

Another key reason for the ceasefire was pressure from the international community. Multilateral organisations were insistent the war should end. In 1993, the UNSC passed four resolutions on the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, repeatedly calling for a cessation of armed hostilities. These resolutions were not legally binding and did not result in the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, as they were passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Socher, 2021). However, the resolutions put pressure on the Armenians and Azeri to stop the fighting. To add, pressure from the Minsk Group to broker a ceasefire became more intense after an escalation in the ferociousness of violence between December 1993 and May 1994.

The 1994 ceasefire was significantly influenced by the geopolitical interests of various states, particularly Russia. Given that the belligerent parties involved were former Soviet satellite states, it is not surprising that Russia held the strongest influence in the region. In March 1993, President Boris Yeltsin advocated for Russia to be granted special authority to address conflicts within the former USSR. The instability in neighbouring states was deemed undesirable, and although Russia provided assistance to both sides during the conflict, the implementation of peacekeeping measures would guarantee the continued influence of Russia in the Caucasus (Altstadt, 1996).

## Domestic Pressures

Both Armenian and Azeri leadership was receptive towards brokering a ceasefire by May 1994. The intensity of the final six months of the war, and the decisive Armenian victories the previous summer had created conditions where negotiations were feasible for the first time since 1988 (Altstadt, 1996). President Robert Kocharyan of Armenia sought to solidify the gains made by Armenia and believed that they held significant leverage in their pursuit of Nagorno-Karabakh secession. Azerbaijan leaders feared aggressive opposition from the Azeri public but understood they could not achieve a military victory on the battlefield. These conditions were able to lead to a ceasefire agreement, but an official peace agreement addressing the fundamental issues of the conflict remained unattainable (De Waal, 2003).

**d. Summary**

The following table highlights the primary and secondary factors that led to ceasefire agreements for the three respective case studies:

<b>Conflict</b>	<b>Primary Factors for Ceasefire</b>	<b>Secondary Factors for Ceasefire</b>
<b>Cyprus Conflict</b>	<p><b>Military Incentives</b></p> <p>Greece and Turkey exhibited a cognisance of the operational objectives at hand.</p>	<p><b>External Actors</b></p> <p>International criticism and retaliation particularly from the US and the USSR.</p>
<b>Arab-Israeli Conflict</b>	<p><b>Economic and Political Relationship with the US</b></p> <p>Israel and Egypt wanted to secure economic and political relationships with the US, who acted as a mediator.</p>	<p><b>Change of Leadership and Military Fatigue</b></p> <p>Egypt’s change of leadership enabled the transition of its policy from protecting the interest of Arab states to prioritising Egypt’s benefit.</p> <p>Both parties recognised that they will not defeat the other.</p>
<b>Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict</b>	<p><b>Military Fatigue</b></p> <p>Neither side was able to reach a decisive victory, and the increasing costs of the conflict, both financial and humanitarian, created an incentive for both parties to seek settlement.</p>	<p><b>External Actors</b></p> <p>International pressures, especially from Russia, helped realise the Bishkek protocol.</p>

Table 1: Primary and secondary factors that led to ceasefire agreements.



### 3. History of the Russia-Ukraine War

This section explains the history and intensification of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that ultimately led to the outbreak of the 2022 war. As we analyse the conditions that can lead to a ceasefire in the coming section, it is important to keep in mind the context on the ground.

With its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine embarked on a challenging journey towards democracy and capitalism. By 2013, Ukrainians were disappointed with the inability of their government to improve their quality of life. The inefficient policymaking and lacking political will since the 1990s, meant that citizens were dissatisfied with their government. Integration with Europe, for many Ukrainians, would provide hope that their standard of living would improve and result in the modernisation of their economic and political life (Shveda and Park, 2016). In late 2013, the refusal of the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich to sign the document for Ukraine to join the European Union (EU) resulted in thousands of Ukrainians marching in protest. These protests escalated in 2014 and became the “Revolution of Dignity” or the “Euro-Maidan”. Various countries across the world had campaigns of solidarity in support of the Ukrainian protests. As a result of the protests, Yanukovich escaped to Russia and the Ukrainian government resigned.

