Over the past decade, a global trend of democratic backsliding has emerged, where threats to democracy are growing, as global freedom declines in different parts of the world. Satisfaction with democracy has fallen in most parts of the world, with 52% of people across 77 countries agreeing that having a strong leader unbound to legislatures or elections is a good thing[1]. Polarization has been increasing to toxic levels, as respect for legitimate opposition and pluralism declines, while autocratic leaders are increasingly using misinformation, repression of civil society, and media censorship to empower their agendas[2]. While this trend is increasingly attributed to the failure to deliver adequate socioeconomic goods to citizens[3] (also known as the ‘democratic delivery deficit’[4]), leading voters to forsake democracy and embrace antidemocratic politicians, recent literature suggests that a wide range of factors, ranging from broader sociocultural anxieties, the impressive electoral and narrative skills of populist leaders, to the corruptibility of media environments have played a role in perpetuating this trend[5].

Recent events in electoral democracies in South Asia have signalled a reversal in this trend, through a ‘democratic reclaiming’, primarily led by young people and their demands. Until recently, there was a renewed pessimism in democratization, with rising democratic regression and autocratization in the region[6]. In the past two years, however, electoral democracies in South Asia have witnessed spontaneous, leaderless, and large-scale political movements led primarily by young people, which have been successful in pushing for a shift towards a more democratic rule in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and, recently, in Nepal. These movements have been spontaneous, often unfolding in a matter of weeks, and have almost always ended with thousands of young people raiding houses of erstwhile prime ministers, expressing their collective frustrations over democratically elected but dynastic leaders and institutions laden by corruption, mismanagement, and repression. These youth movements, led by the ‘Gen Z’ in South Asia, have been driven by a deep-rooted institutional dysfunction, economic inequalities, and a long-standing frustration with the political status quo, and are often triggered by an unlawful and disproportionate use of force by the states, combined with restrictions on the freedom of speech and assembly.

The first of of these spontaneous and youth-led political movements in South Asia began in Sri Lanka in 2022, when the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) led by the ‘Sibling Sovereigns’ known for their authoritarian practices and dynastic rule, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, was faced with peaceful protests over the inability of the government to deal with the economic crisis faced by Sri Lanka [7][8]. As hashtags like ‘#GoHomeGota’ became the taglines of these protests, the scale of the protests increased, with hundreds of young people, among other groups, taking to the streets as part of the Aragalaya (Sinhala for “struggle”) movement [9]. In May 2022, violence against peaceful protestors by the police and government supporters intensified, provoking international reaction, including from the UN Secretary General, António Guterres [10]. In response, and far from addressing the protesters' grievances, President Rajapaksa appointed another member of the political elite as Prime Minister. On July 9, thousands of protesters demanding the president’s resignation disregarded the security forces, stormed, and occupied the presidential secretariat office, the president’s residence, and the prime minister’s official residence, forcing the President to flee the country and an acting interim President who would hold on to power for two more years[11]. 

Young people played a key role in organizing protests and mobilizing people via social media in the Aragalaya movement. In a matter of months, an organic, spontaneous, and leaderless movement, fuelled and sustained by young people, was successful in creating a change[12]. The movement was driven largely by widespread frustration and collective anger, rather than by allegiance to any political party or ideology. Demonstrators attributed the nation’s economic collapse and their own financial struggles mainly to the Rajapaksa government’s mismanagement, excessive spending, and evident corruption [13]. Their primary objectives were to remove the president, demand accountability from the political elite for the harm caused to the economy, and push for a broader “system change.” It took two more years of an interim rule for Sri Lanka to finally be able to elect a new government, but the role played by the Aragalya movement and young people in ‘reclaiming’ democratic institutions from a dynastic authoritarian rule towards setting up a more equitable and accountable democracy is undeniable.

Two years later, in June 2024, the urge for a system change crawled upwards through the Bay of Bengal to Bangladesh, where young people were protesting against a dynastic, authoritarian, but democratically elected government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, known for her brutal crackdown on any opposition. Only this time, students took to the streets to protest the imposition of quotas that reserved 30% of government jobs for children of independence war veterans, bringing the total share of quota reservations 56%, in an economy where young university graduates were already struggling to find meaningful jobs[14]. In response, the government severely cracked down on young protestors, including through internet shutdowns, curfews, and ‘shoot-at-sight’ orders to the police [15]. This only led to the intensification of protests as images of police brutality against students, including the killing of Abu Sayed, a 25-year-old student protestor, who was shot by the police without posing any physical threat, created outrage through social media[16]. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh reacted to the protests by scrapping the controversial quotas, but by now, young protestors demanded not only the scrapping of laws, but also accountability from the government for the severe and deadly crackdown, including the resignation of the Prime Minister, release of political prisoners, and reopening universities, leading to severe violence, killing 200 people in less than 10 days, and leaving thousands injured[17][18]. On August 5, when in a similar trajectory as that of Sri Lanka, amidst calls for mass mobilization by protestors in the country’s capital and as thousands of people marched largely unrestrained, defying the curfew, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced her resignation and was recorded fleeing her residence on a military helicopter[19].

