Arms control treaties are products of their moment — shaped by the threats, technologies, and political realities of their time. The security landscape of 2026 bears little resemblance to 2010, when the New Strategic Treaty (NST) was negotiated in Geneva. Speaking to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 February, US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno marked the treaty's 5 February expiry as ushering in a "new era" beyond what he termed American unilateral restraint.
The last US-Russia arms control agreement set a ceiling of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and was extended in 2021 for five years. Despite the normative appeal of maintaining a framework to constrain nuclear escalation, the treaty emerged from circumstances that no longer exist. By 2023, amid the Ukraine conflict, Russia suspended implementation — halting data exchanges and the 18 annual on-site inspections — while claiming to observe numerical limits. Without verification mechanisms, the treaty's practical utility evaporated. Moreover, Russian advances in hypersonic missiles and nuclear-powered underwater drones, along with approximately 2,000 tactical warheads excluded from the agreement's scope, consistently troubled Washington.
American frustration with the treaty's inability to address Russian capabilities intensified as China's nuclear expansion accelerated dramatically. US official reports suggest Beijing is producing roughly 100 warheads annually, potentially reaching 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, alongside expanding delivery platforms including ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers. Such growth would necessitate revised American targeting strategies requiring higher deployed warhead numbers — increases the New START ceiling would prohibit. President Putin's proposal from the end of 2025 to informally maintain the limits for another year failed to address Washington's core concerns: the absence of verification and the constraint on responding to China's buildup.
When agreements cease to reflect parties' interests, their lapse becomes inevitable, if regrettable. The harder challenge lies in managing risks during the interim and envisioning successor frameworks better suited to current realities. Washington advocates for multilateral negotiations including China and comprehensive coverage of all nuclear weapon types. Moscow accepts the latter condition but insists that China's inclusion requires adding Britain and France. Beijing refuses to participate, arguing that its arsenal is small and urging Washington and Moscow to reduce further. A multilateral, comprehensive framework covering all nuclear states and weapon categories appears conceptually sound yet diplomatically daunting. A long time may be needed to see another agreement in place. The first order, however, is to imagine the theoretical contours of such a framework.
The treaty's expiry may enable arsenals to adjust to evolved threat perceptions while testing assumptions about risk manipulation as negotiating leverage. A cycle of nuclear expansion appears unavoidable, bringing attendant anxieties and costs. Preventing escalation during this period will demand creative thinking amid profound mistrust, regional flashpoints, domestic divisions, and volatile leadership across major powers.
Image: President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia sign the New START Treaty during a ceremony at Prague Castle in Prague, Czech Republic, April 8, 2010. (Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy)