You are a leading figure in the economics of happiness and well-being. Your work moves beyond traditional economic indicators to incorporate dimensions such as hope, aspirations, and perceived security as constitutive of human well-being. Could you explain what this “new science of well-being” entails and how it reshapes our understanding of inequality?

The science of well-being applies the econometric techniques typically used by economists to analyse constructs and variables that are often used in psychology or medical science to better understand both the determinants and consequences of human wellbeing. As such we use responses to surveys of reported wellbeing to measure things such as happiness or stress, meaning and purpose in life, and attitudes about the future via standard econometric analysis to better understand what drives more positive or more negative emotions and aspirations or lack thereof.

We also attempt to disentangle what is the result of innate character traits (such as optimism or pessimism) from trends that are influenced by the environment. An example of this is hope, an important wellbeing dimension that reflects a sense of agency, a trait which differentiates hope from optimism. Optimism is the belief that things will get better, while hope reflects positive attitudes about the future but also individual’s determination to make their futures better. While people with high levels of hope persist despite significant challenges, they may lose their sense of agency and therefore hope if, ultimately, there is no path to forward progress in the environment in which they live,. As in the case of IQ, both genes and the environment interact in determining wellbeing levels as people navigate their lives.

Here there is a strong interconnectedness between the environments that people live in and their long-term outcomes. Those who live in extreme deprivation may be optimistic as a psychological survival strategy, but they lack agency to get ahead. In earlier work, I described this as the “happy peasants versus frustrated achievers” phenomenon, as those who have higher levels of hope and agency may have less contentment and raw optimism at times but persistent determination to get ahead. Those without a sense of agency often adapt to their difficult status quo but are unable to get beyond it. In this instance, inequality of opportunities in the end drive inequality of well-being as well as income.

Not only do we find remarkable consistency in the determinants of well-being in populations around the world (these include having sufficient income, good health, social relationships, and meaning and purpose in life, among others) but that having higher levels of wellbeing also lead to important life outcomes, ranging from productivity to health and longevity to social relations and altruism. High levels of income and wellbeing inequality are linked to lower levels of individual and societal wellbeing and lower levels of civic trust and social cohesion.

A disadvantaged individual in an environment with higher levels of trust and social support is far more likely to get ahead in life than one in an environment lacking those things. As such, governments that place priority on creating the conditions that allow most of their citizens to live healthy, fulfilling lives and have freedom to choose the kinds of lives they want to lead, are investing in more productive, creative, and peaceful societies. 

Your research reveals striking contrasts: high levels of optimism among certain disadvantaged groups and despair among others. How should we interpret these differences? What do they tell us about the role of cultural, social, and institutional contexts on well-being?

These results highlight the importance of communities, respect for cultural diversity, and having institutions — formal or informal — that support those who are left behind matter a great deal. Often deprived minorities have strong community ties that in turn provide informal safety nets for those who fall behind, which not only support material wellbeing but hope for the future among these same groups, which in turn helps them invest in their futures. This highlights the point above that civic trust and social cohesion — whether fostered by formal or informal institutions — are important to future outcomes, particularly but not only for people who live in deprived circumstances. Different cultures and societies tend to prioritise the role of collective versus individual welfare differently, as characterised by the generosity of safety nets, the nature of informal or formal civic institutions, such as churches, unions, or less structured social organisations. 

My recent research with several colleagues shows that the United States, one of the wealthiest countries in the world which is characterised by its strong emphasis on individual effort over social support (and consequentially very high levels of income inequality), has been declining on all markers of reported wellbeing for several decades.  It is only those population cohorts with high levels of community ties and informal social support that are able to retain a sense of hope and agency in the face of deprivation or discrimination.   

What role can institutions — whether educational, economic, or political — play in restoring or strengthening hope, particularly among younger generations?

Each of these institutions have a role to play. Educational institutions are uniquely well-suited to provide mentorship, support for creativity and innovation, and to monitor and provide guidance to students who fall behind or are overwhelmed with the uncertainties they face in today’s troubled times. Economic institutions must re-orient their focus on wealth creation for a small group of “winners” to opportunity creation that can help level the playing field for those who start off with disadvantages. And political institutions must become much more aware of how the increasing polarisation that exists in many countries today, is not only destroying civic discourse, spreading misinformation, and eroding the functionality of governments, but has very high costs on younger generations due to the erosion of hope for the future that results. 

All countries have their own institutions and some function better than others. But an increasing literature shows that countries that organise their institutional strategies, actions, and objectives around the overall objective of societal well-being, which includes economic growth but many other income and non-income dimensions, perform better in increasing their citizens’ wellbeing levels, health, productivity, civic participation, and much more. 

It is impossible to make recommendations that are tailored to the unique circumstances and stakeholders in so many different countries around the world but providing an inclusive organising theme around which to organise public sector efforts and governance also serves to galvanise the efforts of non-government actors, such as the private sector, civic organisations, and community organisations. There is increasing consensus around the world that a narrow vision of social progress as economic growth alone has failed or left out much of the world’s population. Wellbeing is an objective that includes economic growth but also highlights a range of other dimensions that are essential to human welfare and flourishing such as health, social cohesion, resilience and sustainability, that economic growth alone cannot provide. It is time to correct course.

You show that a lack of hope can have tangible consequences for behaviour, affecting decisions related to education, health, or social engagement. In a context marked by climate and other global crises, geopolitical tensions, and social fragmentation, do you believe we are reaching a turning point in collective well-being? Which levers for action appear most urgent to you today to rebuild hope and act positively on well-being?

Individuals with higher levels of hope have better long-term outcomes because those who believe in their futures are more likely to invest in them, via education and healthy behaviours and giving back to society, than those without hope. We are already at a turning point in collective well-being, and not for the better. But increasing awareness of the consequences of ignoring these crises, especially for the young, may, in the end, produce a large-scale push for change and a re-set of global priorities, which I state there is deep need for in the above paragraph. The increased interest in wellbeing science, especially among young scholars, the growth of support for moving towards indicators of progress that include but go well beyond GDP, as in the efforts of many governments such as the UK, New Zealand, Canada, and Chile, among others, in official national statistics; the UN’s recent Commission on the topic (which I served on), and the continued resilience and in fact leading edge of efforts by community organisations around the globe to make positive change are just a few examples. That, in the end, gives me some hope that we may be able to put these troubled times behind us and end up with a more coherent — and hopeful — global community.