Similar to the movement in Sri Lanka, protests in Bangladesh, too, were driven by the need for systemic change and triggered by the use of violence by the state. Yet, the case of Bangladesh was unique in itself, given that Bangladesh was undergoing a stable economic growth, averaging 6.25 per cent annually, and a steady 5% decline in poverty rates over the last two decades[20]. Despite a well-performing economy, the student-led protest movement in Bangladesh further highlights the frustration among young people with a system where economic growth was not trickling down to the educated university students, and with a corrupt, repressive, and authoritarian government that reacted to dissent with violence. Following the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and upon proposals by student leaders, an interim government was installed in Bangladesh, led by Nobel Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, a respected academic with an honest image, who recently announced fresh elections to be held in February 2026[21]. Bangladesh emerged as another successful attempt by the young people at ‘reclaiming democracy’ from a corrupt, dynastic authoritarian government towards a more responsive, accountable, and healthy democracy. 

A year later, in September 2025, youth-led democratic reclaiming moved further upwards, and even more spontaneously in Nepal, where another dynastic leader, KP Sharma Oli, whose recent tenure was marked by corruption, economic stagnation, and authoritarianism, was forced to resign within five days of youth-led protests[22]. The protests were triggered by a social media ban imposed by the government, at a time when hashtags like ‘#nepobabies’ were trending among young people, over the lavish lifestyles of children of renowned politicians and celebrities in Nepal, as a direct portrayal of economic inequalities in the country[23]. Already resenting unemployment rates of 20.8% (one of the highest in the region)[24], new rules imposing a social media ban resulted in nationwide protests from young people, including those in schools. The ‘Gen Z’ Protestors demanded not only the lifting of the ban but also the resignation of the Prime Minister and the establishment of an independent watchdog body to monitor corruption[25], echoing a deep-set frustration and a breakdown of trust in Nepal's elite political class, driven by decades of poor governance, corruption, nepotism, and inequality. Yet again, the government severely cracked down on young protestors, leaving at least 74 people dead and hundreds wounded in clashes between police and protesters[26]. By September 9, the protests that began on September 4 resulted in the resignation of KP Sharma Oli, alongside the burning down of his house and the parliament of Nepal by outraged protestors[27]. 

As the army took control of law and order, the parliament was dissolved, and an interim government was installed, led by Sushila Karki, the former and first woman Chief Justice of Nepal, who also became the first woman to lead the government in Nepal, popular for her clean image[28]. While events in Nepal are still unfolding, Nepal presents itself as the latest political ground where young people in an electoral democracy organised spontaneously, with the only unifying factor of belonging to the ‘Generation Z’, to reclaim their democratic institutions from decades of corruption, instability, and economic inequality, in less than a week.

These rapid political changes among electoral democracies in South Asia, often unfolding in a matter of weeks, signal three significant trends: firstly, that these spontaneous acts of ‘democratic reclaiming’ are a reaction to the democratic backsliding that the region has been grappling with for the past decade. In all three countries, protests intensified following brutal repression as young people demanded accountability from authoritarian and dynastic leaders who had clung to power for years. Secondly, the democratic delivery deficit in the three countries played a huge part in fuelling these movements, where populist leaders made promises to people, but failed to deliver on them, resulting in major economic inequalities, corruption, leading to a desire for systemic change among young people. Lastly, these largely successful acts of democratic reclaiming paint youth-led movements for democratic reform in a new light, giving way to a landmark moment comparable to the failure of the Arab Spring. In the face of a global trend for democratic backsliding, there is a strong need for scholars in democracy studies to understand these regionally cascading movements better. 

As young people in South Asia continue to reverse a global trend by organising themselves and reclaiming democratic institutions in their countries, South Asia is setting a precedent for youth-led movements around the world to reverse the democratic decline using tools like social media effectively, organising themselves spontaneously, and giving way to healthier and more responsive democratic institutions in the region.

References:

 [1]International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2022). The global state of democracy 2022: Forging social contracts in a time of discontent. https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/sites/default/files/2022-11/the-global-state-of-democracy-2022.pdf

[2] United Nations Development Programme. (2023). Signals spotlight 2023. United Nations. https://www.undp.org/future-development/signals-spotlight-2023/signals-spotlight-2023

[3] Carothers, T., & Hartnett, B. (2024). Misunderstanding democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 35(3), 4–18.https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/misunderstanding-democratic-backsliding/

[4] Harrison, S. (2020). Democratic frustration: Concept, dimensions and behavioural consequences. Societies, 10(1), 19.https://doi.org/10.3390/soc10010019

[5] Carothers, T., & Hartnett, B. (2024). Misunderstanding democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 35(3), 4–18. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/misunderstanding-democratic-backsliding/

[6] Croissant, A., & Haynes, J. (2020). Democratic regression in Asia: Introduction. Democratization, 28(1), 1–21.https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1851203

[7] Milan Vaishnav and Paul Staniland (2023). The State of Opposition in South Asia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Vaishnav_et_al_-_Politics_of_Opposition_Final_1.pdf

[8] Timberman, D. G. (2025, August 27). The Aragalaya protest movement and the struggle for political change in Sri Lanka. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/sri-lanka-aragalaya-protest-movement-oust-wickremesinghe-rajapaksa?lang=en

[9] Timberman, D. G. (2025, August 27). The Aragalaya protest movement and the struggle for political change in Sri Lanka. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/sri-lanka-aragalaya-protest-movement-oust-wickremesinghe-rajapaksa?lang=en

[10] Singh, Y. (2022, May 11). UN chief deeply concerned about escalation of violence in Sri Lanka: spokesperson.ThePrint.https://theprint.in/world/un-chief-deeply-concerned-about-escalation-of-violence-in-sri-lanka-spokesperson/951768/

[11] Timberman, D. G. (2025, August 27). The Aragalaya protest movement and the struggle for political change in Sri Lanka. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/sri-lanka-aragalaya-protest-movement-oust-wickremesinghe-rajapaksa?lang=en

[12] Jayasinghe, A. P. (2025, September 14). GenZ and Aragalaya. Nepali Times. https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/genz-and-aragalaya?amp=1

[13] Timberman, D. G. (2025, August 27). The Aragalaya protest movement and the struggle for political change in Sri Lanka. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/sri-lanka-aragalaya-protest-movement-oust-wickremesinghe-rajapaksa?lang=en.

[14] Al Jazeera. (2024, July 18). Who are the protesters demanding an end to job quotas in Bangladesh? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/7/18/who-are-the-protesters-demanding-an-end-to-job-quotas-in-bangladesh

[15] Chughtai, A., & Ali, M. (2024, August 7). How Bangladesh's 'Gen Z' protests brought down PM Sheikh Hasina. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2024/8/7/how-bangladeshs-gen-z-protests-brought-down-pm-sheikh-hasina

[16] Amnesty International. (2024, July 29). What is happening at the quota-reform protests in Bangladesh? Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/what-is-happening-at-the-quota-reform-protests-in-bangladesh/

[17] Al Jazeera. (2024, July 22). Bangladesh protesters issue demands amid shaky calm. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/22/bangladesh-protesters-issue-demands-amid-shaky-calm

[18] Amnesty International. (2024, July 29). What is happening at the quota-reform protests in Bangladesh? Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/what-is-happening-at-the-quota-reform-protests-in-bangladesh/ .

[19] Chughtai, A., & Ali, M. (2024, August 7). How Bangladesh's 'Gen Z' protests brought down PM Sheikh Hasina. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2024/8/7/how-bangladeshs-gen-z-protests-brought-down-pm-sheikh-hasina

[20] Al Jazeera. (2024, July 18). Who are the protesters demanding an end to job quotas in Bangladesh? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/7/18/who-are-the-protesters-demanding-an-end-to-job-quotas-in-bangladesh

[21] BBC News. (2025, August 5). Bangladesh will hold February 2026 election, interim leader Muhammad Yunus says. BBC News. https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/articles/czd031z5md9o

[22] Khan, A. (2025, September 18). Deadly Gen Z protests expose decades of systemic rot in Nepal. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/09/18/deadly-gen-z-protests-expose-decades-systemic-rot-nepal

[23] Parajuli, R. (2025, September 17). Nepal Gen-Z protests: Politicians get rich while we suffer - so I helped bring down the government in 48 hours. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9n760gddo

[24] World Bank. (n.d.). Nepal - Economy. Human Capital Data Portal. Retrieved September 22, 2025, from https://humancapital.worldbank.org/en/economy/NPL

[25] Khan, A. (2025, September 18). Deadly Gen Z protests expose decades of systemic rot in Nepal. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/09/18/deadly-gen-z-protests-expose-decades-systemic-rot-nepal

[26] Onlinekhabar English News. (2025, September 17). Charred body found at Koteshwor Bhatbhateni, Gen-Z protest death toll rises to 74. Onlinekhabar English News. https://english.onlinekhabar.com/charred-body-found-at-koteshwor-bhatbhateni-gen-z-protest-death-toll-rises-to-74.html

[27] Kathmandu Post. (2025, September 9). Gen Z protesters set fire to PM Oli's private residence in Balkot. The Kathmandu Post. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/09/gen-z-protesters-set-fire-to-pm-oli-s-private-residence-in-balkot

[28] BBC News. (2025, September 14). Nepal's interim PM to hand over power within six months. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8wjz90z4no