So far, the comprehensive international sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine have not led to economic collapse; instead, Russia surpassed Japan to become the world’s fourth-largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, with growth outpacing that of sanctioning powers like the UK, France, and Germany. This challenges existing theories assuming unipolar financial governance under neoliberal globalization. The article introduces “transnational financial orders” to address this puzzle in the processes of international currency circulation, the financial embeddedness of transnational politically embedded bankers (TPEBs), and the transnational investment order. TPEBs’ stance on unipolar vs. multipolar global governance is crucial. Too broad unipolar sanctions on too many entities in competitive powers such as Russia and China create economies of scale for TPEBs to afford a multipolar order with benefits outweighing the costs imposed by sanctioning powers. This multipolar order benefits competitive powers’ ability to withstand sanctions, signaling a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity in a post-neoliberal parallel globalization.