Following these protests, Russia annexed Crimea and undertook military actions in the Donbas region. While Russia had a military base in Crimea, as per the agreements signed in 1997 with Ukraine, in 2014, Russian forces were deployed outside of the agreed-upon areas, compelling Ukrainian forces to withdraw. Russia justified its intervention by claiming that Yanukovich had invited them to intervene, though in reality, the invitation was sent only after Yanukovich had fled (Weller, 2014). Russia claimed that a coup had taken place in Ukraine, robbing the Ukrainians of legitimate leadership.

Russia subsequently conducted a referendum in Crimea, which deviated significantly from international standards. Unsurprisingly, the results indicated that 96% of the electorate, with an 82% turnout, supported Crimea's independence. Crimea then declared its independence and swiftly requested Russia's annexation, serving as a tactic to obscure the coercive acquisition of the territory (Weller, 2022). Russia's operation in the Donbas region was followed by the 2014 Minsk agreement, which orchestrated a ceasefire, the removal of all foreign armed formations and military equipment from Ukraine, and amnesty to those who had taken up arms in the Donbas region (Aljazeera, 2022). The majority of the Donbas population preferred to be a part of Ukraine.

On 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. On 21<sup>st</sup> February, Putin gave a long list of justifications for the invasion ranging from the expansion of NATO to reclaiming Ukraine as part of Russia in accordance with history. He believes that the Slavic origins that present-day Russia, Ukraine and Belarus share needs to be unified and that any ‘Ukrainian’ or ‘Belarusians’ identity, conceived as a result of affiliation to the respective state, is a foreign or artificial conception (Mankoff, 2022). The Russian military strategy probably presumed that eastern Ukraine would, if not support, at least accept a re-integration with the Russian side as they already had a lot in common culturally, linguistically, and religiously. However, this proved to be wrong as Ukrainian resistance to the invasion continues even after a year.



Map 4: How military control of Ukraine has changed (BBC, 2022).

Regardless of the earlier estimate that the Russian army could defeat the Ukrainian army easily as well as Russia's earlier success in the battlefields, the two are evenly matched at the moment. Since Ukraine successfully counterattacked to reverse Russian advances in Eastern Ukraine in Autumn 2022, the frontline has remained fairly consistent (Barros *et al.*, 2023; Weller, 2023). In May 2023, Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack in the Bakhmut area (Bailey *et al.*, 2023). Although the Russian military has launched numerous aerial attacks on civilian areas, they do not substitute battlefield successes, nor have they succeeded in destroying the resolve of the Ukrainians. However, it is unclear whether Ukraine can eject Russia from its territory, despite the support from the Western governments (Haass, 2023).

The following section establishes a connection between the ongoing war in Ukraine and the three examined case studies. It seeks to highlight similarities in the current situation and aims to explore the factors that could potentially contribute to a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.

#### 4. Analysis of Possible Ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine War

The given case studies on the Cyprus, Arab-Israeli and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict revealed various conditions that contributed to successful ceasefires. Among those, conditions like military fatigue, mediation by International Organisations (IOs) and third-party states, and domestic politics appear to be the most prominent in these three case studies. These factors have also been observed in a number of literature that analysed the peace process in the Russia-Ukraine war as well. We will focus on these three aspects in the following.

##### a. Military Fatigue

For the Russia-Ukraine war, military fatigue may contribute to the eventual cessation of hostilities. Wars typically come to an end through one of two means: either one side emerges victorious, imposing its desired terms for peace, or both sides mutually recognise that finding a compromise is more desirable than persisting in a conflict where neither has the upper hand (Haass, 2023). In the Arab-Israeli case, the latter scenario applied. Egypt preferred the ceasefire because it recognised that it cannot defeat Israel's military superiority and it was worn out by the intermittent war. To add, Israel preferred compromise because completely defeating all the hostile Arabic states and imposing its peace terms were highly challenging despite its military strength.

