How did you come to choose your research topic?

Many factors influenced my choice of topic, but I would like to highlight one in particular. Having worked on the topic of enforced disappearance for years prior to starting my PhD, I realised the complexity of the offence’s structure. In this context, I felt that this complexity posed both theoretical and practical challenges. For instance, it led to misinterpretations in the existing literature on enforced disappearance. I also felt that it made it difficult to prosecute and convict someone for enforced disappearance. Moreover, the existing literature and case law mostly examined enforced disappearance from a human rights law perspective.

Taken together, all of these factors led me to believe that a PhD thesis on individual criminal responsibility for enforced disappearance — especially in the English language, where the literature on the topic is very limited — would not only be welcome, but also desperately necessary for both theory and practice.

Can you describe your research questions?

The first research question concerns the essence of enforced disappearance, namely, the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person. I have noticed a tendency in the literature to define it as a crime of omission. Therefore, my initial questions focused on whether this is accurate and what the legal implications would be.

The second research question concerns the fact that the crime of enforced disappearance consists of two parts: the deprivation of liberty and the subsequent refusal to share information about their fate or whereabouts. This puts the disappeared person in an unlawful situation. The continuity of this situation was at the heart of my second research question. I noticed that, when prosecuting offenders who participated in one or both of the material acts, the question arose before the courts as to which law to apply. This was particularly pertinent because, domestically, enforced disappearance was mostly not a crime when the victims were deprived of liberty or last seen. For some courts, this was reason enough to apply the law in force at the time the person was deprived of liberty, due to the principle of non-retroactivity. However, for other courts, the continuity of enforced disappearance as a crime meant that they could apply the law that came into force at a later point in time. Therefore, I wanted to establish which approach was correct. In other words, I sought to understand whether enforced disappearance is truly a continuing crime, and if so, what the specific consequences are for the application of the relevant law and the statute of limitations.

How did you approach those questions?

I examined the research questions from the perspectives of both national and international law. This is because international law on enforced disappearances has shaped the primary context for interpreting the crime, while national law is the primary source of interpretation for most domestic courts worldwide.

One difficulty was deciding which national criminal law to analyse. Due to the prevalence of academic literature and case law from Latin American countries, I focused on the law in these countries. Furthermore, since the concept of omission liability originates from German legal scholarship, I often refer to examples from this scholarship. At the same time, my focus on some other states was influenced by various factors. These factors included the accessibility of cases and criminal codes (e.g. whether I had contacts or had heard that claims involving charges based on enforced disappearance were being prepared), and the accessibility of literature and languages I spoke.

I considered enforced disappearance as both a discrete crime and an underlying offence of crimes against humanity. I felt this was necessary for four reasons. First, the intertwined development of the two definitions. Second, enforced disappearance is often committed as a crime against humanity; therefore, international and regional bodies often analyse it under both frameworks. Third, the central element of both definitions is essentially the same: secrecy and uncertainty for friends and family, rendering them special victims in addition to the disappeared person, who is the direct victim of this crime. Fourth, many states have adopted the definition from the Rome Statute to define the crime of enforced disappearance as a discrete offence.

What are your major findings?

Regarding the refusal to acknowledge deprivation of liberty or concealment through the lens of omission liability, I concluded that this constitutes an improper omission. In essence, this means that the actus reus (“guilty act”) is established by failing to act when there is a duty to do so. In this context, the duty would be to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or disclose the fate or whereabouts. Overall, I suggested that there may be multiple situations in which a duty to act would arise and that one would have to consider the specific circumstances. For instance, an individual in an institutional position has a duty to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the victim, because such a position creates a legal expectation of higher social and legal responsibility. Additionally, I suggested that by voluntarily subscribing to the suppression of information, one assumes a special responsibility – and hence, a duty to act – towards any citizen at risk of enforced disappearance.

Regarding my second question, concerning whether enforced disappearance is a continuing crime and the legal implications for its cessation, I first had to define a continuing crime. I established that this is a category of crimes which not only create, but also maintain, unlawful situations. It seems prima facie that enforced disappearance corresponds to this category because the material elements and links between them create an ongoing unlawful situation. The finding that enforced disappearance is a continuing crime has some implications. Specifically, the law in force at the end of the unlawful situation may be applied to continuing crimes, and this approach does not conflict with the principle of non-retroactivity because the latter only applies from the moment when the crime ceases.

However, when I tried to apply this finding to the crime of enforced disappearance, I immediately encountered a major challenge: how to determine when the unlawful situation had ended. My conclusion was that one cannot approach the end of the unlawful situation of enforced disappearance in any other way than in a more individualised manner. Therefore, if the court establishes that an offender has ceased their criminal conduct, this would be the relevant moment to determine the applicable statute of limitations. Otherwise, I believe that offenders of enforced disappearance would not be sufficiently encouraged to end the crime.

What practical relevance has your thesis?

I wrote my thesis in such a way that it would hopefully serve both academics and practitioners. For practitioners, I hope that the interpretations of the crime of enforced disappearance that I offer will be helpful to prosecutors and judges, as well as to non-governmental organisations, victims and any other actors trying to interpret the elements of the crime. The thesis’s added value lies in its efforts to make the crime “prosecutable” within national borders by taking into account the challenges that may arise in such a context.

What key takeaways have you gained from conducting this research?

My PhD research was an incredibly positive experience and I would do it all again. One of the key takeaways is the understanding of how difficult it is to implement international law within national law, especially in criminal matters. This is even more challenging when international law evolves independently of national discussions.

Having become so emotionally invested in the topic, I have also learnt that no matter how hard I try, I cannot “save” anyone from becoming a victim of such a heinous crime as enforced disappearance. This has always been difficult for me to accept. Nevertheless, this has motivated me to try even harder to produce the best possible results and increase the chances of combatting the crime.

What will you remember of your doctoral experience and what bearing will it have on your career plans? 

I will always remember the many splendid people who crossed my path and helped me digest, reflect on and grow through my research. I will also always remember that, no matter how challenging the days are during the PhD journey, it is all worth it when the submission day arrives. In fact, all of those challenging days feel necessary in order to truly appreciate the goal achieved!

As for its bearing on my career plans, I have always loved teaching and research, which is also why I pursued the PhD in the first place. Having a PhD is just the right choice for me as I hope to continue in this field!

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On 20 November 2025, Ana Srovin Coralli (second from the left) successfully defended her PhD thesis in International Law, titled “The Crime of Enforced Disappearance: Unpacking Omission Liability and Continuity”. Committee members were Professor Paola Gaeta, Thesis Supervisor, Professor Andrew Clapham (right), President of the Committee and Internal Member, and Professor Florian Jessberger, Chair in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, International Criminal Law and Modern Legal History, Humboldt-University, Germany.

Banner image: photo montage by Fernando Alonso Tuero, based on three photographs taken at the “Doris Salcedo” exhibition, Fondation Beyeler, Basel, 2023.