WESTERN BALKANS – MAINTAINING THE EU ACCESSION LEAD OVER THE EASTERN PARTNERS?

The Western Balkans is at risk of being sidelined by the recent changes in the EU enlargement agenda

As late as mid-February 2022, the European Union had been applying two nominally distinct approaches towards its geographic neighbors: enlargement agenda in the case of the Western Balkans (WB), on the one hand, and the Eastern Partnership (EP) for the post-Soviet European countries, on the other. Nonetheless, the invasion of Ukraine has brought up some profound changes in these domains. Following many years of what Gawrich et al. (2010:1210) referred to as “neighborhood Europeanization” of the Eastern partners, the long-sought accession perspective of Ukraine, Moldova, and (conditionally) Georgia has been recognized by Brussels over the course of only several months in 2022. Moving from the so-called soft enlargement or enlargement lite to the formal inclusion into the accession agenda represented a fundamental gesture of political support towards Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership frontrunners. Considering that the EP has been initially designed as an alternative to EU membership (Petrović 2022:79) – while striving to repeat the transformative efforts of the enlargement policy – the steps above also signaled a paradigm change in the enlargement policy per se.

However, expanding the scope of the EU accession policy – for geopolitical reasons – does not exclusively affect the aforementioned Eastern partners. That fact raised concerns regarding the position and perspectives of the WB candidates within the augmented enlargement agenda. Although the swift “status upgrade” of several Eastern European neighbors does not necessarily need to convert into speedy EU accession (especially for security and territorial integrity reasons, but also due to democratic, economic, and political underperformance), the WB candidates have not received a comparable “upgrade,” which also mirrors their marginal geopolitical importance. Therefore, this text will focus on the altered EU enlargement context, especially from the perspective of the countries which have obtained their accession perspective “once upon a time” during the Thessaloniki European Council Summit twenty years ago.

The author perceives the geopolitical shift as both an opportunity and a threat to the Western Balkans. The previous Eastern enlargement rounds were also fuelled and motivated by geopolitical considerations (Piedrafita & Torreblanca 2005:36; Kovačević 2020:140) and can be analyzed through both optimistic and pessimistic lenses. The optimistic assumption would be that the EU’s increased geostrategic awareness would derive positive changes across the entire accession agenda. That scenario resembles the previous enlargement rounds, when, for instance, Bulgaria and Romania were included in the accession negotiations stage alongside their more advanced CEE neighbors, despite their “laggard” position in the transformative process (Dimitrova 2021:296). On the other hand, a more pessimistic alternative would be a renewed yet selective approach aimed at specific countries or (sub)regions rather than the entire policy. Such potential country-specific or (sub)region-specific solutions should not be hailed as a fundamental policy change because they would not ultimately change the state of play in the broadest sense. In other words: the fast-track inclusion of several Eastern partners in the enlargement domain and their formal recognition as membership candidates, however significant for the post-Soviet European region, does not necessarily signify comparable changes in the case of the WB candidates. Notwithstanding certain positive developments in the WB during 2022 in the European integration context (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, North Macedonia), those modifications can hardly be perceived as revolutionary, considering that the three mentioned countries had applied for EU membership long before the tumultuous 2022 and have formed part of the accession policy for twenty years.

What could be done?

Whereas seemingly, the WB cannot change the perception of the EU’s geopolitical urgency to their favor, several aspects should be considered when advancing their accession bid.

The staged accession model (Emerson, Lazarević, Blockmans & Subotić, 2021) appears to be in line with the revised enlargement methodology approach (on which subject – consult the special issue of “International Problems” journal) and already mainly applicable to the old candidates like Serbia (Petrović, 2022). According to the proposed model, the candidates would be allowed to gradually deepen their integration through distinct stages, ranging from the initial accession (partial funds and observer status in numerous domains) over intermediate accession (greater participation in institutions and increased funding) to new member state (most privileges, without veto power in the Council) to conventional membership – all of this conditional to the progress track record. These proposals align with the revised accession negotiations methodology, integrating its “clusterized” logic of membership talks while considering the need to allow more significant benefits to the candidates before acceding to the EU. In addition, its elements can also be implemented towards the new Eastern candidates (Meister, Nič, Kirova & Blockmans, 2023). The gradual accession method appears to draw some inspiration from the principles and ideas like differentiation and multi-speed concepts. Its flexibility can translate to acknowledging both the “seniority” of WB candidates and the urgency of providing solutions for the new candidates by placing them in respective political and economic integration circles.

In case of pursuing conventional rather than gradual EU membership, the WB candidates should insist on their seniority in the process based on the “Thessaloniki promise,” having in mind several arguments:

• The two decades of Europeanization of the political and economic systems in the WB have yielded significant results and have already enabled one EU accession, that of Croatia, ten years ago);

• The region’s relative stability contrasts with insecurity and other challenges further eastwards. According to Griessler, maintaining peace has re-emerged as a strategic priority, which strengthens the argumentation for the Western Balkan candidates;

• Apart from the small demographic size of the region (the size of Romania - less than one-half of the pre-war population of Ukraine or even a smaller share of another formal candidate, Turkey), one should also take into account the annual migration of thousands of WB citizens into the EU, which has its economic, political and social consequences;

• The geographical argument. The reasoning behind geopolitics is motivated by the strengthening or securing of power; in that regard, geography can be viewed as essential in geopolitics (Lacosta 2012:XIV). Including the Western Balkan enclave into the European Union would not only reduce tensions but also prevent the escalation in the historical “powder keg of Europe,” all of which would reflect positively on EU ambitions in the region (that is, advance its power) at a delicate geostrategic moment;

• Of course, the aspects above do not apply to institutional stagnation and/or democratic backsliding. The WB candidates need to continue building a convincing case by conducting activities toward meeting the accession criteria (the rule of law, corruption, and fundamental freedoms constituting the most pressing priorities). However, the author of this comment finds that the candidates should not be requested to democratically outperform any present member-state in any domain to be allowed to join the EU. Many member-states, including those from East-Central Europe, are experiencing illiberal turns (Vachudova 2020) and no longer meet the accession criteria in various domains. In the context of widespread democratic backsliding across Europe, the context differs from that in the early 2000s and needs to be considered when evaluating the progress of WB candidates.

Whereas many of the mentioned aspects do not depend (entirely) on the WB, there are things the local authorities could do to make the context more favorable for their accession: to speed up and deepen their transformative efforts, to communicate more proactively with the EU and its member-states, and try to present themselves as reliable future member-states, while insisting on their long-recognized perspective of joining the European Union, which has been a strategic goal of their transformative efforts for decades.

Miloš Petrović, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade and a Visiting Lecturer at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade.

Read more about our commentary series on the Balkans and the challenges of democratic transformation HERE.