In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, military fatigue also played a role in freezing the violence. The war, ongoing for 6 years, came at huge humanitarian and military costs on both sides. The ferocity of the violence in 1993 and the inability of Azeri forces to reclaim the territory occupied by Armenian forces was the primary reason Azerbaijan was pushed into negotiations in 1994 (De Waal, 2003). Both sides suffered from depleted weapon arsenals, with Armenia facing severe consequences due to an economic blockade enforced by Azerbaijan and Turkey (Walker, 1998). The instability and cost of the conflict in the region contributed to the decision for the Baku and Yerevan governments to come to the negotiating table.

In the Ukraine war, neither ceasefire scenario seems to apply at the moment because the military strength of the two parties has been somewhat balanced. Little progress has been made in the battlefields in terms of new territorial gains and both armies believe in their military success (Haass, 2023). Although both Russia and Ukraine have suffered significant losses in the war and face a lack of manpower and equipment, with regards to the military supplies, they have not reached the point where either cannot continue fighting the war (Jones, 2022). Extensive Russian casualties in the first six months of the war were covered by an autumn conscription drive, which more than doubled the size of its force in the winter of 2022 (Taylor, 2023; Ilyushina and Ebel, 2023). As seen from the recent report on Russia's successful mobilisation of personnel in May 2023, Russia seems to have the internal capacity to sustain and regenerate its own military capabilities (Bailey *et al.*, 2023). Ukraine, despite its predicted military inferiority to Russia and its considerable loss of soldiers and military equipment in the battles, has substantial support from the Western governments, who are making efforts to speed up the supplies of equipment and funds (Jones, 2022).



Furthermore, both parties seem to assume that they control the momentum of the conflict and, thus, are not inclined towards talks at present (Bisaria and Dutta, 2023). Both parties believe that a decisive military victory or advance on the ground is just around the corner (Weller, 2023). Ukraine's successful counterattacks in Autumn 2022 and military and political support from the West have reinforced its view that it might prevail in the conflict in the end. In January 2023, the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that the aim is also to retake territory occupied by Russia since 2014, including Crimea (Neukam, 2023).

Russia also believes it can achieve military success. Putin has been announcing the mobilisation of extra troops and launching new offensives (Myre and Maynes, 2022). Russia might continue its strategy of terrorising the population and breaking down the will of the Ukrainians to resist through missile strikes against civilians and civilian infrastructure, while attempting to win a slow war of attrition on the ground (Weller, 2023). It is also viewed that Putin believes the Western governments will gradually rethink the costs of supporting Ukraine (Haass, 2023). As such, major intellectuals view the military situation at the moment as seeming unlikely to lead to an immediate ceasefire.

Having said that, the protracted war may change the parties' calculations, resulting in the exhaustion of both parties and their understanding that military engagement will not settle the issue. Sanctions against Russia, although not seen to have impacted the Russian economy heavily yet, could also affect its ability to produce ammunition, undermining an already weak weapon arsenal (Weller, 2023). Moreover, the recent news on the rebellion of the Wagner group in June 2023 exposed the division and weakness of Russia's military forces (Lukiv, 2023). Russia's recruitment of soldiers from prisons and mental hospitals also shows signs of its future shortage of soldiers (The Moscow Times, 2022). Ukraine's military capabilities may also decline as the willingness and capacity of Western governments to continue supplying arms and ammunition to Ukraine are not unlimited, as seen from the US population's increasing reluctance to fund Ukraine (Este, 2023). The parties' calculations will also depend on many other factors, including if China chooses to outwardly support Russia as well as NATO's involvement (Jones, 2022; Haass, 2023). In addition to such instability in supplying weapons and soldiers, the limited progress on the battlefield may lead the parties to prefer peace talks. The situation has not changed drastically since Autumn 2022 and therefore, it could be a matter of time before the parties shift to peace negotiations.

