After 16 years in power, Viktor Orbán did not wait for the final count before calling Péter Magyar, leader of the opposition Tisza party, to congratulate him on his electoral victory. This gesture placed him far from Nicolás Maduro, and also from leaders such as Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro. In Hungary, the 12 April election opened a window for potential democratic renewal. The question is why a similar opening has not been possible in Venezuela.

The Venezuelan presidential election of 28 July 2024 shares some surface similarities with Hungary’s contest. In both cases, freedom of expression had been eroded and governments had expanded control over key institutions. Both elections were framed as a stark choice between continuity and regime change. Yet these similarities conceal decisive differences.

In Hungary, electoral competition remains constrained but real: opposition parties can still campaign and organise. In Venezuela, state control is far more extensive, including candidate disqualifications, politicised electoral and judicial institutions, and a lack of transparency in vote counting. These differences shape what elections can actually do.

Both cases also feature opposition figures rooted in conservative traditions, and both contests are framed around sovereignty versus external interference — Brussels in Hungary, US imperialism in Venezuela. But the post-electoral dynamics diverge sharply. In Hungary, results are recognised and a new political cycle can begin. In Venezuela, the aftermath is marked by disputes over results, repression of protest, and competing claims of victory, despite extensive evidence collected by opposition networks.

Three factors help explain this divergence: the European Union, the armed forces, and the institutional embeddedness of opposition actors. Hungary’s membership in the European Union creates external constraints that, while imperfect, still matter. EU conditionality, access to resources, and political pressure have not prevented democratic backsliding, but they have raised its costs and limited its most extreme forms. The EU also functions as an aspirational horizon for segments of society, particularly younger voters, especially in a context of growing geopolitical insecurity.

Venezuela lacks comparable external constraints. Weaker institutional integration, combined with alternative international alliances (Russia, China, Cuba), has reduced the effectiveness of external pressure. Symbolic gestures — such as María Corina Machado receiving the Nobel Peace Prize — have had limited (if any) impact on domestic power structures. At the same time, the relatively restrained positions of regional actors such as Brazil and Colombia have reduced coordinated pressure to enforce electoral transparency. Most importantly, the military’s deep entanglement in political authority and economic management creates strong incentives for regime continuity.

A third, often overlooked factor is the fragility of popular mobilisation when it is not anchored in institutional leverage. Electoral coordination, civic energy, and mass discontent are necessary but not sufficient. Without effective constraints on executive power and control over key institutions, elections — even when competitive in appearance — may fail to produce alternation.

Hungary illustrates that democratic erosion is not irreversible. Venezuela shows that its reversal depends on a combination of institutional, regional, and coercive conditions that extend far beyond the act of voting.
 

This is a revised version of an article published in Spanish in La Crítica del Derecho.