Seven Years in the Making: Reflections on the Role of Diplomacy and Mediation in the Iran-war
The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) joined institutional partners at the Maison de la Paix for a timely expert briefing hosted by DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance on the rapidly evolving security situation in the Middle East. Co-organised with DCAF, CCDP, Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, Switzerland Permanent Missions to the United Nations, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and Principles for Peace, the event convened members of Geneva's peacebuilding community to discuss the widening scope of hostilities, the growing role of new warfare technologies, and the implications for regional and international peacebuilding efforts.
As one of the contributing speakers, Julia Pickhardt offered reflections from a mediation and conflict prevention standpoint, focusing on the diplomatic failure that preceded the war, the lessons it holds for peacebuilding practice, and the prospects for de-escalation.
When Agreements Don't Outlast Administrations, Trust in Mediation Is Lost
The build-up for this war did not begin on 28 February 2026. It was constructed, step by step, over seven years, beginning in 2018 when the United States withdrew from the JCPOA.
The JCPOA was working. While it did not address the security concerns of regional states, it did address the specific problem it was designed to solve: Iran's nuclear programme. The IAEA had verified Iran's compliance repeatedly. The deal was not failing. Walking away from it without a credible alternative was not a strategy. It was a gamble that has now come due.
Yet, the deeper damage of 2018 was not the loss of the deal itself. It was the signal it sent: that a binding multilateral agreement, verified by international inspectors, cannot survive a change of administration. Iran returned to the negotiating table twice after that. It negotiated in Vienna in 2021 and 2022. It engaged again through Omani mediation in 2025 — and yet was not able to escape being targeted by air strikes. It came back again in February 2026, with talks that the Omani Foreign Minister described as promising just days before the war began — and yet Iran was struck again. Each time, it negotiated. Each time, escalation followed.
It is extraordinarily difficult to bring a party back to the table when every previous negotiation has ended in military action. That pattern is now embedded — not just in Tehran, but in every capital watching.
The Military Option Did Not Complement Diplomacy — It Consumed It
We often speak of military pressure and diplomatic engagement as complementary tracks. However, the Iran case exposes the structural limits of that assumption. The way the military option was exercised against Iran did not complement diplomacy — it consumed it.
The Omani back-channel was not structurally doomed. It had genuine credibility with both sides and a track record going back to the Obama era. What it could not survive was one party maintaining a ready strike package throughout the process. When the military option is imminent, it does not incentivise negotiation — it incentivises capitulation or pre-emption.
This dynamic reflects a broader and troubling trend. In an era marked by multipolar politics, military options are increasingly being reached for before diplomatic ones are exhausted. The risk is a world in which the credibility of negotiated agreements erodes with every cycle — making the next crisis harder to prevent, and the architecture of conflict prevention weaker with each iteration.
And Yet: It Is Now Diplomacy That Must Save the Day
The ongoing escalation is not leading anywhere sustainable. The United States is spending approximately one billion dollars per day. The Strait of Hormuz — through which one-fifth of global oil and gas flows — is effectively closed, driving energy prices up globally. Critically, the economic pressure is being felt not only by adversaries, but by partners as well.
Iran has stated its condition for stopping: security guarantees. Washington and Tel Aviv, meanwhile, are invoking the language of "historic achievement" — building a domestic narrative, but also signalling that an exit is available. These are negotiating positions, and they deserve serious engagement. At the heart of any mediation is a basic condition: parties must have some will to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. That will exists, at least partially, on one side. Whether Tehran can reciprocate under its new, controversial and untested leadership remains the central open question.
Who Can Still Mediate?
Oman remains willing despite having been struck. Qatar and Turkey retain functioning channels. But the most significant recent signals have come from Germany and Pakistan.
President Steinmeier publicly called the war a breach of international law — unusually direct language from a European head of state. Foreign Minister Wadephul has welcomed negotiations, offered Germany's contribution to security guarantees in the region, and distanced Berlin from any military Hormuz mission. Together with France and the United Kingdom, Germany has offered Iran immediate negotiations. Meanwhile, Pakistan has become the most active back-channel, delivering a US ceasefire proposal to Tehran and offering to host direct talks. While Iran has publicly rejected the proposal, messages continue to be exchanged through intermediaries.
The Gulf and other countries unwilling to join a military Hormuz protection mission represent a potential coalition of the diplomatically willing. A multilateral format built around them — drawing on the E3+3 architecture that underpinned the original JCPOA — would carry considerably more durability than any bilateral deal vulnerable to the next US administration.
The gap between public posture and back-channel reality is wide. That gap is where diplomacy happens — if the collective will to use it can be found. That will is being tested. The case for diplomacy has never been more urgent, or more difficult to make.
About the People
Trude Strand is Deputy Head of the Middle East and North Africa entity at DCAF and Research Associate at CCDP. Dr. Strand contributed expert analysis on shifting regional security dynamics during the discussion. Dr. Strand is a Human security, peacebuilding and humanitarian professional with 20+ years working for UN agencies, INGOs, research institutes and the private sector. She offers global level expertise with in-depth knowledge of the Middle East region shared in her recently published book, Israel and the Gaza Strip since 1967 A History of Occupation, Domination and Unilateralism examining Israeli policy towards the Gaza Strip since 1967.
Julia Pickhardt is a Research Assistant, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP), and PhD Researcher and mediation expert in International Relations and Political Science, Geneva Graduate Institute. Julia Pickhardt is a PhD candidate in International Relations and Political Science, focusing on political agency in multipolar mediation set-ups. She also works as a research assistant in Sara Hellmüller’s project “Yes I Do: A Theory on Belligerent Consent to United Nations Peace Missions.” She has over ten years of experience in facilitating and implementing dialogue and mediation efforts in the Middle East, leading initiatives such as the Iran–Saudi Dialogue Initiative at CARPO, political dialogue platforms in Iraq with forumZFD, and inclusive dialogue processes in Yemen with CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation. Holding a BA in Arabic and Islamic Studies and Politics from Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg and an MA in Development Studies from the Graduate Institute, Geneva, she combines academic training with practical experience in peace and dialogue processes.
Related Publication
Trude Strand's participation reflected longstanding research expertise on regional conflict dynamics, including insights developed in her recently published book, Israel and the Gaza Strip since 1967 A History of Occupation, Domination and Unilateralism examining Israeli policy towards the Gaza Strip since 1967. Drawing on archival sources, official records and media reporting, the book analyses the strategic importance of Gaza in Israeli domestic, regional and international policy, situating current developments within longer historical trajectories.