In contrast, military fatigue was not a primary factor in the de-escalation of the conflict in the Cyprus case. The crucial factors included Greece's hesitancy to send more troops to Cyprus at the risk of its mainland's defence and Turkey's prudence and reluctance to push the limits of its strategic position, which has been mentioned above. The UNFICYP's role in mitigating the situation was also important and this will be analysed in the next section.

The following table explores specifically military fatigue in the four separate conflicts:

<b>Conflict</b>	<b>Duration of Active Conflict</b>	<b>Availability of Weapons and Soldiers</b>	<b>Situations of the Battlefield and Parties' Expectations of Military Success</b>
<b>Cyprus Conflict</b>	<b>4 days</b> (Conflict from 20 <sup>th</sup> July to 16 <sup>th</sup> August, with active conflict on 20 <sup>th</sup> July and from 14 <sup>th</sup> -16 <sup>th</sup> August).	Greece lacked air and naval support in Cyprus compared to Turkey.	Turkey was confident of gaining its operational objective of 37% of the island.
<b>Arab-Israeli Conflict</b>	<b>4 years</b> (Major conflicts in 1948-1949, 1956, 1967, 1968-1970, and 1973).	Arab states, including Egypt, lacked trained soldiers and weapons compared to Israel. However, neither party suffered a serious shortage of those.	Although Israel had a military superiority, it was not strong enough to defeat all the Arab states.  Neither party expected to completely defeat the other.
<b>Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict</b>	<b>6 years</b> (Conflict from February 1988 - May 1994 with notable border clashes occurring in 2008, 2014 and 2016).	Both Armenia and Azerbaijan suffered from limited weapons and trained soldiers.	While both Armenia and Azerbaijan were initially optimistic when the war broke out, this positivity quickly waned.
<b>Russia-Ukraine Conflict</b>	<b>1 year and 4 months.</b>	Both Russia and Ukraine do not suffer from a serious shortage of weapons and soldiers at the moment. However, shortages may occur in the future.	Currently, the two parties are fairly evenly matched and both seem optimistic of their success.

Table 2: Military fatigue for each conflict.



## b. Role of External Actors

### International Organisations

For the purposes of this study, external party engagements refer to both the involvement of other countries not directly engaged in the conflict and the work of IOs to freeze the hostilities. IOs play a crucial role in conflict resolution. The deep distrust between Russia and Ukraine means that both countries could utilise a third-party mandate and oversight for any armistice or agreement that leads to the discontinuation of hostilities (Gowan, 2022). This poses a challenge due to Ukraine's probable inclination towards seeking NATO engagement, whereas Russia would favour the involvement of Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) personnel. One solution, as Gowan (2022) suggests, would be to have a mixed council with a pre-agreed number of NATO, CSTO, and non-aligned members.

Bodies like the UN usually mediate conflicts by sending peacekeeping missions to those areas. In the case of the war in Ukraine, however, the role of the UN, and specifically the UNSC in bringing about a resolution to the war is a huge question mark, since Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council and has veto power. Any authorisation of the blue helmets, i.e., the peacekeeping force of the UN, would require the approval of the UNSC (Wesolowsky, 2022). A case where the UN was successful in containing the conflict and mitigating tensions is that of Cyprus, where the UNFICYP forces took over Nicosia airport, thereby preventing further escalation of the conflict using this strategic location.

The UN is not the only IO mandated to help with conflict mediation. The OSCE's Minsk Group was tasked with aiding in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, set up specifically for this purpose. The Group tried a number of negotiating methods between Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan and Armenia rejected all proposals, despite extensive talks, due to the incompatibility of the conflicting parties' stances. Considering the UNSC deadlock, creating a new group or institution to manage the mediation may be a possibility in the Ukraine War.

