Vilfredo Pareto Research Seminar
Christian Fischer

Optimal Payment Contracts in Export Relationships

Christian Fischer, University of Bayreuth
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Room S4 (Petal 2), Maison de la paix, Geneva.

The Vilfredo Pareto Research Seminar is the Economics department's weekly seminar, featuring external speakers in all areas of economics.

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As part of the Vilfredo Pareto Research Seminar series, the International Economics Department at the Graduate Institute is pleased to invite you to a public talk given by  Christian Fischer, Assistant Professor of International Economics, University of Bayreuth.

Abstract: “I study an exporter's optimal choice of payment contracts in a situation of repeated contracting with adverse selection. The exporter repeatedly sells a product in a foreign market at arm's length through an importer who either is of reliable or unreliable type. Payment contracts allow to shift a transaction's payment risks from the importer to the exporter, and vice versa. I show that choosing a payment contract has fundamental implications on the exporter's ability to learn about the importer's reliability. In the context of export relationships, deciding on the dynamically optimal payment contract requires to balance its impact on successfully completing the current export transaction with its capacity to reveal information about the importer's type. Importantly, this trade-off is shaped by the quality of the contracting institutions of the foreign market. Trade credit insurance can catalyse export growth and transaction profitability but its positive impact is limited to the initial phase of export relationships.”

Christian Fischer works in the fields of International Trade and Industrial Organization. In his research, he studies the organization of firms. In particular, he investigates their sourcing and export decisions as well as the challenges they face due to market competition and globalization.