In light of ongoing reports of grave human rights violations against migrants and refugees in different parts of the world, this article discusses whether, in specific contexts, migrants and refugees can be considered a civilian population that may constitute the main object of potential crimes against humanity. As the analysis of relevant case law and academic debate shows, the notion ‘population’ and its entailed collective dimension have so far not been interpreted in a uniform manner. Nonetheless, two main strands of argumentation can be identified in the debate on the meaning of this term: one focusing on the ‘quantitative’ and one on the ‘distinguishable group’ approach. While the first interprets the term ‘population’ mostly as a group consisting of a relatively high number of people, the second interprets it above all as a group of people that share (a) certain distinguishable feature(s), which often also make(s) them the target of the attack. This article suggests that both of these approaches can be useful in establishing the collective nature of a potential crime against humanity, highlighting, however, that the ‘distinguishable group’ approach must be interpreted broadly, so as to avoid reintroducing the discriminatory intent requirement for all underlying material acts of the crime. Using a combination of the two approaches, this article argues that, in specific contexts, migrants and refugees can constitute a population in the sense of crimes against humanity.