Even before the war broke out in 2022, the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) led by OSCE was responsible for monitoring the ceasefire in Ukraine. It was "the world's largest dedicated third-party ceasefire monitoring operation" (Verjee, 2022, p. 808). By learning and understanding why the SMM failed to uphold in Ukraine, a new and improved mission can be mandated to overlook any possible ceasefire. Since the SMM did monitor the ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine for over eight years, many lessons can be learned from its failures and successes (Verjee, 2022). Conflicts with ceasefire monitors seem most likely to last, like in Cyprus where the 'Green Line' monitored by the UNFICYP froze hostilities and any major violence between the two communities. However, the effectiveness of these third-party organisations in the current war is questionable considering the limited leverage they would have over Russia. One of the reasons why the SMM failed in Ukraine was due to the lack of enforcement mechanism with regard to violations. Considering Russia's power and its position as a permanent member in the UNSC, it remains to be seen whether any existing IOs would have the ability to successfully mediate a ceasefire that ensures Russia's capitulation.



## States as External Actors

External party engagement can include those that do not support either side of the conflict but seek to mediate it. The actions of these third-party states can be helpful in bringing a resolution to the situation. These third-party interventions would include the involvement of countries that are not deeply invested or have maintained a distance from the Ukraine-Russia conflict to act as mediators. While most states have taken a stance in the UN in support or against the war, there are states that have abstained and those that are politically and geographically remote from the war or have taken a balanced approach (Gowan, 2022).

Take the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict; though there has been no active engagement of the IOs or any UN organisation in concluding the peace agreement, the role of the US was significant in bringing the hostile parties together. It used its relationship with the two states as leverage to facilitate their compromises. Moreover, as a third-party, it also helped them overcome the deep distrust and historically rooted antagonism among them. Some countries have already started attempting to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. In June 2023, a group of leaders from seven African countries travelled to both Ukraine and Russia on a “self-styled peace mission” (Press, 2023). China also presented a peace proposal earlier in 2023, though it was dismissed by Ukraine (Bloomberg, 2023). Both China’s and the African nation’s peace plan attempt cannot be seen in the same vein, in light of the considerable differences these states possess, in terms of power and leverage in the international arena.

It also cannot be denied that third parties who seek to mediate usually have their own agenda for embarking on ‘peace missions’. For these African countries, peace in the Russia-Ukraine region is important as it relies on them both for food and fertiliser imports (Press, 2023). As for China, it has been accused of being interested in the war only as it views the causes behind Russia’s failure to be a mirror to the hindrances it will face in its reunification plans in Taiwan (Singleton, 2023). There is also the fact that a prolonged war will result in increased debt defaults among the developing countries, which is not ideal for China since it has become a prominent creditor among these countries (Singleton, 2023).

The Cyprus case study also noted the involvement of both the US and the UK in attempting to de-escalate the situation. However, again, both these countries had their own motives for preventing an all-out war in Cyprus. It would be foolish to presume that countries in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are driven by entirely pure motives when they seek to mediate a conflict. Even with their hidden agendas, these countries can prove to be helpful in freezing the situation, as was the case in Arab-Israel. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh as well, Russia was able to mediate the most recent outbreak in violence very successfully. However, the situation of a superpower's patronage to the two conflicting parties is not comparable to the Ukraine war, as this particular case is very different.

When states act as mediators, they need to have leverage and the ability to penalise in case of violations. This was the reason why the US was able to mediate in Cyprus and Arab-Israeli, and Russia in Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, the question remains as to who possesses the power to play this role in the case of the current war in Ukraine, and whether there is any state that can have leverage over Russia. China appears to answer some of these questions, though the extent to which it can fulfil this role remains to be seen. Hence, even if the African nations, the UN or the OSCE bring forth a successful solution,



their utility will be limited as long as they have no effective enforcement mechanism over Russia. The UNSC deadlock due to Russia’s position as a permanent member is an attestation to this fact.

