For years, Europe seemed condemned to strategic irrelevance. This was partly explained by the rise of new (and not so new) radical right, Eurosceptic parties reluctant to grant more power to the EU. Vox in Spain, AfD in Germany, Fidesz in Hungary, and the Rassemblement National in France, among others, made it difficult to build common policies in key areas. Leaders such as Viktor Orbán pushed this blocking capacity to its limits.
Faced with the rise of China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the foreign policy of the Trump administration, the EU appeared relegated to a corner of the negotiating table, almost like a small group of observers disputing the interpretation of events rather than acting as a player with real influence.
But in politics, windows of opportunity are not announced: they simply open, sometimes unexpectedly, and they are rarely the result of a single cause. They emerge when critical junctures, miscalculations or strategic errors, and leaders capable of reading the moment converge. Today, the European Union seems to be facing such a moment.
In recent months, a combination of domestic and external factors has begun to reshape this scenario. Among the former, a shift in electoral trends stands out, marked by three recent developments in France, Italy, and Hungary. In France, the advance of Marine Le Pen’s party has been contained by the reactivation of the left in major cities in the March local elections. In Paris, Emmanuel Grégoire revitalised the Socialist Party by winning around 50% of the vote.
In Italy, also in March, the leadership of the until-now seemingly unassailable Giorgia Meloni suffered a setback after losing a key referendum through which she sought to promote a deep reform of the judicial system. Instead, the vote functioned as a plebiscite on her leadership and was rejected by 54% of voters.
Finally, the most striking case: in Hungary, Viktor Orbán was displaced following a landslide electoral defeat (the opposition Tisza party won 138 of 199 seats, partly due to the electoral reform that had previously allowed Orbán to maintain a large majority).
None of these developments alone would have changed Europe’s trajectory. But together, they point to a relative weakening of the national-populist projects that have shaped the last decade.
To this internal reconfiguration we must add an increasingly volatile international context, in which any hint of certainty is valued. The foreign policy of the United States — erratic, costly, and increasingly aggressive — has contributed to escalating tensions, with focal points in Iran, Lebanon, and Israel. The consequences are evident: rising oil prices, economic uncertainty, and growing social fatigue with the logic of permanent war.
In this context, the narrative of inevitable decline gives way to one that emphasises the importance of political agency. It is here that figures such as Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez have intervened. His explicit rejection of involving Spain — and, by extension, the EU — in a military escalation he considers counterproductive not only marked a contrast with other positions, but also helped shift the terms of the debate, breaking with the ambiguity (if not outright alignment) with US policies announced by Trump via social media. In doing so, Sánchez did not only seek to reposition himself in response to domestic difficulties within his party, shaken by recent corruption cases; he also opened a space to rearticulate a pro-European narrative.
This move is not isolated. It resonates with other leaders, such as António Costa. The attack by Trump on Pope Leo XIV (whom he described as “wrong” and “nefarious”), the support expressed by Meloni for the Pontiff (calling Trump’s comment “unacceptable”), and the subsequent backing of the Italian Prime Minister by major political forces in Italy illustrate a shift in mood within the EU.
The window is open. But as always in politics, it will not remain so for long. Will EU leaders be able to seize it?