While the prospects of a peace talk in the near future appear slim given the divergent stances of Russia and Ukraine, should a potential armistice become possible, it will be crucial to handle the involvement of third parties with caution, to avoid jeopardising it. Third-party engagements have a deep influence on how conflicts are played out, be it in an escalation of the conflict or the establishment of a peace agreement. The involvement of multiple non-belligerent entities in this conflict emphasises the significance of their support for any armistice or ceasefire agreement. While this third-party support has been helpful for Ukraine in defending itself and fighting back, it is important that states remember that the parties directly engaged are Russia and Ukraine and that they, particularly the Ukrainians, will be the ones to face the repercussions of an active conflict. Thus, if Russia and Ukraine reach a potential ceasefire agreement, it is crucial that these external actors align with the proposed settlements and act cautiously and avoid antagonising Russia.

The following table lays out the mediators, belligerent actors and non-belligerent actors in the four conflicts:

Conflict	Mediator	Belligerent Actors	Non-belligerent Actors
<b>Cyprus Conflict</b>	The UK and the US.	Turkey, Greece.	-
<b>Arab-Israeli Conflict</b>	The US.	Israel, Arab states (the heavily involved states were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon).	The US, the UK, France (supporting Israel), Russia (supporting Egypt).
<b>Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict</b>	OSCE Minsk Group, United Nations, the US, Russia.	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.	Soviet Union (pre-1991), Russia (supporting both), Turkey (supporting Azerbaijan).
<b>Russia-Ukraine</b>	-	Russia, Ukraine.	NATO, EU, the US, the UK, Australia, Japan, South Korea (supporting Ukraine), Belarus, Iran, Syria, Myanmar, North Korea, Eritrea (supporting Russia).

Table 3: External actors involved in the conflicts.



### c. Domestic Pressures

The Russia-Ukraine War's future ceasefire and subsequent peace processes will likely depend on the domestic situation in both Russia and Ukraine, relating to both public sentiment and political climate. Ukraine has already surprised the world in its ability to defend vast swathes of its territory against the Russian superpower. The grit of Ukrainians and their resilience against oppressing forces has been cited repeatedly as the backbone to the country's ability to continue fighting. Zelenskyy, while controversial at times, has been praised universally in his ability to mobilise a nation and provide strong leadership. Russia does not have the same public support in the war that Ukraine does. Instead of relying on mustering nationalistic pride and defiance in the face of aggression as the Ukrainians have, Russia relies on censorship, propaganda and the violent subjugation of political opposition to squash dissent and ensure that the masses do not rebel against the Kremlin. American historian Stephan Kotkin argues that Putin's authoritarian regime is exceptionally strong and he is highly skilled at the suppression of political alternatives (Remnick, 2023). Both Russian and Ukrainian leader's ability to sway the opinion of their populations and galvanise public support will be crucial in how the war plays out over the next few years.

Public sentiment in Ukraine will be fundamental to negotiating a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Russian invasion has been brutal and has taken the lives of approximately 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers according to the U.S Defence Intelligence Agency (BBC, 2023). In a survey by Petro Burkovsky (2022), 94% of Ukrainians believed that Ukraine would win the war with only 1% of respondents thinking Russia would win. Now that the war has shifted into one of attrition and the destruction of Ukrainian territory has surpassed a cost of 411 billion USD, it appears highly challenging for Zelenskyy to negotiate with Putin, considering the prevailing animosity felt by the Ukrainian public towards Russia (World Bank, 2023). The strong anger and outrage among Ukrainians complicates peace talk engagement with the Kremlin unless territorial gains are achieved and Russia begins its retreat.

In April last year, Robert Seery (2022, p. 1) predicted conditions for a comprehensive ceasefire as part of Cambridge University's Ukraine Peace Settlement Project and asserted that "any ceasefire may be comprehensive only if it is accompanied with the full and verifiable withdrawal of foreign forces." This will then create the conditions needed for a peace settlement to be drafted. Zelenskyy has repeatedly asserted that he will only enter into peace talks with Russia after Moscow withdraws its forces, an unyielding approach that mirrors the views of the majority of the Ukrainian population (DW, 2023).

The Russian public has not been allowed to have its own thoughts on the Russia-Ukraine War. The Kremlin has carefully weaved a narrative that has been forced upon the Russian public, persuading many that Russia is a victim, forced by the US and NATO into a fight for survival against the West as a whole. Opposing this narrative is dangerous and dissent is suppressed with uncompromising efficiency. There are many in Russia who support Putin and his plight against perceived Western antagonism. It is hard to truly ascertain how many Russians support the War in Ukraine. The Levada Centre, a Russian sponsored polling system regarded by many internationals as Russians only independent pollster, released data stating that in March 2023, 72% of respondents support the military activities in Ukraine (Responsible Statecraft, 2023). Although it is difficult to ascertain the precise extent of pro-war



sentiment in Russian society, there is no denying that there is significant support for the invasion of Ukraine. Mass opposition to the war is highly unlikely in the immediate future and peace talks will likely require instigation from political leadership rather than by public sway due to the nature of Russian authoritarianism.

In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, polarisation of public sentiment intentionally by political leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in a hostile climate where resentments between the two countries were so high that peace processes have so far been unsuccessful. In 2011, after the Kazan Summit, due to concerns about domestic public opinion and opposition from the diaspora, the political leaders in both nations lacked the willingness and capability to make difficult concessions (Ismailzade, 2022). Decades of impassioned, divisive nationalist rhetoric have led to an entrenched maximalist stance among the general population of Armenia and Azerbaijan (Hoppmann, 2015). As a result, leaders have chosen to prioritise stability by preserving the existing state of division, rather than risking public outrage during negotiations.

In the context of Cyprus, the Greek political leadership contributed to the de-escalation of the conflict and achieving a successful cessation of hostilities. They established a new temporary government to manage the situation until elections could take place. Karamanlis, leading the interim government, made a significant declaration that Greece would refrain from sending additional troops to counter the Turkish offensive. This decision undoubtedly averted further escalation of the conflict. Unfortunately, in the case of Russia-Ukraine, the hostilities have already surpassed the point where choosing a morally superior stance of non-engagement is feasible. Putin's invasion has been marked by intense brutality and numerous allegations of war crimes. Non-engagement was never a viable choice for Ukrainian leaders, and presently, it remains the only viable path forward.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the policies of the leadership and the public sentiment of Egypt facilitated the ceasefire and the peace agreement. The change of leaders from Nasser to Sadat resulted in the change in policy taken by Egypt, from Pan-Arabism to statism, which favoured ceasefire in order to prevent the future damage to Egypt (Karawan, 1994). Moreover, Egypt's socio-economic hardships and its connection with Egypt's external commitment in several armed conflicts with Israel, which was politically emphasised by Sadat, led the population to incline to favour ceasefire (Hinnebusch, 2002; Karawan, 2002).

For both Russia and Ukraine, this war has utilised technology and social media in new ways not seen played out before. The advancements in technology have meant that this conflict, more than any, has been a 'hybrid war,' which Dr. Talita Dias (2022, p. 9) defines as "any coordinated or individual deployment of digital resources for cognitive purposes to change or reinforce attitudes or behaviours of the targeted audience." She argues a 'hybrid war' utilises five mechanisms to reinforce public opinion: propaganda, disinformation, misinformation, malinformation and hate speech. This weaponization of information is not a new phenomenon in wartime strategy, with propaganda being effectively utilised in wars for the last century. Yet the speed and quantity of information dissemination now possible has raised the stakes. Peace processes will have to carefully consider information circulation while negotiations are ongoing to prevent misinformation spreading that could hinder talks.

The following table summarises the main factors this paper posits will be relevant in a future Russia-Ukraine ceasefire:

	Military Fatigue		Influential External Actors	Domestic Pressure
	<i>Availability of Weapons and Soldiers</i>	<i>Situations of the Battlefield and Parties' Expectations of Military Success</i>		
<b>Cyprus Conflict</b>	Greece lacked air and naval support in Cyprus compared to Turkey.	Turkey was confident of gaining its operational objective of 37% of the island.	The UNFICYP, the US, the UK.	Change of leadership.
<b>Arab-Israeli Conflict</b>	Arab states, including Egypt, lacked trained soldiers and weapons compared to Israel. However, neither party suffered a serious shortage of those.	Although Israel had a military superiority, it was not strong enough to defeat all the Arab states. Neither party expected to completely defeat the other.	The US.	Change of leadership.
<b>Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict</b>	Both Armenia and Azerbaijan suffered from limited weapons and trained soldiers.	While both Armenia and Azerbaijan were initially optimistic when the war broke out, this positivity quickly waned.	Russia, OSCE Minsk Group, the UN, the US, Turkey.	Political leadership and public sentiment.
<b>Russia-Ukraine Conflict</b>	Sufficient at the moment but could change in the future as their supplies are unstable.	Military strength of the two parties has been somewhat balanced with not much progress in the battlefields in terms of new territorial gains.  Both parties believe in their military success.	NATO, EU, the US, the UK, Belarus, Iran, China.	Leadership and public sentiment have remained stable.

Table 4: Main factors for incentivising a future Russia-Ukraine ceasefire.



## 5. Conclusion

The three specific case studies on the Cyprus, Arab-Israeli, and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts revealed various conditions that realised successful ceasefires, such as military fatigue, mediation by third parties, geopolitical significance, policies of leaderships, and public sentiment. Building on such research, we have examined the conditions that could lead to a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war and hypothesised how the peace process may look like with a special focus on three vital aspects: military fatigue, mediation by third parties, and domestic pressures.

The military situation of the Russia-Ukraine war at the moment seems unlikely to lead to a ceasefire. As seen in the Arab-Israeli and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, a ceasefire can be facilitated by the parties' recognition that neither could defeat the other, which is not currently present in the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the possible lack of military supplies in the future may lead to the parties preferring a ceasefire, considering Ukraine's dependence on Western support and Russia's unstable production of weapons, poor training of soldiers and division in its military. Also, lack of substantial territorial gains may result in the parties recognising that military options will not resolve the conflict, thereby commencing peace talks.

The role of existing IOs in creating a successful ceasefire and peace agreement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is doubtful considering their lack of leverage over Russia. This is apparent with the UNSC's inability to bring about a resolution in the conflict due to Russia's position. A possible remedy would be the creation of a new neutral institution, although its leverage capacity will need to be considered. Mediation by third-party states could possibly be more helpful, but it is questionable whether such eligible states exist in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China could prove to be a potential actor due to its power and role in the international arena, though it is clear that it has its own agenda for mediating between Russia and Ukraine.

The domestic situation, relating to both public sentiment and political climate, are vital to the Russia-Ukraine war's future ceasefire as they were in the Nagorno-Karabakh case. At present, the outrage of Ukrainians makes it difficult for Ukraine to start peace talks with Russia until it retreats. In addition, due to the nature of Russian authoritarianism and limited freedom of speech of its people, mass opposition to the war is highly unlikely in the immediate future and peace talks will likely require instigation from political leadership rather than by public sway, although this may change.

Currently, many scholars are pessimistic about the ceasefire of the Russia-Ukraine war in the near future. Nonetheless, the situations on the battlefields, domestic conditions, and international trends are rapidly changing, which could shift dynamics. Although the scope of our research prevented us from analysing other insightful armistices, such as the ones in the Korean peninsula and Iraq, further analysis of case studies of armistice agreements could help hypothesise a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire and appropriately react to the situation.

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